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Allstate Insurance Co. v. Hague:
An Unprovided-for-Case in the
Supreme Court
Clifford D. A llo*
Professor Ai1o uses a recent Supreme Court decision, Allstate
Insurance Co. v. Hague, as a vehicle to propose improvements in
conflict of laws ana sis. Hague, according to the author, is de-
cided correctly, butfor wrong reasons. With extensive case devel-
opment, Professor 411o advocates strict interest anasis, a
modjfed version of the interest anaysis of Professor Currie and
others, as a superior analytical toolfor reconcilingprecedent and
decidingfuture cases. The Article's thesis is threefold First, state
interests should be construed strictl for choice of law; second,
such strict construction permits the integration of choice of law
with constitutional constraints, merging two issues heretofore
treated separately, and third, state court jurisdiction over defend-
ants having minimal contacts unrelated to the litigation should be
strictly construed to simplify the choice of law problem.
INTRODUCTION
CONFLICT OF LAWS presents four major issues: choice of
law, constitutional constraints on choice of law, jurisdiction,
and recognition of judgments. Although these issues generally are
regarded as separate, they can be related. A judgment, for exam-
ple, is not worthy of recognition unless it was based in sound juris-
diction.' The relationship between choice of law and the
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Detroit School of Law. A.B., Yale
(1967); J.D., University of Michigan (1974). The author wishes to thank Terrance
Sandalow and William W. Bishop, Jr., both of the faculty of the University of Michigan
School of Law, for first provoking and then sustaining his curiosity in the mysteries of
choice of law, and also Robert A. Sedler of the Wayne State School of Law for suggesting
the expansion of a less ambitious effort.
1. See Thompson v. Whitman, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 457 (1873).
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constitutional constraints on choice of law should seem important,
but instead, that relationship often has been regarded as attenu-
ated or peripheral.' This Article urges that these two issues can
and should be integrated. If state interests for the purpose of
choice of law are construed strictly, then this strict interest analy-
sis can provide a more complete explanation of the Supreme
Court's choice of law decisions of the last two generations. More-
over, if state interests are construed strictly, state interests in
choice of law and state interests for the constitutional constraints
on choice of law can be equated, thereby unifying the issues. Ad-
ditionally, if state court jurisdiction also is narrowed, several less
desirable choices of law will be unnecessary. In particular, these
adjustments provide a rational approach to a problem which
largely has fallen through the cracks: the unprovided-for-case 3
There are two types of courts: those that recognize the unpro-
vided-for-case and those that do not.4 The distinction is not triv-
ial. A court which overlooks the utility and importance of
unprovided-for-cases faces several problems. If the court does not
accept the rebuttable presumption that the forum's law applies,
then it must make an affirmative case for the application of either
the law of the forum or a law from outside of the forum.5 Un-
provided-for-cases, however, do not provide affirmative argu-
ments for any law. In seeking affirmative arguments, a court
which does not acknowledge unprovided-for-cases instead must
ponder and even exaggerate the significance of "contacts." 6 Since
2. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 9 (1971).
3. It is assumed that the reader is generally familiar with the well known approaches
to choice of law. In Currie's interest analysis, the unprovided-for-case is the case in which
neither the forum nor any other state has an actual interest in the application of its law. B.
CURRIE, SELECTED ESSAYS ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 152-56 (1963) (a collection of arti-
cles from 1958 to 1963). These concepts are discussed further in infra notes 85-101 and
accompanying text.
4. Compare Erwin v. Thomas, 264 Or. 454, 506 P.2d 494 (1973) (court recognized
existence of unprovided-for-case when Washington resident brought action for loss of con-
sortium in Oregon following injury of husband in Washington by truck operated by Ore-
gon resident and owned by Oregon corporation) with Neumeier v. Kuehner, 31 N.Y.2d
121, 286 N.E.2d 454, 335 N.Y.S.2d 64 (1972) (court did not recognize existence of unpro-
vided-for-case in action against New York resident for wrongful death of Canadian resi-
dent in automobile-train collision in Canada).
5. See, e.g., Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302 (1981); Hurtado v. Superior
Court, I1 Cal. 3d 574, 522 P.2d 666, 114 Cal. Rptr. 106 (1974).
6. The term "policy" will be used to mean the purpose, aim, or social goal of a law.
Policies will be construed narrowly and obvious policies will be preferred over interpreta-
tions of subtle or devious policies. This policy, however, is distinguishable from the "public
policy" discussed in infra note 127. The term "interest" represents the congruence of policy
and the relevant party which makes the law in question relevant for choice of law purposes.
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no state's policies actually will be advanced, or frustrated, by the
application of either of the laws, the contacts in an unprovided-
for-case may be considered out of context, resulting in mistaken
views of precedent.' As courts interpret different sets of facts to
support spurious interests or hold those facts to be sufficiently sig-
nificant, the courts increasingly will establish misleading prece-
dents. Those precedents, on later reflection, will be difficult to
reconcile and, in turn, will suggest spurious true conflicts.
This Article suggests that any analysis based on the contacts in
the Supreme Court's choice of law decisions obscures the true na-
ture of the cases and misconstrues the constitutional constraints on
state choice of law doctrines. Strict interest analysis of the Court's
choice of law decisions yields a more consistent pattern than anal-
yses based on either contacts or even the particular phrasings used
in the Court's opinions. Moreover, this pattern is not inconsistent
with accepted constitutional doctrines. It is not claimed that the
views advanced in this Article can be deduced directly from the
language of court decisions. The views, however, are concise, sim-
ple, and, unlike others, do reflect an ability to rationalize the
decisions.'
I. ALLSTATE INSURANCE Co. V HAGUE
Allstate Insurance Co. v. Hague9 is an example of an unac-
knowledged unprovided-for-case. Justice Stevens, who cast the
deciding vote in that case, indicated that the law of the forum ap-
plies unless displaced. Parts of the Court's opinions and the result
of the decision reflect strict interest analysis, and the Court might
have adopted its phrasings had they been available. Blessed with
With policies construed narrowly, interests also will be construed narrowly. The term
"contacts" refers to each fact in a lawsuit which appears to involve another state without
regard to whether the fact has any legal or choice of law significance.
7. See, ag., Hurtado v. Superior Court, 11 Cal. 3d 574, 522 P.2d 666, 114 Cal. Rptr.
106 (1974) (discussing Ryan v. Clark Equip. Co., 268 Cal. App. 2d 679, 74 Cal. Rptr. 329
(1969).
8. Galileo began science's modem age when he urged that the ultimate test of a
theory is its ability to account for experience. Bronowski quotes Galileo as saying: "I think
that in discussions of physical problems we ought to begin not from the authority of scrip-
tural passages, but from sense-experience and necessary demonstrations .... Nor is God
any less excellently revealed in Nature's actions than in the sacred statements of the Bible."
J. BRONOWSKi, THE ASCENT OF MAN 209 (1973).
The task here is analogous. The meaning of the Constitution is suggested by the
Court's opinions, but an understanding of that meaning is more accurate if it rests instead
on what the Court has done.
9. 449 U.S. 302 (1981).
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sounder instincts than analytical tools, the Supreme Court af-
firmed the use of the Minnesota forum's law in an unprovided-
for-case with opinions which are unlikely to provide comfort to
most commentators.
A. The Facts
Ralph Hague, a passenger on his son's motorcycle, was injured
fatally when the cycle was struck by an automobile. While neither
driver carried insurance, Hague had three policies with Allstate,
each providing $15,000 in uninsured motorist coverage. All three
policies had been delivered in Wisconsin, the state in which
Hague resided and in which the accident occurred.'" Shortly
before bringing suit, Hague's widow moved to Minnesota for rea-
sons unconnected with the litigation. Suit then was filed in a Min-
nesota state court. The key issue was whether the federal
Constitution permitted the Minnesota Court to apply its own law,
which, like a majority of states, "stacked""I the separate uninsured
motorist coverages, or whether the Constitution required the Min-
nesota court to defer to Wisconsin, the state of Hague's residence
and injury, which might not have stacked the separate coverages.
B. Hague in the Minnesota Supreme Court
The Minnesota Supreme Court listed three alternatives:
(1) decline jurisdiction and thus defer to the Wisconsin courts;
(2) grant jurisdiction and apply Wisconsin law; or (3) apply Min-
nesota law.' 2
Having noted that stacking was the only disputed issue, the
Minnesota court first examined Guf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert'3 to de-
cide whether to disturb plaintiffis choice of court by finding Min-
10. Hague's home was in Hager City, Wisconsin, a town of under 2,000 directly across
the Mississippi River from Red Wing, Minnesota, where Hague worked and to which Mrs.
Hague moved after his death. The accident occurred 10 miles north of Hager City. Mrs.
Hague liter remarried and moved to Savage, Minnesota, a town 40 miles northwest of Red
Wing and 10 miles south of the Twin Cities. Hague v. Allstate Ins. Co., 289 N.W.2d 44, 45
(Minn. 1979).
11. When more than one uninsured coverage may be available, insurance contracts
often provide, in effect, that only the largest of the coverages shall be available. These
contractual clauses forbid "stacking" the separate coverages. The majority of states, in-
cluding Minnesota, however, refuse to enforce such clauses and provide that the coverages
must be stacked. Nelson v. Emp. Mut. Cas. Co., 63 Wis. 2d 558, 563, 217 N.W.2d 670, 673
(1974). See infra note 16.
12. 289 N.W.2d at 45.
13. 330 U.S. 501 (1947). "[U]nless the balance is strongly in favor of the defendant,
the plaintiff's choice of forum should rarely be disturbed." Id. at 508.
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nesota to be an inconvenient forum. The court concluded that
"the mere fact that Wisconsin law may be different from Minne-
sota law is not sufficient reason to decline jurisdiction."' 4
The court next focused on choice of law. After determining
both that Minnesota law could be applied15 and that Wisconsin's
law actually differed, 6 the court made the choice of law according
14. 289 N.W.2d at 46.
15. Although no mention was made of any constitutional authority, it will be as-
sumed, in light of the choice of law discussion which follows, that the Minnesota court was
concerned with whether it had the power to apply its own law. The court listed several
contacts between Minnesota and the parties in the facts of the case: Mrs. Hague's new
residence; Allstate's license to do business in Minnesota; Allstate's conduct of business in
Minnesota; Minnesota's role as a 'Justice administering state"; and Hague's history of
commuting within Minnesota. Minnesota also claimed interests "in maximizing the tort
recovery of plaintiffs who are involved in accidents involving uninsured motorists," and in
"the administration of estates." Id. at 47. These contacts, however, are constitutionally in-
sufficient to give Minnesota affirmative legislative power over the Hague litigation. Mrs.
Hague's new residence is insufficient. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Yates, 299 U.S.
178 (1936). Allstate's presence is also insufficient. Home Ins. Co. v. Dick, 281 U.S. 397
(1930). Furthermore, the Court did not develop the relevance of Hague's death occurring
while on a recreational motorcycle to his commuting to work. Minnesota's role as a justice
administering state does not make a constitituional difference, even if other states might
have no interest in administering justice.
Minnesota's other claimed interests are similarly overstated and attenuated. Minne-
sota's interest in maximizing the recovery of plaintiffs injured by an uninsured motorist
cannot include all plaintiffs wherever they reside or are injured. The Minnesota policy
should be limited to plaintiffs residing in Minnesota or who, at the time of the injury, were
otherwise sufficiently affiliated with Minnesota that failure to receive compensation would
burden Minnesota's resources. In addition, Minnesota's claim to an interest in estates also
includes too much, especially when the estate's primary asset in Minnesota is the cause of
action from the accident.
Thus, contact analysis is insufficient to explain the Hague case, but nevertheless, appli-
cation of Minnesota law is appropriate for an unprovided-for-case such as Hague when
viewed under strict interest analysis. See infra notes 262-67 and accompanying text.
16. It generally has been assumed that the Wisconsin law differed from Minnesota's
law. The assumption is probably wrong. Nelson v. Employers Mut. Casualty Co., 63 Wis.
2d 558, 217 N.W.2d 670 (1974) (Wisconsin statute did not require stacking before its 1973
amendment).
One of the arguments in Nelson, however, is of great relevance:
It is argued that the legislature meant that uninsured-motorist coverage if pro-
vided under this section, has to provide absolutely the amount of coverage stated
in the section. Thus the amount of coverage provided by statute was the minimum
for each policy and not the maximum coverage afforded in fact by several poli-
cies. It is contended this view is correct because after our decision in Leatherman,
sec. 204.-30(5)(a), Stats. 1967, was amended by the legislature by ch. 72, Laws of
1973. This section now expressly provides that the uninsured-motorist coverage
shall not be reduced by the terms thereof to provide the insured with less protec-
tion than would be afforded him of [sic] he were injured by a motorist insured
under an automobile policy containing the limits provided in this subsection. We
do not hereby construe this section or intimate any interpretation; we point out
the amendment because of the argument made.
Id. at 568, 217 N.W.2d at 675. The amendment was effective July 22, 1973. Hague was
injured July 1, 1974. It appears, therefore, that there was no actual conflict of laws.
1982]
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to Professor Leflar's criteria 7 discussed in Milkovich v. Saari.i"
Predictability of results slightly favored the application of Wis-
consin law to benefit Allstate, apparently because the policy re-
flected Wisconsin insurance rules. Maintenance of interstate
order favored Minnesota law because of the Minnesota contacts.
The court, however, did not indicate that this factor favored Min-
nesota law. Leflar's third factor, simplification of the judicial task,
was irrelevant because Wisconsin law was accessible. 9 Minnesota
law was more likely to promote advancement of the forum's gov-
ernmental interest than Wisconsin law, but the thin Minnesota
contacts failed to persuade the court to apply forum law. Leflar's
fifth criterion ultimately controlled as Minnesota law was chosen
as the better rule of law.20
2. Rehearing
On rehearing,2' the issues shifted. The majority reaffirmed its
reasoning and after a brief discussion of the automobile as a mov-
able object, concluded that "[a]pplication of Minnesota law in this
case is, therefore, not so arbitrary and unreasonable as to violate
due process. '22 Whether "so" implied an admission that the ap-
plication of Minnesota law is somewhat arbitrary and unreasona-
ble is unclear. To the extent that application of Minnesota law
required justification and that justification was sought in either re-
statement,23 the court may well have been uneasy: the accident
and the contract were both in Wisconsin.
The dissent by Justice Otis advanced three themes. The first
argument attempted to link judicial and legislative jurisdiction via
justified expectations. The dissent cited arguments by Justices
17. Leflar, Choice-Influencing Considerations in Conflicts Law, 41 N.Y.U. L. REV. 267
(1966). These criteria are: (1) predictability of result; (2) maintenance of interstate order,
(3) simplification of the judicial task; (4) advancement of forum's governmental interest;
and (5) better rule of law.
18. 295 Minn. 155, 161, 203 N.W.2d 408, 412 (1973). Simply because Minnesota law
was thought to be better than Ontario law, an Ontario gratuitous guest plaintiff received
the benefits of Minnesota law against his negligent Ontario host-driver, notwithstanding
the Ontario guest act and that no medical expenses were incurred in Minnesota.
19. Even though Wisconsin law was accessible, it was misread. See supra note 16.
20. See infra note 162 for a discussion of the relationship of Leflar's aproach to strict
interest analysis.
21. 289 N.W.2d 50 (Minn. 1979).
22. Id. (emphasis added).
23. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAws (1971); RESTATEMENT OF CON-
FLICr OF LAWS (1934); see infra notes 62-84 and accompanying text.
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Black and Brennan in Hanson v. Denckla24 and Shaffer v. Heit-
ner25 that choice of law should have greater influence on jurisdic-
tion.26 Justice Otis, however, seems to have twisted the argument
to suggest that because Allstate had not pufposely availed itself of
the benefits and protections of Minnesota law in doing business
with Hague, Minnesota law should not have been applied.
2 7
The second argument was clearer and stronger. Justice Otis
relied on the contacts mentioned in two prior cases, Milkovich v.
Saari28 and Bolgrean v. Stich,29 to argue that the contacts in
Hague favored Wisconsin law. An important assertion in this ar-
gument was that "the only question in Bolgrean and Milkovich
was whether Minnesota had sufficient interest in the litigation to
apply this state's better rule of law."30 Thus, under Justice Otis'
view, the forum must have an interest as a condition precedent to
application of forum law. It is evident, therefore, that Justice Otis'
view allows for application of forum law to a true conflict or a
false conflict in which the forum has the interest, but never to an
unprovided-for-case in which neither state has an interest. Since
Justice Otis failed to recognize the unprovided-for-case, he was
24. 357 U.S. 235 (1958).
25. 433 U.S. 186 (1977).
26. True, the question of whether the law of a state can be applied to a transac-
tion is different from the question of whether the courts of that state have jurisdic-
tion to enter a judgment, but the two are often closely related and to a substantial
degree depend upon similar considerations. Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. at 258
(Black, J., dissenting) (distinction between legislative jurisdiction and judicial
jurisdiction).
I recognize that the jurisdictional and choice-of-law inquiries are not identi-
cal... .In either case an important linchpin is the extent of contact between the
controversy, the parties, and the forum state. While constitutional limitations on
the choice of law are by no means settled. .. important considerations certainly
include the expectancies of the parties and the fairness of governing the defend-
ants' acts and behavior by rules of conduct created by a given jurisdiction.
Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. at 224 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
27. Justice Otis' reasoning was not altogether clear. His syllogism appears to have
been:
(a) The second Restatement protects justifiable expectations;
(b) Legislative jurisdiction should depend upon judicial jurisdiction;
(c) Hanson conditions judicial jurisdiction on purposeful availment of the benefits and
protections of forum law,
(d) Allstate did not purposely avail itself of Minnesota's law in writing Hague's
insurance;
(e) Therefore, Allstate had a reasonable expectation that Minnesota law would not ap-
ply to Hague's policies;
(f) Therefore, Minnesota law should not apply.
28. 295 Minn. 155, 203 N.W.2d 408 (1973).
29. 293 Minn. 8, 196 N.W.2d 442 (1972).
30. 289 N.W.2d at 52.
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foreclosed from applying Minnesota law to Hague, in which he
correctly found no Minnesota interest. Thus, Justice Otis' analysis
forced him to accept Wisconsin's contacts without examination.
The dissent's third argument rested not only on Home Insur-
ance Co. v. Dick, 31 but also on Hartford Accident and Indemnity
Co. v. Delta Pine Land Co. 32 Justice Otis proved that Texas had
no interest in Home33 and Minnesota had no interest in Hague,
but he overlooked the crucial distinction between Mexico's inter-
est in Home and Wisconsin's lack of interest in Hague .34 For Jus-
tice Otis, apparently, the law of the place of the contract was the
"Milhollinian" residual law to be applied when the risk of non-
persuasion as to choice of law was not overcome .3  On correctly
finding no affirmative basis for Minnesota's law, Justice Otis ap-
plied Wisconsin law without further inquiry. The difficulty, there-
fore, lies not in Justice Otis' discernment, but in his analytic
scheme. The next section of the Article describes the Hague opin-
ions in the Supreme Court, setting the stage for the critical analy-
sis to follow.36
C. Hague in the Supreme Court
The Supreme Court affirmed the lower court opinion in
Hague.37 Justice Brennan wrote for himself and Justices White,
Marshall, and Blackmun. Justice Stevens concurred in a separate
opinion. Justice Powell dissented for himself, Chief Justice Bur-
ger, and Justice Rehnquist. No opinion commanded a majority of
the Court.
31. 281 U.S. 397 (1930).
32. 292 U.S. 143 (1934). Delta & Pine lacks precedential value because of its heavy
reliance on the first Restatement. See Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 308 n. 11,
330 n.22 (Stevens, J., concurring) (1981); B. CURRIE, supra note 3, at 271.
33. For a discussion of Home, see infra text accompanying notes 118-30.
34. See infra notes 262-67 and accompanying text.
35. There are three different views as to which law controls when the party with the
risk of nonpersuasion on the issue of choice of law fails to meet the burden. Currie would
apply the forum law; hence, there is a rebuttable presumption in its favor. Judges Fuld and
Otis would follow the choice of law dictates of the first Restatement. See, e.g., Neumeier v.
Kuehner, 31 N.Y.2d 121, 286 N.E.2d 454, 335 N.Y.S.2d 64 (1972). Hence, there would be a
rebuttable presumption in favor of territorialism. See infra note 507. It appears that Jus-
tice Traynor would apply the nonforum law. See infra note 108. Professor Milhollin has
discussed this relation in terms of which law is the "residual law," that is, the law to be
applied by default. Milhollin, The Forum Preference in Choice of Laws: Some Notes on
Hurtado v. Superior Court, 10 U.S.F.L. Rav. 625, 626-38 (1976). This concept deserves
greater recognition.
36. See infra notes 354-433 and accompanying text.
37. 449 U.S. 302 (1981).
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1. The Plurality
The plurality opinion has three parts. Part I presents the facts
and the holding below. In part II, after reviewing precedent, Jus-
tice Brennan selected contact analysis as the standard for decision,
thereby eschewing interest analysis. In part III, Justice Brennan
was forced to exaggerate the importance of Minnesota's contacts
to show compliance with the standard derived in part II. Wiscon-
sin's interest was given no direct consideration.
Justice Brennan decided that neither the due process clause of
the fourteenth amendment nor the full faith and credit clause of
article IV, section 1 of the Constitution barred the Minnesota
Supreme Court's choice of substantive Minnesota law.38
The plurality limited the Court's role in choice of law to set-
ting the outer boundaries of decisionmaking for the states. While
Justice Brennan acknowledged that cases or issues may support
the application of the law of more than one state without being
inconsistent with the Constitution, he nonetheless required an af-
firmative demonstration of contacts to sustain a choice of law:
In order to ensure that the choice of law is neither arbitrary nor
fundamentally unfair... the Court has invalidated the choice
of law of a State which has had no significant contact or signifi-
cant aggregation of contacts, creating state interests, with the
parties and the occurrence or transaction.39
The minimum contacts standard was derived from a compari-
son of Home Insurance Company v. Dick' and John Hancock Mu-
tual Lfe Insurance Co. v. Yates,"1 which reversed forum attempts
to apply the local law, with Alaska Packers Association v. Indus-
trialAccident Commission,42 Cardillo v. Liberty Mutual Insurance
Co.,4' and Clay v. Sun Life Insurance Office, Ltd,' which af-
firmed applications of forum law. As cases rejecting application
of forum law, Home and Yates presented only the "nonsignificant
forum contact ' 45 of what might be called "tainted residency." In
Home, Dick was a "a nominal, permanent resident of Texas"
46
"who was domiciled in Mexico and 'physically present and acting
38. Id. at 304.
39. Id. at 308.
40. 281 U.S. 397 (1930).
41. 299 U.S. 178 (1936).
42. 294 U.S. 532 (1935).
43. 330 U.S. 469 (1947).
44. 377 U.S. 179 (1964).
45. Hague, 449 U.S. at 309.
46. Id.
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in Mexico.' " In Yates, the plaintiff-widow presented only the
nonsignificant forum contact of having moved to Georgia to seek
its more favorable law after both the purchase in New York of life
insurance on her late husband and his death in that state.
In the set of cases affirming application of forum law, Justice
Brennan found more significant contacts. In Alaska Packers, the
worker was hired in California; in Cardillo, the worker was hired
in, commuted from, and resided in the District of Columbia; and
in Clay II, the insured resided in and suffered his loss in Florida.
According to Justice Brennan, the lesson of these two sets of
cases is that the law of a particular state may be applied only if
that state has a significant contact or aggregation of contacts
which creates a state interest. If either of those prerequisites is
met, the choice of that state's law is neither arbitrary nor funda-
mentally unfair.48
In Part III of the plurality opinion, Justice Brennan found a
significant aggregation of contacts which permitted the Minnesota
court's application of Minnesota law in favor of stacking. This
aggregation comprised three contacts. First, Mr. Hague was both
a Minnesota employee and a Minnesota commuter. Second, "All-
state was at all times present and doing business in Minnesota."49
Finally, without any "suggestion that Mrs. Hague moved to Min-
nesota in anticipation of this litigation or for the purpose of find-
ing a legal climate especially hospitable to her claim," 0 she
"became a Minnesota resident prior to the institution of this
litigation."'
2. The Dissent
Justice Powell's dissent, joined by the Chief Justice and Justice
Rehnquist, accepted the plurality's contacts standard of decision.
This dissent, however; rejected the plurality's result.
According to the dissent, the "modest" 2 check on choice of
law provided by due process and full faith and credit comprises
two requirements. First, like the plurality, the dissent articulated a
contacts requirement that "there must be some connection be-
tween the facts giving rise to the litigation and the scope of the
47. Id. (quoting from Home, 281 U.S. at 408).
48. Id. at 312-13.
49. Id. at 317.
50. Id. at 319.
51. Id. at 318.
52. Id. at 332 (Powell, J., dissenting).
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State's lawmaking jurisdiction ... [in order that] the States do
not 'reach out beyond the limits imposed on them by their status
as coequal sovereigns in a federal system.' , Second, to prevent
fundamental unfairness, the application of the state's law must not
be beyond a party's reasonable expectations.
Although "no reasonable expectations of the parties were frus-
trated," Minnesota lacked "sufficient contacts with the 'persons
and events' in [Hague] to apply its rule permitting stacking." 54
Post-accident changes in residence could not be permissible con-
tacts. Furthermore, without a relationship to the facts of the dis-
pute, presence of the defendant in a state is relevant only to the
question of personal jurisdiction. Hague's employment status in
Minnesota would have been relevant to an employment-based is-
sue like workers' compensation, but had no relevance to the issue
in this case. Since no contact was relevant to any Minnesota poli-
cies, aggregation of the contacts likewise failed to make the neces-
sary affirmative case for application of Minnesota law.
3. Justice Stevens' Concurrence
Whereas the plurality and the dissent agreed on the rule, but
divided over its application to the facts, Justice Stevens' concur-
rence in the judgment manifested a sophisticated appreciation of
the constitutional constraints on choice of law, a clear affirmation
of the presumption in favor of forum law, but a preference, none-
theless, for traditional Bealean choice of law doctrines.
Justice Stevens separated full faith and credit from due
process:
As I view this unusual case-in which neither precedent nor
constitutional language provides sure guidance-two separate
questions must be answered. First, does the Full Faith and
Credit Clause require Minnesota, the forum State, to apply
Wisconsin law? Second, does the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment prevent Minnesota from applying its
own law? The first inquiry implicates the federal interest in
ensuring that Minnesota respect the sovereignty of the State of
Wisconsin; the second implicates the litigants' interests in a fair
adjudication of their rights.55
According to Justice Stevens, the function of the full faith and
credit clause is to forbid encroachments by one state on another
53. Id. at 334 (quoting from World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S.
286, 292 (1980)).
54. Id. at 336.
55. Id. at 320 (Stevens, J., concurring) (emphasis supplied).
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state's sovereignty by requiring deference from a state lacking an
interest to any state possessing an interest. Deference would not
be required, however, if either the forum state possessed an inter-
est or if, as in Hague, no other state possessed an interest. Justice
Stevens wrote that whether Minnesota had followed "normal con-
fficts law,"56 the absence of a Wisconsin interest supported the
Minnesota court's use of Minnesota law:
Petitioner has failed to establish that Minnesota's refusal to ap-
ply Wisconsin law poses any direct or indirect threat to Wis-
consin's sovereignty. In the absence of any such threat, I find it
unnecessary to evaluate the forum State's interest in the litiga-
tion in order to reach the conclusion that the Full Faith and
Credit Clause does not require the Minnesota courts to apply
Wisconsin law to the question of contract interpretation
presented in this case.57
Thus, the full faith and credit clause did not bar Minnesota's
courts from applying Minnesota law because Wisconsin's sover-
eignty suffered no encroachment.
Due process would be denied, according to Justice Stevens,
only if a state's choice of law was either totally arbitrary or funda-
mentally unfair to a litigant. By suggesting that application of fo-
rum law by a forum judge could not be arbitrary, Justice Stevens
seems to have implied the existence of a rebuttable presumption in
favor of forum law. This presumption would be rebutted if "the
application of a rule of law [would be] fundamentally unfair to
one of the litigants."58 Fundamental unfairness would be found if
the forum's law discriminated against nonresidents, "if it repre-
sented a dramatic departure from the rule that obtains in most
American jurisdictions, or if the rule itself was unfair on its face or
as applied."59 Unfair surprise, for example, would make an other-
wise permissible law unfair as applied. 0
The decision of the Minnesota court to apply Minnesota law
presented no fundamental unfairness. Not only was stacking not a
"dramatic departure," it was also the majority rule. Furthermore,
a rule could not be fundamentally unfair on its face merely for
requiring the insurance company to provide that for which it had
been paid. Finally, Allstate would not be unfairly surprised by
the stacking rule because the company did business in Minnesota
56. Id. at 324.
57. Id. at 325-26.
58. Id. at 326.
59. Id. at 326-27.
60. Id. at 327.
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and had neglected to forbid stacking in the policy it had drafted.
Consequently, Justice Stevens concluded: "The choice-of-law de-
cision of the Minnesota courts is consistent with due process be-
cause it does not result in unfairness to either litigant, not because
Minnesota now has an interest in the plaintiff as resident or for-
merly had an interest in the decedent as employee." 61
Since the full faith and credit clause did not require applica-
tion of Wisconsin's law and due process of law was not denied by
application of Minnesota law, the presumption in favor of forum
law was not rebutted. Thus, Justice Stevens voted to affirm the
Minnesota court's application of Minnesota law.
D. Hague and the Restatements
Justice Stevens seemed to view Hague as opening new ground
because Minnesota's use of Minnesota law was "plainly unsound
as a matter of normal conflicts law."'62 Although Justice Stevens
did not define normal conflicts law, two obvious possibilities are
the first and second Restatements of Conflict of Laws. If either of
the two Restatements is deemed to be normal conflicts law, then
Justice Stevens' observation is accurate because neither Restate-
ment can support the result in Hague. This Article will examine
next the deficiencies of the Restatements and then will introduce
more satisfactory analyses.
1. The First Restatement
The first Restatement of Conflict of Laws reflects the territori-
alist view of its reporter, Joseph H. Beale,63 that only one law gov-
61. Id. at 331.
62. Id. at 324.
63. After graduating from Harvard College in 1882, and its law school in 1887, Beale
spent all but four of the next 56 years on the Harvard Law School faculty. Three years
were spent in private practice and one year as the organizer and first Dean of the Univer-
sity of Chicago School of Law. In all, Beale compiled casebooks in nine different subjects.
SELECTED READINGS ON CONFLICT OF LAWS 629 (M. Culp ed. 1956) [hereinafter cited as
SELECTED READINGS].
A measure of one's work, however, is the effort required to refute it. W. COOK, THE
LOGICAL AND LEGAL BASES OF THE CONFLICT OF LAWS (1942) and Cavers, 4 Critique of
the Choice ofLaw Problem, 47 HARv. L. REv. 173 (1933) are early and devastating criti-
ques of Beale's ideas. B. CuRRIE, supra note 3; A. EHRENZWEIG, TREATISE ON THE CON-
FiCT OF LAWS (1962); R. LEFLAR, AMERICAN CONFLICTS LAW (3d ed. 1977); A. VON
MEHREN & D. TRAUTMAN, THE LAW OF MULTISTATE PROBLEMS (1965); and L WEIN-
TRAUB, COMMENTARY ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS (2d ed. 1981) are recent and thorough
works which are completely at odds with Beale. Despite the weight and vigor of scholarly
criticism, some courts continue to apply his choice of law ideas. See, e.g., Gibson v. Fullin,
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erns the consequences of any event or transaction.' 4 If, for
example, a motorist and his guest, both from New York, drive
from Buffalo to Toronto and are injured in Ontario because of the
driver's negligence, Professor Beale believed that the law of Onta-
rio should be applied to decide whether the injured guest could
recover from the negligent host. Beale's belief was premised on
Ontario being the territory of the last event of the tort. Thus, both
New York's and Ontario's courts would be compelled to apply
Ontario law.65 The place of the tort invariably would be the place
of the last event-the harm.66 Under Beale's territorialist system,
every choice of law is made without consideration of the content
of the various states' laws.
Beale's system promised simplicity, certainty, and uniformity.
Simplicity would promote ease of administration and enhance
certainty. Certainty would assist the bar in planning both before
transactions and during litigation. Uniformity would promote
fairness of treatment and minimize forum shopping.
Beale's system could achieve these three goals with reasonable
consistency only if factual patterns could be allocated to but one
of Beale's many rules. Before the appropriate rule could be se-
lected, however, the case would have to be characterized, for ex-
ample, as contract, property, or tort. While in many instances the
classification would not be difficult, some factual patterns would
be hard to characterize. If workers' compensation cases were
172 Conn. 407, 374 A.2d 1061 (1977); McMillan v. McMillan, 219 Va. 1127, 253 S.E.2d
662 (1979).
64. [T~he applicability of law to the juridical facts must be determined as of the
time of their occurrence. Some proper law must have governed the juridical situ-
ation at the moment of its occurrence; the effort of the court is to determine what
the law was; and that involves a question of the power of some particular law to
extend to and rule the juridical situation.
I J. BEALE, TREATISE ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS § 1.1 (1935).
65. "The existence and nature of a cause of action for a tort is governed by the law of
the place where the plaintiffs alleged right to be free from the act or event complained of is
alleged to have been violated by a wrongful act or omission." 2 Id. § 378.2.
66. It is impossible for a plaintiff to recover in tort unless he has been given by
some law a cause of action in tort; and this cause of action can be given only by
the law of the place where the tort was committed. That is the place where the
injurious event occurs, and its law is the law therefore which applies to it.
Id. § 378.1.
Beale advanced a similar rule for contracts. He deemed the "place of contracting" to
be the place in which the final act was done which made the promise or promises binding.
Id. § 311. 1. Notwithstanding his belief that the forum would be able to determine the place
of contracting, Professor Beale provided explicit rules for 23 different contractual situa-
tions. See id. §§ 312.1-331.1.
Property questions were to be determined by the situs of the property. Id. § 208.1.
[Vol 32:1
ALLSTATE INSURANCE CO. v. HAGUE
deemed to arise from the employment relation, then they could be
characterized as contract cases and governed by the law of the
place of contract--the place of hiring.67 If compensation cases,
however, were deemed to arise from the injury, as Beale be-
lieved,68 then they could be characterized as tort cases and gov-
erned by the place of the tort-the place of the injury. If,
therefore, as in Bradford Electric Light Co. v. Clapper,6 9 a Ver-
mont employee generally em'ployed in Vermont by a Vermont
employer were injured in New Hampshire in an accident arising
from and in the course of his employment, Professor Beale be-
lieved that the law of New Hampshire should govern.70
Even when characterization was not a problem,7 the territori-
alist view of the first Restatement presented a basic dilemma. The
fundamental premise of the Restatement that only one law gov-
erns each case necessarily implied that the principles of the Re-
statement apportion legislative jurisdiction among the states.72 If
New Hampshire had the power to provide the rule for Clapper,
then Vermont could not have the same power. To apportion such
legislative powers among the states, the apportioning power must
be superior to the states or be "super law."' 73 In the United States,
however, the only conceivable such power would be in the Consti-
67. For cases subscribing to the contracts view, see authorities collected in Bradford
Elec. Light Co. v. Clapper, 51 F.2d 992, 996 (1st Cir. 1931).
68. 2 . BEALE, supra note 64, § 401.2.
69. 286 U.S. 145 (1932).
70. "It follows generally that no statute has force to affect any person, thing, or act
... outside the territory of the state that passed it.... Neglect of these principles seems
to have led to an untenable decision in ...Clapper." 1 . BA.LE, supra note 64,
§§ 61.1-.2.
71. Even if labelling did not tempt the court, there were other escape devices available
such as renvoi, the substance-procedure dichotomy, and public policy. See generaly R.
CRAMToN, D. Cmuziu & H. KAY, CONFLICT OF LAWS 63-145 (3d ed. 1981) [hereinafter
cited as CRAMTON & CURRIE].
72. This view is reflected in the Beale quotation at supra note 64.
73. "Super law" is a general term usually used to disparage the idea that there is an
overlying law or compulsion which controls choice of law. The first Restatement at-
tempted to be a super law in apportioning legislative jurisdiciton. Beale's analysis implic-
itly required a super law to determine which secondary rights had vested. Many critics
have debunked the myth of super law. See, e.g., W. CooK, supra note 63, at 94; Traynor,
War and Peace in the Conflict of Laws, 25 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 121, 122 (1976). Nonethe-
less, super law remains an insidious influence. Ehrenzweig, for example, saw both the
second Restatement's attempt to measure the significance of relationships with states and
Currie's interest analysis as requiring a nonexistent super law. R. CRAMTON, D. CURRiE &
H. KAY, CONFLICT OF LAWS 305 (2d ed. 1975). Ehrenzweig's advocacy, however, of "true
rules," see generally Ehrenzweig, A Proper Law in a Proper Fo=rn A 'Restatement" ofthe
'Lex ForiApproach," 18 OKLA. L. RaV. 340 (1965), is even more clearly the advocacy of
another species of the genus super law.
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tution which, whatever its ultimate impact on choice of law, has
not been interpreted to provide the kind of exclusive grants of au-
thority suggested by Beale and the first Restatement. Thus, the
first Restatement's implicit claim to be a super law conflicts with
current constitutional law, and thus, fails to restate fundamental
law accurately. In fact, by affirming application of Minnesota
law, Hague thwarted the first Restatement's attempt to allocate
legislative jurisdiction. If the first Restatement were Justice Ste-
vens' normal conflicts law, the question arises as to how much
longer it could remain the norm after having its core repudiated.74
2. The Second Restatement
Alternatively, the second Restatement of Conflict of Laws75
74. Recall Justice Stevens' willingness to let either law control in Hague. See supra
notes 55-61 and accompanying text.
75. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS (1971). The second Restatement
was to have been a more detailed, precisely focused, and less ambitious reworking of Pro-
fessor Beale's first Restatement. Professor Reese, the Reporter for the Restatement, stated:
"[C]onflict of laws was not ripe for restatement in the 1920's and 1930's, [for] [tihe subject
was then largely unexplored.. . . It soon became apparent that many of the rules stated
in [the first] Restatement [were] wrong or at least so oversimplified as to be misleading."
Reese, Conflict of Laws andthe Restatement Second, 28 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBs. 679, 680
(1963). Hence, Professor Reese advocated replacing the first Restatement's few, simple
rules of general application with a "large number of relatively narrow rules that [would] be
applicable only in precisely defined situations." Id. at 681. Recognizing that many situa-
tions had not yet been litigated often enough to create a weight of authority, Reese was
prepared either to understate the law or, in the alternative, to offer "a rule that may be too
fluid and uncertain in application [rather] than take one's chances with a precise and hard-
and-fast rule that may be proved wrong in the future." Id.
The second Restatement, however, was deflected from its three goals by court decisions
employing "center of gravity" or "state of the most significant relationship" analyses. Not
long after work was begun on the second Restatement, the New York Court of Appeals
broke with both territorial practice and theory by seeking to determine the "center of grav-
ity" and "place which ha[d] the most significant contacts with a dispute." Auten v. Auten,
308 N.Y. 155, 124 N.E.2d 99 (1954). To break with territorialist practice was not novel, for
courts repeatedly had used escape devices. See Levy v. Daniels' U-Drive Auto Renting
Co., 108 Conn. 333, 143 A. 163 (1928) (characterization); University of Chicago v. Dater,
277 Mich. 658, 270 N.W. 175 (1936) (renvoi alternative holding); Mertz v. Mertz, 271 N.Y.
466, 3 N.E.2d 597 (1936) (public policy). In earlier cases, however, the courts usually had
stoutly proclaimed allegiance to that which they were evading. The New York Court of
Appeals, in contrast, simply announced its new approach with minimal apology and per-
haps even less authority. The immediate results were incorporation of the new view into
the evolving drafts of the new Restatement, commendation by some, see, e.g., Fabricus v.
Horgen, 257 Iowa 268, 132 N.W.2d 410 (1965), and condemnation by others. See, eg.,
Ehrenzweig, The "Most Significant Relationshp" in the Conflicts Law Of Torts, 28 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBs. 700 (1963). The effort which began with an attempt to find or create
better rules had evolved to include a general criterion which required an external standard.
Thus, the same super law problem which fatally flawed the first Restatement was raised
again.
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might have been Justice Stevens' normal conflict of laws, but it is
no more able to account for the result in Hague than was the first
Restatement. A comparison of the two Restatements and further
analysis can explain the deficiencies of the second Restatement.
Like the first Restatement, Hague presents the potential for a
characterization problem.76 The second Restatement not only
permits alternative characterizations of cases or issues, but also
presents the option of applying either specific, presumptive rules
or the generalized policy principles of section 6 of that Restate-
ment.77 Yet none of the specific, presumptive rules can explain
To determine which state has the most significant relationship with an issue requires a
universal yardstick with which to measure significance. It is not clear, however, what au-
thority could provide such a yardstick. Since that yardstick would allocate legislative juris-
diction among the sovereign states, it would be a super law. Although the full faith and
credit clause would authorize such a scheme by Congress within the federal union, Con-
gress has not so acted. Although the first Restatement's territorialist principles, in toto, did
amount to an attempted super law, only the drafts of the second Restatement made explicit
the super law implicit in any set of a priori jurisdiction selecting rules as a specific standard.
The second Restatement ultimately broke apart on the wave of interest analyses, judi-
cial and academic. Currie had published his landmark series of articles. B., CURRIE, supra
note 3. Important courts concurred. See, e.g., Reich v. Purcell, 67 Cal. 2d 551, 432 P.2d
727, 63 Cal. Rptr. 31 (1967); Tooker v. Lopez, 24 N.Y.2d 569, 249 N.E.2d 394, 301
N.Y.S.2d 519 (1969). Scholarly commentary also made an impact. See, e.g., A. VON MEH-
REN & D. TRAUTMAN, supra note 63; R. WEINTRAUB, supra note 63 (collection of his es-
says over the decade 1959-68). To ignore the policy analyses was impossible; to adopt any
of them instead of "relatively narrow rules. . . applicable only in precisely defined situa-
tions," Reese, supra, at 681, would repudiate the original goals; and to reconcile the two
would have seemed implausible. Nonetheless, the second Restatement, as published in
1971, contained hundreds of rules, repeated searches for the state having the more signifi-
cant relationship to a particular issue, see, e.g. §§ 145, 188, 222, 270, 283, 291-294, 302-306,
and a ukase to consider a list of factors which included, but was not limited to, "relevant
policies." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 6 (1971). See also infra note
77.
76. Characterization could be done at the level of the case as a whole, the technical
legal issue, or the actual practical problem. CRAMTON & CURRIE, supra note 71, at 100. In
Haumschild v. Continental Casualty Co., 7 Wis. 2d 130, 95 N.W.2d 814 (1959), for exam-
ple, a former wife sued her ex-husband for injuries allegedly inflicted negligently on her
while they were in California. The whole case could be characterized as tort. The legal
issue of immunity could be characterized as procedural or the actual problem as domestic
relations. The court chose the domestic relations characterization in a thoughtful opinion.
77. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 6 (1971), under the heading of
Choice of Law Principles, provides:
(1) A court, subject to constitutional restrictions, will follow a statutory direc-
tive of its own state on choice of law.
(2) When there is no such directive, the factors relevant to the choice of the
applicable rule of law include
(a) the needs of the interstate and international systems,
(b) the relevant policies of the forum,
(c) the relevant policies of other interested states and the relative interests of
those states in the determination of the particular issue,
(d) the protection of justified expectations,
1982]
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Hague because they all require that Wisconsin, not Minnesota,
law be applied. Viewing the case as one in tort,7 8 Wisconsin was
the place of injury, the place of the conduct causing the injury, the
domicile of Hague and a place of business of Allstate, and finally,
the place where Allstate and Hague had formed their relationship.
Viewing the case instead as one in contract,7 9 Wisconsin was still
the place of contract, the place where the contract was negotiated,
the place where Hague had performed by paying his three sepa-
rate premiums and the place where Hague might have expected
Allstate to perform by paying his claim, the location of the cars,
and again, Hague's residence and a place of business for Allstate.
Even the very specific rule of section 193 of the second Restate-
ment8° called for application of Wisconsin law.
(e) the basic policies underlying the field of law,
(f) certainty, predictability and uniformity of result, and
(g) ease in the determination and application of the law to be applied.
78. The second Restatement, under the heading of "The General Principle," provides:
(1) The rights and liabilities of the parties with respect to an issue in tort are
determined by the local law of the state which, with respect to that issue, has the
most significant relationship to the occurrence and the parties under the principles
stated in § 6.
(2) Contacts to be taken into account in applying the principles of§ 6 to deter-
mine the law applicable to an issue include:
(a) the place where the injury occurred,
(b) the place where the conduct causing the injury occurred,
(c) the domicil, residence, nationality, place of incorporation and place of
business of the parties, and
(d) the place where the relationship, if any, between the parties is centered.
These contacts are to be evaluated according to their relative importance with
respect to the particular issue.
Id. § 145.
79. Id. § 188 under the heading, "Law Governing in Absence of Effective Choice by
the Parties," provides:
(1) The rights and duties of the parties with respect to an issue in contract are
determined by the local law of the state which, as to that issue, has the most
significant relationship to the transaction and the parties under the principles
stated in § 6.
(2) In the absence of an effective choice of law by the parties (see § 187), the
contacts to be taken into account in applying the principles of§ 6 to determine the
law applicable to an issue include:
(a) the place of contracting,
(b) the place of negotiation of the contract,
(c) the place of performance,
(d) the location of the subject matter of the contract, and
(e) the domicil, residence, nationality, place of incorporation and place of
business of the parties.
These contacts are to be evaluated according to their relative importance with
respect to the particular issue.
(3) If the place of negotiating the contract and the place of performance are in
the same state, the local law of this state will usually be applied, except as other-
wise provided in §§ 189-199 and 203.
80. Id. § 193, pertaining to "Contracts of Fire, Surety or Casualty Insurance,"
provides:
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Under the generalized policy principles of section 6, the an-
swer appears no different, even if less certain. As Justice Stevens
viewed the case, at least the application of either law would meet
the needs of the interstate system since neither state possessed an
interest.81 Consequently, since Minnesota had no interest in the
outcome, it is not clear that any Minnesota policy is relevant.8 2
Similarly, Wisconsin's policies lack relevance. 3 Once again, how-
ever, a comparison of the relative interests of the various states
raises the problem of implied super law.
Furthermore, under section 6's broad principles, protecting
justified expectations is complicated. First, the expectations must
be identified. The choice then must be made as to whether the
expectations to be protected are expectations of outcomes or of
choices of law.
Analysis of Hague's expectations when he mounted his son's
motorcycle raises several questions. Presumably, at a minimum,
Hague expected to return home safely. If Hague contemplated
being injured, the question is whether he then relied on an expec-
tation of being compensated or faced the danger without regard to
financial peril. If Hague expected compensation, the question is
whether he contemplated compensation from his or another's re-
sources. If Hague expected compensation from his insurance,
then the issue is whether he expected compensation simply be-
cause insurance had been purchased or because he believed that
Wisconsin law required compensation. Furthermore, inquiry
must be made into whether Hague knew anything about Wiscon-
sin law or any details of his insurance policy.
Even if Hague did expect the outcome, without regard to the
details of the law to be applied, the question of the standard by
which an expectation becomes justifed must be addressed. An ex-
pectation may be justified, for example, because it appears fair a
priori or because it is confirmed by experience. If the latter, no
expectation can influence choice of law because the justification
yel non depends completely on the outcome of the choice of law
The validity of a contract of fire, surety or casualty insurance and the rights
created thereby are determined by the local law of the state which the parties
understood was to be the principle location of the insured risk during the term of
the policy, unless with respect to the particular issue, some other state has a more
significant relationship under the principles stated in § 6 to the transaction and
the parties, in which event the local law of the other state will be applied.
81. 449 U.S. at 325-26 (Stevens, J., concurring).
82. See infra notes 263 & 337-40 and accompanying text.
83. See infra notes 264-67 & 341-47 and accompanying text.
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decision. If fairness is the test, a subjective dimension is added,
even though, in Hague, fairness would require Allstate to deliver
that for which it had been paid. Certainty, predictability, and uni-
formity of result are similarly circular. There appeared to be no
difficulty in applying either law, but there was doubt about the
actual content of Wisconsin's law.84
Thus, it would appear that there is no clear thrust under sec-
tion 6 towards shifting the presumptive answers provided by the
more specific sections. The second Restatement, like the first, re-
quires the application of Wisconsin law. Notwithstanding re-
peated references in the opinions to significant contacts and
normal conflicts law, the Supreme Court nevertheless differed and
affirmed the use of the Minnesota forum's law. Neither Restate-
ment can support such a result which suggests a departure from
the traditional conflict of laws rules as enshrined in the two
Restatements.
E. Interest Analysis
With both Restatements requiring the application of Wiscon-
sin law in Hague, neither Restatement explains the actions of the
Supreme Court. Interest analysis as developed by Currie,8" Tray-
n1or, 86 Sedler8 7 and other writers provides a better explanation of
Hague than does traditional conflicts law.
Currie defined an interest as the "product of (a) a governmen-
tal policy and (b) the concurrent existence of an appropriate rela-
tionship between the state having the policy and the transaction,
the parties, or the litigation."88 If only one state possessed an in-
terest, the case would be a false conflict, and the law of the inter-
ested jurisdiction would apply. If both states possessed interests,
the case would present a true conflict, and forum law would pre-
vail. Finally, if neither state possessed an interest, then forum law
again would be applied to the unprovided-for-case.89
Many courts and commentators have subscribed to the appli-
cation of the law of the interested state in false conflicts.90 The
84. See supra note 16.
85. B. CURRa, supra note 3.
86. See Traynor, supra note 73.
87. See, e.g., Sedler, The Governmental Interest Approach to Choice of Law:An Analy-
sis and a Reformulation, 25 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 181 (1977).
88. B. CuRPmE, supra note 3, at 621.
89. Id. at 189.
90. See, e.g., McSwain v. MeSwain, 420 Pa. 86, 215 A.2d 677 (1966). See authorities
collected in CRAMTON & CUR.E, supra note 71, at 240-51.
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ranks begin to thin as to true conflicts, however, because some
courts and commentators prefer making attempts to solve true
conflicts rather than embracing Currie's insistence on applying fo-
rum law.9' Similarly, the consensus in favor of applying forum
law in unprovided-for-cases is less than universal.92 Since any dis-
pute in which the laws actually differ in outcome must fall into
one of these three categories, 93 these disputes over true conflicts
and unprovided-for-cases are affected greatly by the court's or
commentator's propensity to find state interests. If the deci-
sionmaker readily discerns interests,94 then few unprovided-for-
cases, but many true conficts, will be identified. 95 Alternatively, if
91. See, ag., Offshore Rental Co., Inc. v. Continental Oil Co., 22 Cal. 3d 157, 583 P.2d
721, 148 Cal. Rptr. 867 (1978); Traynor, Conflict of Laws.: Professor Currie's Restrained and
Enlightened Forum, 49 CALiF. L. REv. 845 (1961). See generally CRAMTON & CURRIE,
supra note 71, at 260-65.
92. See, ag., Neumeler v. Kuehner:-A Conflicts Conflict, 1 HOFSTRA L. REV. 93 (1973).
93. If the laws do not actually differ in outcome, even though different in form, there
is no need to choose between the laws, and any explanation for a purported choice is only
dictum. A case in which the outcomes under the allegedly varying laws do not differ
should be called an "apparent conflict."
94. The idea of an analyst's propensity to find interests only reflects the observation
that some will interpret policies more broadly than others. If an analyst consistently draws
the line between relevant and irrelevant policies to include more policies than another ana-
lyst would, then the first analyst has a greater propensity to find interests.
95. Because a given dispute must either be a true conflict, false conflict, or unpro-
vided-for-case, reducing the frequency of one class of conflicts necessarily increases the
frequency of at least one of the others, if not both. Thus, the elimination of unprovided-
for-cases through the discernment of spurious interests will lead to unnecessary spurious
true conflicts.
The relations can be expressed symbolically as follows. If the propensity to find a local
interest is p (the propensity not to find a local interest being q) and the corresponding
propensity to find a foreign interest is p' (the propensity not to find a foreign interest being
q') then the propensity to find a true conflict, T, is pp, the propensity to find an unpro-
vided-for-case is (l-p) (l-p') since p + q = I and p' + q' = 1, then q = I-p and q' = l-p'.
Since an unprovided-for-case is a case in which neither state has an interest, Ze., a case
within the set of (q)(q'), the final expression is derived by substitution for q and q'. ,The
propensity to find a false conflict, F, is p(l-p') + p'(l-p) because in a false conflict either the
forum has an interest and the foreign state does not, or vice versa. The propensity to find
the first type of case is expressed symbolically as:
pq'
which is equivalent after substitution for q to
p(l-p).
The propensity to find the second configuration of a false conflict is expressed as:
p'q
which is equivalent after substitution for q to
p'(1-p).
The propensity in total that either such case will occur is the sum of the two:
p(l-p) + p'(l-p).
If dT/dp - dF/dp > 0, then an increased propensity to recognize local interests will
increase true conflicts at a greater rate than it will increase false conflicts because dT/dp >
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interests are construed narrowly, with a consequent reduction in
the number of true conflicts to be decided by applying forum law,
then more disputes will present unprovided-for-cases.
This Article suggests that Currie and Sedler were correct in
choosing to apply the forum law in true conficts. 96 The Article
further urges that Currie was correct in choosing to apply the fo-
rum law in unprovided-for-cases, 97 but that Sedler erred in sug-
gesting the application of the so-called common policy of the two
jurisdictions.98 Finally, the Article suggests that Sedler is correct
dF/dp. This outcome is undesirable for all of the reasons Currie identified concerning
state courts being tempted to resolve or adjudicate conflicts among peers. B. CuRRIE, supra
note 3, at 181-83.
Begin with dT/dp - dF/dp = dT/dp - dF/dp. Then substitution of the expressions
derived above to express a true conflict, T = pp', and a false conflict, F = p(l-p) + p'(l-p),
generates:
dT/dp - dF/dp = d/dp [ pp' - p(l-p) - p'(1-p)].
Then expansion by multiplication of the terms in parentheses yields:
dT/dp - dF/dp = d/dp [ pp' - p + pp' -p' + pp']
= d/dp [ 3pp' -p - p' ]
Then taking the first derivative of each term, dT/dp - dF/dp
= 3(p dp'/dp + p' dp/dp) - dp/dp - dp'/dp
Since dp/dp = 1, then
dT/dp - dF/dp = 3p dp'/dp + 3p' - 1 - dp'/dp
= dp'/dp (3p-l) + (3p' - 1)
It is fair to assume that p _ p' for all courts. If p=p', then dp'/dp = 1, and dT/dp - dF/dp
= I (3p-l) + (3 p-1) = 6p - 2.
Thus, so long as p > 1/3, dT/dp - dF/dp is > 0. If, as is more likely the case with
courts, p > p', then the condition will be true if.
p + p' > 2/3 + (l-dp'/dp) (p-l/3).
An implicit estimate of p can be obtained by noting that if p and p' are both 1/3, then
but 1/9 of all cases will be true conflicts, 4/9 will be unprovided-for-cases, and the remain-
ing 4/9 will be false conflicts. It subjectively appears from the reported cases that there are
more true conflicts and fewer false conflicts than a propensity of only 1/3 would suggest. If
the propensities are as much as 1/2, then the true conflicts compose 1/4, the false conflicts
1/2, and the unprovided-for-cases 1/4. A starting point for estimating what the courts'
current propensities might be is closer to 2/3 with true conflicts 4/9, unprovided-for-cases
only 1/9, and false conflicts the remaining 4/9. Any propensity greater than 2/3 accelerates
the preponderance of true conflicts.
96. Whatever the relative propensities, according to Currie, a problem with true con-
flicts remains: "There is no conceivable choice-of-law rule that will solve the problem,
even though both states adopt it and consequently apply it. . . . There is no apparent
warrant for such an arbitrary preference of the one policy over the other." B. CuRuaE,
supra note 3, at 180-81.
Seder, however, has suggested that true conflicts can be solved, Sedler, supra note 87, at
217-18, but in the end joins Currie in articulating the role of state courts to include ad-
vancement of local policy and to exclude the purposeful frustration of local policy. Id. at
220.
97. See B. CuRRIE, supra note 3, at 152-56.
98. Sedler takes an entirely different approach to the unprovided-for-case. He be-
lieves that unprovided-for-cases generally reflect a juxtaposition of two laws, one which has
but one policy and another which both shares the general policy expressed in the first and
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that only real interests should be considered99 and that all policies,
and consequently all interests, should be construed narrowly.
Hence, this Article's primary thesis differs,.from Currie's on state
choice of law doctrine in that the analysis of interests should be
strict rather than loose. Additionally, unlike either Restatement,
the doctrines developed in this Article for the explanation of state
court choice of law decisions explain Supreme Court precedent in
carves out a special exception which can be called a second tier. See infra note 255 (discus-
sion of Curries altruistic interests). Sedler uses guest statute immunity to illustrate this
point. The "common policy reflected in. . . the general law of both states" is to compen-
sate victims of negligence. Sedler, supra note 87, at 235. The guest statute is an exception to
this common policy for cases in which the victim is a passenger in the gratuitous host's
automobile. Because the defendant is from the recovery state and the plaintiff is from the
guest act state, Sedler concludes that the guest act state has no interest in furthering its
policy providing its special defense. Thus, in an unprovided-for-case, in which the defend-
ant is from the recovery jurisdiction and neither state has an interest, the "common policy"
of the general law should be applied and recovery allowed. Id.
Conversely, if the state having the two tier law had an interest in the application of its
special rule, such as Cipolla v. Shaposka, 439 Pa. 563, 267 A.2d 854 (1970), in which the
defendant was from Delaware, the guest act state, and the plaintiff was from Pennsylvania,
the recovery state, Sedler would recognize its interest. When, as in an unprovided-for-case,
neither state has an interest in applying its law so that the state with the special rule does
not have an interest in implementing its special rule, Sedler would urge the application of
the rule which reflects the general, common policy rather than the special exception. Sed-
ler apparently would engage in such application regardless of which state was the forum.
Sedler's approach is clear when the special rule favors defendants with a special de-
fense. Moreover, the usual outcome will be the same as under Curries analysis, for the
plaintiff will choose the defendant's forum to get the more favorable law. But see infra note
309.
It is less clear what the practical outcome will be when the special rule favors the plain-
tiff. Under Curries reasoning and strict interest analysis, the forum law again will be ap-
plied, and Sedler would urge the common policy to the exclusion of the special rule
favoring plaintiff. One analytic difficulty, however, lies in identifying a plaintiff-favoring
rule that also could not be a defendant-targeting rule, which could be said to support a
deterrence interest in the defendant's forum. Because dram shop acts are usually among
the few laws with a clear deterrent component, see infra notes 332-34, they do not provide a
useful vehicle for analyzing unprovided-for-cases.
Instead, consider comparative negligence which favors plaintiffs but does not apprecia-
bly target defendants. What is the common policy between the older rule of contributory
negligence and the emerging rule of comparative negligence? Which law should control
when a plaintiff from a traditional state contributes slightly to an injury caused primarily
by a defendant from a progressive state?
Sedler's approach, both in his consideration of the possibility of solving true conflicts
and in his advocacy of the use of the common policy in unprovided-for-cases suggests a
support for a super law which is inconsistent with interest analysis and which others have
rejected. See supra note 73. The common policy can be identified only by polling the
states or by resort to a priori assumptions to determine which policy is the norm and which
is the special rule. Even if resort is taken only to nose counting, the individual sovereign-
ties of the several states potentially are impaired by having their choice of law decisions
dependent on the actions of faraway courts with no concern for local problems.
99. See Sedler, supra note 87, at 222.
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choice of law cases even before Erie Railroad v. Tompkins."c°
Strict interest analysis can be summarized with three principal
points. First, the law of the forum is rebuttably presumed to ap-
ply. Second, a state has an interest in the resolution of an issue if,
and only if, it has both a relevant policy and a party toward whom
that policy is directed. Finally, due process is denied by a choice
of law if, and only if, the law of a state lacking an interest is ap-
plied to the exclusion of the law of another state which has an
interest. 101
When viewed under this strict interest analysis, Hague is an
unprovided-for-case in which the application of the Minnesota fo-
rum law is fully appropriate, if not compelled. The rest of this
100. 304 U.S. 64 (1938). Erie represents the division between two watersheds in the
Court's attitude toward state law issues, such as choice of law. Before Erie, as with most
state law questions, the Court openly expressed its views on choice of law. See, eg., Brad-
ford Elec. Light Co. v. Clapper, 286 U.S. 145 (1932) (reversing the court of appeals in a
diversity suit); Western Union Co. v. Brown, 234 U.S. 542 (1914) (an obligation created by
law of the place of tort follows defendant's person). Since Erie, however, the Court has
been more reticent about affirmatively articulating its own views and more deferential to
state interests. See, e.g., Day & Zimmermann, Inc. v. Challoner, 423 U.S. 3 (1975). But Gf.
Carroll v. Lanza, 349 U.S. 408 (1955), discussed at infra notes 233-61, and accompanying
text.
101. A flow chart of strict interest analysis is provided for comparison with other
approaches.
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Article examines strict interest analysis as applied to Hague. Part
II illustrates the presumption in favor of applying forum law in
each type of case, analyzes Hague as an unprovided-for-case, and
discusses the impact of each of the Hague opinions on the pre-
sumption in favor of applying forum law.° 2 Part III considers the
differences between strict and loose construction of interests. 0 3
Part IV examines the constitutional constraints on courts consider-
ing false conflicts, "° while part V investigates some of the interac-
tions between judicial jurisdiction and constitutional constraints
on choice of law.1°5 Finally, part VI explores the possible constitu-
tional constraints on choice of law in true conflicts and unpro-
vided-for-cases.106
II. THE PRESUMPTION IN FAVOR OF APPLYING FORUM LAW
Like the interest analyses of Currie, 107 Traynor, °8 and Sed-
102. See infra notes 107-299 and accompanying text.
103. See infra notes 258-347 and accompanying text.
104. See infra notes 348-433 and accompanying text.
105. See infra notes 434-94 and accompanying text.
106. See infra notes 495-530 and accompanying text.
107. B. CURRIE, supra note 3, at 183. Currie's interest analysis is illustrated by this flow
chart:
108. A flow chart of Justice Traynor's interest analysis is supplied for comparison.
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ler, 10 9 Justice Stevens articulated in Hague an explicit "presump-
tion in favor of [applying] the forum's own law."'1 0 In strict
interest analysis, this presumption reflects not only a forum's natu-
109. The following flow chart illustrates Professor Sedler's interest analysis.
110. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 322 (1981) (Stevens, J., concurring). See
also infra notes 296-99 and accompanying text.
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ral inclination, but also the rational outcome of several separate
kinds of cases.
If neither the plaintiff nor defendant raises the issue of choice
of law, the law of the forum will be applied by default. Since
choice of law goes to neither personal nor subject matter jurisdic-
tion, no collateral attack will be possible."' Moreover, although
the traditional view differed," 2 Currie, Traynor, and Sedler all
concur that the court, as neutral arbiter, should not raise the
choice of law issue if neither party has chosen to do so.'13 There is
nothing in any of the Hague opinions inconsistent with leaving the
choice of law issue solely to the parties to raise.
As this Article will demonstrate, the presumption in favor of
applying forum law remains intact in true conflicts, unprovided-
for-cases, and apparent conflicts, each of which will be illustrated,
in turn, through the Supreme Court's decisions. Attention, how-
ever, will be directed first to the case in which the presumption is
rebutted-the false conflict in which the nonforum state has the
interest.
A. The Presumption in Operation Before Hague
1. False Conflicts
The rebuttable presumption in favor of applying forum law is
overcome if the forum lacks an interest in the application of its
law and the nonforum state has an actual interest in the applica-
tion of nonforum law. When only one state has an interest, a false
conflict exists. The outcome in such cases depends on which state
has that interest. If the forum has the interest, then the presump-
tion in favor of applying forum law compels choice of forum law.
If the forum lacks an interest, then the presumption is rebutted,
and thus nonforum law must be applied.
Many state courts have found the false conflict to be a valuable
concept because it supports rational advancement of state policies
where relevant, but avoids unnecessary harm to other states' poli-
cies through overreaching." 4 Although eschewing the label, the
Supreme Court has been a forerunner in preventing a forum with-
out an interest from applying its law in the face of another forum's
11. Fauntleroy v. Lum, 210 U.S. 230 (1908).
112. See Walton v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 233 F.2d 541, 544 (2d Cir. 1956).
113. See, ag., Traynor, supra note 73, at 123 (citing B. CURRIE, supra note 3).
114. See, eg., Tooker v. Lopez, 24 N.Y.2d 569, 249 N.E.2d 394, 301 N.Y.S.2d 519
(1969); McSwain v. McSwain, 420 Pa. 86, 215 A.2d 677 (1966). See also infra notes 322-26
and accompanying text.
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interest. Three of the most important illustrations of the Court's
philosophy are Home Insurance Co. v. Dick,1 15 Bradford Electric
Light Co. v. Clapper,"6 and John Hancock Mutual Life Insurance
Co. v. Yates. 1
17
a. Home Insurance Company v. Dick." 8 A Mexican insur-
ance company sold fire insurance on a tug boat to Bonner, a resi-
dent of Mexico. The tug boat was to be used and insured for use
only in Mexican waters. Before the loss, Bonner assigned his pol-
icy to Dick, a citizen of Texas residing in Mexico. In a separate
transaction, the Mexican insurer sold the risk, via reinsurance, to
Home and another New York insurer. Both the premium and any
losses were to be paid in Mexican funds in Mexico.1'9
Both the policy and the Mexican commercial code required
any suit on the policy to be brought within a year of any loss.' 20
Texas law, however, guaranteed at least two years in which to
bring suit regardless of any contractual language to the con-
trary. 2' When Dick brought suit in the Texas courts more than
one year after the loss, the Texas state court applied the Texas
provision guaranteeing two years in which to sue and allowed the
citizen of Texas, Dick, to recover against the New York defend-
ants.122 The Supreme Court unanimously reversed the Texas
decision.
The Court rejected Dick's argument that because only ques-
tions of state law and the conflict of laws were involved, the Court
lacked jurisdiction to hear the case. The Court stated that because
"nothing in any way relating to the policy sued on, or to the con-
tracts of reinsurance, was ever done or required to be done in
Texas," '2 3 "[t]he Texas statute as here construed and applied de-
prive[d] the garnishees of property without due process of law."' 24
The Court noted that all acts relating to the making of the
original or reinsurance policies were performed outside of Texas,
and that all performance on the contracts was to occur outside of
115. 281 U.S. 397 (1930).
116. 286 U.S. 145 (1932).
117. 299 U.S. 178 (1936).
118. 281 U.S. 397 (1930).
119. Id. at 403-04.
120. Id. at 404.
121. Id. at 404-05.
122. Id. at 405.
123. Id. at 408.
124. Id. at 407.
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Texas. Neither Texas law nor the Texas courts were invoked for
any purpose other than Dick's suit. The Court did not view
Dick's permanent residence in Texas as having significance be-
cause at all relevant times, Dick was physically present and acting
in Mexico. The Court concluded that the attempt of the Texas
court to impose a greater obligation than that agreed upon and to
seize property in payment of the imposed obligation was an un-
constitutional deprivation of property without due process of
law. 125
Even the public policy argument supporting the choice of law
of the forum state, advanced in Loucks v. Standard Oil Co. ,126 was
unavailing. The Texas provision was, of course, an unlikely can-
didate to provide the public policy escape device. 127 The Court
reiterated the irrelevance of Texas law to the transaction and
stated that all the defendants sought was "to be let alone."' 28
Hence, the Texas courts could not invoke their public policy af-
firmatively to undo a completed transaction. Whether the Texas
courts could refuse to enforce a repugnant contract was a question
reserved for another day.
Mexico's law favored the insurers in Home by limiting the
time in which suit could be brought. 129 Because Mexico had both
a policy in favor of defendants and a defendant which would have
been assisted by the policy's enforcement, Mexico had an interest
in the application of its law. In contrast, although Texas had a
policy which favored plaintiffs, 130 as a matter of federal constitu-
tional law, Texas lacked a plaintiff within a protected class. The
125. Id. at 408.
126. 224 N.Y. 99, 120 N.E. 198 (1918).
127. It is necessary to distinguish foreign laws which violate public policy under
Loucks by "violat[ing] some fundamental principle of justice, some prevalent conception
of good morals, some deep-rooted tradition of the common weal," id. at 111, 120 N.E. at
202, from foreign laws which merely differ from the local policy. The former situation
presents the forum with no choice, for violation of some fundamental principle of justice
must be beyond the court's power. Cf. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137 (1803).
The latter presents a choice of law which should be made according to the forum's choice
of law criteria. The problem then becomes one of sorting the two situations. It is urged in
this Article that a foreign law should be presumed merely to dffer unless it is shown to
violate at least either the federal Constitution or forum state constitution. The Loucks
doctrine is extremely powerful and must be reserved for cases within its limited scope, lest
all choice of law be destroyed.
128. 281 U.S. at 410.
129. Not only was the one year limitation permitted under Mexican law, it also was
part of Art. 1043 of Mexico's Commercial Code. Id. at 403 n.l. The insurance policy
incorporated the commercial code's relevant provisions. Id.
130. See Tax. REv. Civ. STAT. art. 5545 (1925), cited in 281 U.S. at 404.
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Texas courts lacked an interest and thus, were not allowed to ap-
ply their law in the face of Mexico's clear interest.
b. Bradford Electric Light Co. v. Clapper.'3 ' Leon Clapper,
employed in Vermont by Bradford Electric, a Vermont corpora-
tion, was killed in New Hampshire while attempting to repair
Bradford's Haverhill, New Hampshire substation.' 32 Clapper's
representative brought suit in New Hampshire state court under
that state's wrongful death act.' 33  Bradford Electric defended
with the argument that plaintiff was restricted to the exclusive
remedy of the Vermont Workmen's Compensation Act to which
both Bradford and Clapper had consented.'34 After defendant's
removal of the case from the New Hampshire court, the Federal
District Court for New Hampshire gave plaintiff judgment on a
jury verdict for $4,000. 1 This judgment was awarded on the as-
sumption that because the Vermont Act had no extraterritorial ef-
fect in New Hampshire, New Hampshire law applied.' 36
Initially, the court of appeals viewed the case as a characteriza-
tion problem, chose to apply the contracts characterization and
Vermont law instead of the tort characterization and New Hamp-
shire law, and reversed. 137 On rehearing, however, a new majority
affirmed the judgment for the plaintiff because of Bradford's ac-
ceptance of the New Hampshire Workmen's Compensation
131. 286 U.S. 145 (1932).
132. Bradford Elec. Light Co. v. Clapper, 51 F.2d 992, 993, 1000 (1st Cir. 1931).
133. Clapper's representative based her negligence claim on defendant's failure to give
warning that the apparent cutoff switch at the electrical substation was ineffective. All of
defendant's substations except Haverhill had a master switch for cutting off the power so
that repairs could be attempted without risk of electrocution. The cutoff switch for Haver-
hill, however, was across the river in Vermont. Clapper generally was aware of the use of
the cutoff switch at other substations, but apparently unaware that what appeared to be the
cutoff switch at the Haverhill unit would be ineffective to make repairs to the substation
safe.
134. Actually, the parties' consent to the application of the Vermont Act to an out-of-
state injury was presumed. See infra note 150. Consent was an issue because of legisla-
tures' concerns that nonelective coverage would raise due process challenges to workers'
compensation statutes. NATIONAL COMMISSION ON STATE WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION
LAWS, THE REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON STATE WORKMEN'S COMPENSA-
TION LAWS 34 (1972). The concern, of course, was unfounded. See New York Cent. R.R.
v. White, 243 U.S. 188 (1917).
The exclusivity provisions of the Vermont Workmen's Compensation Act in effect at
the time of Clapper's death in 1926 were outlined by the Court in a footnote. 286 U.S. at
145 n. 1.
135. 286 U.S. at 145.
136. Id.
137. 51 F.2d 992 (1st Cir. 1931).
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Act. 138
After a grant of certiorari, 139 Justice Brandeis initially articu-
lated the issue in terms which raised the characterization problem:
The main question for decision is whether the existence of a
right of action for Leon Clapper's death should be determined
by the laws of Vermont, where both parties to the contract of
employment resided and where the contract was made, or by
the laws of New Hampshire, where the employee was killed."
In the next paragraph, however, after observing that it was
"the purpose of the Vermont Act to preclude any recovery by pro-
ceedings brought in another State,"'' Justice Brandeis rephrased
the issue:
[M]ay the New Hampshire courts disregard the relative rights
of the parties as determined by the laws of Vermont where they
resided and made the contract of employment; or must they
give effect to the Vermont Act, and to the agreement implied
therefrom, that the only right of the employee against the em-
ployer, in case of injury, shall be the claim for compensation
provided in the statute?
14 2
Although omitting any mention of competing policies, Justice
Brandeis' first statement of the issue reflected the modem view
recognizing the competing contacts.' 43 The first statement is also
neutral since the question posed does not assume any part of the
answer. Justice Brandeis' second statement of the issue, however,
reflected territorialism in focusing on the rights of the parties. In
contrast to Professor Beale, who would have taken the position
that the rights and duties of the parties vested at the time and
place of injury in New Hampshire, 44 Justice Brandeis suggested
that the employer's right to limited liability provided by the Ver-
mont Workmen's Compensation Act vested in Vermont prior to
138. Id. at 999.
139. 284 U.S. 221 (1931). Bradford Electric sought appeal, arguing that the Court of
Appeals for the First Circuit had found the Vermont Act void and that the full faith and
credit clause required application of the Vermont Act. Determining that the court of ap-
peals had not found the Vermont Act void, but rather had chosen not to apply it, the
Supreme Court denied the appeal, but granted certiorari.
140. 286 U.S. at 153.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 154.
143. Under this Article's analysis, the issue would be whether a Vermont employee's
death in New Hampshire, which occurred in the course of employment in Vermont, is
within the concern of the New Hamphsire wrongful death act when the decedent neither
lived nor left dependents in New Hampshire and when the Vermont law expressly limited
the Vermont employer's liability.
144. See 2 J. BEALa, supra note 64, § 401.2.
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any right which might have arisen under the laws of New Hamp-
shire. "'45 The first Restatement broke with its reporter and fol-
lowed Justice Brandeis. 146
After concluding that if the full faith and credit clause were
relevant, it would require the application of Vermont law, Justice
Brandeis finally reached the nub of the case in his discussion of
the inapplicability of New Hampshire's policy. Justice Brandeis
wrote: "The interest of New Hampshire was only casual. Leon
Clapper was not a resident there. He was not continuously em-
ployed there. So far as it appears, he had no dependent there. It
is difficult to see how [New Hampshire's] interest would be sub-
served under such circumtances, by burdening its courts with this
litigation."'' 47
Whereas the court of appeals rested on Bradford's consent to
the New Hampshire statute, Justice Brandeis placed that consent
in proper context by explaining that it was "referable only to such
New Hampshire employees, and not as bringing under the New
Hampshire Act employees not otherwise subject to it."'148 Thus, to
find an interest, Justice Brandeis required both a policy and a citi-
zen subject to the policy. Reserved for a later day were cases in
which the injured employee was a resident of New Hampshire,
had been employed continuously in New Hampshire, or had left
dependents in New Hampshire, 49 each of which might be recog-
nized today under appropriate circumstances to combine with
New Hampshire's policy to provide a New Hampshire interest.
The Vermont Act embodied a policy of favoring the employer
by limiting recovery for death arising out of and in the course of
employment. In Clapper, the suit involved a Vermont employer,
and the Vermont Act was not self-limited to only instate inju-
ries.' 5° Vermont, therefore, had an actual interest in the applica-
145. 286 U.S. at 158. No right, of course, can ever have vested until some court, well
after the fact, so declares. Cf. K. LLEWELLYN, THE BRAMBLE BUSH 12 (1960). "What
these officials do about disputes is, to my mind, the law itself." Id.
146. See RESTATEMENT OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 401 (1934).
147. 286 U.S. at 162. Note also that it was the federal court in New Hampshire which
had heard the case.
148. Id. at 162-63.
149. Id. at 163.
150. Employers who hire workmen within this state to work outside of the state,
may agree with such workmen that the remedies under the provisions of this
chapter shall be exclusive as regards injuries received outside this state by acci-
dent arising out of and in the course of such employment, and all contracts of
hiring shall be presumed to include such an agreement.
Id. at 153 n.1 (citing VT. GEN. LAWS ch. 241, § 5774 (1917)).
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tion of its law.
In contrast to the employer-favoring Vermont Act, the New
Hampshire law in this case favored employees. This favoritism
was shown by giving plaintiffs an election between assured, but
limited, liability under workers' compensation and unlimited lia-
bility if the wrongful death were due to the employer's negligence.
There was, however, no New Hampshire employee in this case.1
51
Hence, New Hampshire had no interest in the application of its
law, the case was a false conflict, the presumption in favor of ap-
plying New Hampshire forum law was rebutted, and application
of the law of the jurisdiction having an interest-in this case, Ver-
mont-was compelled.
c. John Hancock MutualLife Insurance Co. v. Yates. '52 Han-
cock insured the life of Harmon H. Yates in favor of his wife for
$2,000. The insured died of cancer one month after the policy's
issuance. The application for insurance contained questions con-
cerning the insured's health. The answers appearing on the appli-
cation were undeniably false and, under the law of New York,
material misrepresentations which were grounds for avoidance of
liability on the policy. After Yates' death, his widow-beneficiary
moved to Georgia, where she brought suit on the policy in a Geor-
gia state court. The Georgia jury found that truthful answers had
been given to the insurance agent and by imputing knowledge of
the truth to the insurer, the misstatements found on the applica-
tion were not material. Georgia law supported all these argu-
ments. The court granted the widow judgment on the policy.' 53
Writing for a unanimous Court, Justice Brandeis quickly 54
disposed of the case, relying on Home and Clapper to reverse.
The insured's liability on the policy was not merely a question of
remedy to be governed by the forum, 55 but rather a question of
substantive law. "In respect to the accrual of the right asserted
under the contract, or liability denied, there was no occurrence,
nothing done, to which the law of Georgia could apply.' 56
The insurer, the insured, and the beneficiary all resided in
New York both at the time of the issuance of the policy and at the
151. Professor Currie also considered whether any other party could support a New
Hampshire interest and concluded none could. B. CURRIE, supra note 3, at 209-10.
152. 299 U.S. 178 (1936).
153. 182 Ga. 213, 185 S.E. 268 (1936).
154. Only two and a half weeks passed from argument to decision. 299 U.S. at 178.
155. See supra notes 71 & 76.
156. 299 U.S. at 182.
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insured's death a month later. New York's law protected insurers,
and John Hancock was within the protected class. New York,
therefore, had an interest in the application of its law. Whether
Georgia's law favored either insureds or their beneficiaries, Geor-
gia had no one within its protected class until Mrs. Yates moved
there after the death of Mr. Yates. The date of that move, how-
ever, was too late to afford her such protection. Neither Mr. or
Mrs. Yates was within the protection of the Georgia law at any
relevant time. Only New York had the congruence of party and
policy which creates a state interest. The Supreme Court correctly
reversed the Georgia forum's application of its uninterested law in
the face of New York's undeniable interest.
2. True Conflicts
In true conflicts, cases in which both the forum and another
jurisdiction have an interest, the presumption in favor of applying
the forum's law should govern. Although another jurisdiction has
an interest, the forum's own interest meets the constitutional pro-
hibition against applying the law of a jurisdiction without an in-
terest in the face of another jurisdiction's interest. 57
Even though many states have embraced Currie's insights con-
cerning the false conflict, 158 his approach to the true conflict has
been received less warmly. Currie rejected the propriety of state
courts attempting to choose among competing state policies on
any basis other than adherence to the forum law.'59 Many com-
mentators and some courts, however, have attempted either to in-
voke external factors by which to make a choice,' 6 ' to compare
the relative impairments to be suffered as a result of the competing
state interests,' 6' or to identify and then apply the better of the
competing laws. 162 None of these alternatives was attractive to
157. See infra notes 300-47 and accompanying text.
158. See supra note 114.
159. See B. CURRIE, supra note 3, at 181-82.
160. See, e.g., McDougal, Choice of Law: Prologue to a Viable Interest-Analysis Theory,
51 TUL. L. REv. 207 (1977).
161. See, e.g., Offshore Rental Co. v. Continental Oil Co., 22 Cal. 3d 157, 583 P.2d 721,
148 Cal. Rptr. 867 (1978); Baxter, Choice of Law andthe Federal System, 16 STAN. L. REv.
1 (1963).
162. See Milkovich v. Saari, 295 Minn. 155, 203 N.W.2d 408 (1973), applying Leflar,
supra note 17. It may be that Leflar's principles can be used to parallel strict interest analy-
sis, but they do not provide any unique outcome. False conflicts in which the forum has the
interest should be governed by the fourth consideration, advancement of the forum's gov-
ernmental interest. True conflicts also would receive forum law under the fourth and fifth
considerations-the application of the better law-which would have to be the forum's law
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Currie. While Congress163 certainly was entitled to enact positive
choice of law principles to apportion legislative jurisdiction
among the states, even to the point of writing "super law,"' 64 Cur-
rie urged that state courts were neither empowered nor equipped
to allocate power among their peers. 6- Traynor, 166 Sedler, 167 and
proponents of strict interest analysis concurred.
Before Erie, the Supreme Court's behavior was mixed.'
68
Since that decision, the Court consistently has sustained the appli-
cation of forum law in true confficts. Three examples, delineated
below, are illustrative of this consistency.
In Griffin v. McCoach,169 a group of investors retained an in-
surance policy on the life of the syndicate's organizer as the syndi-
cate's remaining asset after a partial liquidation. The application
had been completed and the policy delivered in New York, a state
where the investors met the requirements for an insurable interest
in the insured. After the insured's death several years later, his
representative brought suit in the United States District Court for
the Northern District of Texas claiming that under Texas law the
syndicate's members lacked an insurable interest, and therefore
that the entirety of the proceeds belonged to the estate. The suit
presented a true conflict because New York had an interest, evi-
denced by New York law favoring the investors and the presence
of New York investors in the case. Texas also had an interest be-
cause Texas law protected insureds and the insured was a citizen
of Texas from before issuance of the policy until his death.
if the court took its oath seriously. False conflicts in which the forum had no interest would
not trigger the fourth consideration, but rather could be governed by the second considera-
tion-maintenance of the interstate and international order-because applying the local
law despite the absence of a local interest and the existence of a foreign interest would, in
choice of law, upset interjurisdictional order. Thus, so long as a case presented some inter-
est, Leflar's choice influencing considerations can be made to achieve a proper result.
These considerations can, of course, also be used to produce a contrary result. Unless the
third consideration, simplification of the judicial task, is read to support a presumption in
favor of applying forum law, the unprovided-for-case again would be the orphan. Even
Professor Leflar has lost some enthusiasm for these considerations as normative guidelines.
Compare Leflar, Choice Influencing Considerations in Conflicts Law, 41 N.Y.U. L. REv. 267
(1966) (considerations as prescriptions) with Leflar, The "New Choice of Law," 21 AM. L.
REV. 457 (1972) (considerations as descriptions).
163. The United States Supreme Court might likewise be so entitled.
164. See B. CURRIE, supra note 3, at 179-83.
165. Id. at 182. See supra text accompanying note 53 (limits imposed by status as coe-
qual sovereigns).
166. See Traynor, supra note 73, at 123-24.
167. See Sedler, supra note 87, at 121.
168. See supra note 96.
169. 313 U.S. 498 (1941).
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After the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit decided this
true conflict according to the law of New York, as the place of
contract,1 70 the Supreme Court reversed and remanded. The
Court held that Texas choice of law principles, the law of the fo-
rum, governed. If those principles required the use of Texas law,
applying such law to the case would be constitutional in light of
Texas' legitimate policy to protect insureds from attempts to con-
trol the outcome of wagers on their longevity. Home Insurance
Co. v. Dick,'' the false conflict, was distinguished as a case in
which nothing was "done or to be done within [Texas'] bor-
ders."' 72 It is striking that the Court reversed the outcome man-
dated by the first Restatement 73 to require not only the
application of the forum's choice of law rule, 174 but also the fo-
rum's substantive rule in a case which could not have been heard
in the Texas state courts. Despite judicial jurisdiction having been
available in the federal district court only through statutory inter-
pleader,17 5 the Court nevertheless required application of forum
law, if that law were relevant.
In Watson v. Employers Liability Assurance Corp., 76 a prod-
ucts liability case removed to the District Court for the Western
District of Louisiana, the defendant insurance company sought to
avoid the application of Louisiana's direct action statute by inter-
posing its contractual right under the laws of Massachusetts and
Illinois to remain on the sidelines unless and until the insured
manufacturer had been held liable. 177 Relying in part on Home,
the federal district court in Louisiana held, and the Court of Ap-
peals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed, 71 that a Louisiana statute
170. Griffin v. McCoach, 116 F.2d 261 (5th Cir. 1941).
171. 281 U.S. 397 (1930). For a discussion ofHome, see supra notes 118-30 and accom-
panying text.
172. 313 U.S. at 507.
173. See RESTATEMENT OF CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 317-319 (1934). These sections state
the conflict of laws rules as they apply to insurance contracts.
174. 313 U.S. at 503 (citing Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487 (1941)).
175. The action was brought under Act of Jan. 20, 1936, Pub. L. No. 74-422, 49 Stat.
1096 (current version at 28 U.S.C. § 1335 (1976)).
176. 348 U.S. 66 (1954).
177. 348 U.S. at 68. The case states that the insurance policy sued upon contained a
clause "which prohibits direct actions against the insurance company until after final deter-
mination of the Toni Company's [the insured] obligation to pay personal injury damages
either by judgment or agreement. Contrary to this contractual 'no action' clause, the chal-
lenged statutory provisions permit injured persons to sue an insurance company before
such final determination." (emphasis supplied).
178. Watson v. Employers Liab. Assurance Corp., 107 F. Supp. 494 (W.D. La. 1952),
aj7'd, 202 F.2d 407 (5th Cir. 1953).
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could not constitutionally override a valid contract made under
other states' laws. The Supreme Court reversed. Even though
Massachusetts had an interest in the application of its law because
of the defendant manufacturer's presence in that state, that inter-
est could not outweigh the interest in the plaintiff who was injured
in Louisiana.'79 Home was inapposite because the claim was "for
injuries from a product bought and used"' 0 in Louisiana. As in
Grin,'8' the Court required the application of relevant forum
law in a true conflict.
The recent case of Nevada v. Hall"2 reconfirms the Supreme
Court's acceptance of forum law in true conflicts. California
plaintiffs were injured in California in an automobile collision
with a car owned by the state of Nevada and driven by an em-
ployee of Nevada acting within the scope of his employment. 83
Suit was brought in a California state court, and the state of Ne-
vada was served under California's nonresident motorist statute.
Failing with the argument that no state need appear in the courts
of another state, 18 4 Nevada next argued that California owed full
faith and credit to Nevada's statute limiting its liability in tort to
$25,000.185 The California courts disagreed, following Califor-
nia's abrogation of the doctrine of sovereign immunity, and en-
tered judgment against Nevada on the jury's verdict of $1.15
million. 86
This case presented a true conflict because California law fa-
179. The Court noted the state's interest:
Louisiana's direct action statute is not a mere intermeddling in affairs beyond
her boundaries which are no concern of hers. Persons injured or killed in Louisi-
ana are most likely to be Louisiana residents, and even if not, Louisiana may
have to care for them. Serious injuries may require treatment in Louisiana homes
or hospitals by Louisiana doctors. The injured may be destitute. They may be
compelled to call upon friends, relatives, or the public for help. Louisiana has
manifested its natural interest in the injured by providing remedies for recovery.
of damages.
348 U.S. at 72.
180. Id. at 72-73. The Court noted that Home might have been decided differently if
activities upon which that action was based took place in Texas. Id. at 71.
181. For a discussion of Griffin, see supra notes 169-75 and accompanying text.
182. 440 U.S. 410, reh g denied, 441 U.S. 917 (1979).
183. Id. at411.
184. See Hall v. University of Nev., 8 Cal. 3d 522, 503 P.2d 1363, 105 Cal. Rptr. 355
(1972), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 820 (1973).
185. The relevant Nevada statute appears in 410 U.S. at 412-13 n.2. This statute has
since been amended to remove the monetary limitation. See NEv. REv. STAT. § 41.031
(1979).
186. Hall v. University of Nev., 74 Cal. App. 3d 280, 141 Cal. Rptr. 439 (1977), aj7'd,
440 U.S. 410, reh'g denied, 441 U.S. 917 (1979).
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vored plaintiffs and two California plaintiffs were present in the
case. Furthermore, Nevada law favored Nevada, an interest be-
yond dispute. Whether or not the California Court of Appeals
correctly followed California's current choice of law doctrine,'87
the Supreme Court reaffirmed the forum's power to apply its law
to true conflicts, except "in certain limited situations.""88 The
only limitation on this power is that forum law not be applied
without an actual interest when another jurisdiction has such an
interest.
3. Apparent Conflicts
If the laws of all the potentially relevant states suggest the
same result, the conflict is deemed apparent, and there is no rea-
son to displace forum law. Alaska Packers Association v. Indus-
trial Accident Commission,189 Pacfic Employers Insurance Co. v.
IndustrialAccident Commission,19 and Cardillo v. Liberty Mutual
Insurance Co.191 are examples in which the parties' failure to
plead differences between the allegedly applicable laws presented
the courts with, at most, only apparent conflicts. Reliance on
these three cases for any stronger proposition, therefore, is
misplaced.
In each of the three cases, the defendant insurance carrier,
which was fully and incontestably within the judicial jurisdiction
of the forum, raised the concededly limited jurisdiction of the
workers' compensation tribunal as a procedural defense. In each
case, however, the defendant failed to plead any substantive dif-
ference between applying forum law and the other state's law
which would have provided an actual, or at least a colorable, de-
fense to the insurance company's liability. In each of these appar-
ent conflicts, the Supreme Court affirmed application of forum
law.
a. Alaska Packers Association v. Industrial Accident Commis-
sion. 192 A nonresident alien, Juan Palma, was hired in San Fran-
187. See Kay, The Use of Comparative Impairment to Resolve True Conflicts: An Evalua-
tion of the California Experience, 68 CALIF. L. REv. 577 (1980).
188. 440 U.S. at 421. "Moreover, in certain limited situations, the courts of one State
must apply the statutory law of another State." Id. (citing Bradford Elec. Light Co. v.
Clapper, 286 U.S. 145 (1932)).
189. 294 U.S. 532 (1935).
190. 306 U.S. 493 (1939).
191. 330 U.S. 469 (1947).
192. 294 U.S. 532 (1935).
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cisco to work during the salmon season in Alaska with the
employer agreeing to supply roundtrip transportation. Palma was
injured and treated in Alaska, and then returned to San Francisco.
Shortly thereafter, Palma claimed worlkers' compensation in
California.
The employer offered two defenses. First, the employer con-
tended, without explanation, that the accident had not arisen out
of Palma's employment. Second, the employer argued that
Alaska's Workmen's Compensation Act provided Palma's sole
remedy for any work-related injury in Alaska and that, therefore,
the California Industrial Accident Commission had no jurisdic-
tion. In an attempt to bolster its argument, the employer offered
Palma's adhesive election in the employment contract to be bound
by Alaska's workers' compensation law even though such a con-
tractual provision would have been ineffective under California
law. ' 93
It is difficult in this case to determine whether Alaska had any
interest. The employer did not rely on Alaska law to invoke any
particular defense or to profit from a lower compensation scale,
but rather, to deny jurisdiction to the California Industrial Acci-
dent Commission.' 94 As the defendant presented the case, there
was no conflict between the laws of Alaska and California. Each
state conditioned compensation on the accident having arisen out
of employment, and this issue was the only substantive concern
mentioned. The California Supreme Court's decision indicated
that the defendant did not even suggest that the application of
Alaska law would result in a different decision on the substantive
issue than the application of California law. 195
193. The facts are taken from the per curiam decision of the California Supreme Court,
I Cal. 2d 250, 252-54, 34 P.2d 716, 717-18 (1934).
194. Id. at 254, 34 P.2d at 718.
195. The Alaska's Workmen's Compensation Act was designed to keep the litigation
over its provisions at home.
No action for the recovery of compensation hereunder shall in any case be
brought outside of the Territory of Alaska, except in cases where it is not possible
to obtain service of summons upon the defendant in said Territory, and in all
such cases the plaintiff must plead and prove his inability to obtain service of
summons upon the defendant within the Territory of Alaska.
1929 ALASKA Sass. LAWS ch. 25, § 25 (cited in I Cal. 2d at 255, 34 P.2d at 719).
The California Court disingenuously confused Alaska's attempt to limit judicial juris-
diction to Alaska with an attempt instead to retain exclusive legislative jurisdiction. Alaska
could not limit California's power to hear the case, Tennessee Coal, Iron & R.R. v. George,
233 U.S. 354 (1914), nor could California limit itself. Hughes v. Fetter, 341 U.S. 609
(1951). The California court nonetheless attempted to agree with Alaska that California
could not enforce the Alaska law.
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Writing for a unanimous Supreme Court, Justice Stone easily
affirmed the use of California law. California had a "peculiar con-
cern" I" in providing a remedy for employees hired in California
sufficient to justify application of forum law. Even if Alaska did
have an interest, Justice Stone deemed California's interest to be
greater than that "of a state of which the employee was never resi-
dent and to which he may never return."1 97 Justice Stone then
established a rebuttable presumption in favor of applying forum
law and found that Alaska's situs of the injury did not require
displacement of California law:
The interest of Alaska is not shown to be superior to that of
California. No persuasive reason is shown for denying to Cali-
fornia the right to enforce its own laws in its own courts, and in
the circumstances the full faith and credit clause does not re-
quire that the statutes of Alaska be given that effect.' 98
Professor Beale, of course, would have insisted that California or any state with judicial
jurisdiction yield to what he saw as Alaska's exclusive legislative jurisdiction. See supra
note 70. The defendant argued that since California's workers' compensation agency could
not apply Alaska law, it should not hear the case. The California view was that the case
would be heard, but under California law.
Judicial and legislative jurisdiction are ordinarily separate issues. See supra note 26.
Certain disputes, however, commingle the issues. Workers' compensation boards generally
believe that they are empowered only to apply the local compensation law. W. MALONE,
M. PLANT & J. LITTLE, CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE EMPLOYMENT RELATION 515 n.2
(1974). Hence, it appears that the defendant raised the colorable, albeit easily resolved,
issue of choice of law to frustrate the California system's ability to hear the case.
One can sympathize with an agency asked to decide a claim under the law of another
state, but that sympathy does not compel dismissal of the claim. Cook, of course, rejected
exclusive legislative jurisdiction several years before Alaska Packers. Cook, The Logical
and Legal Bases of the Conflict of Laws, 33 YALE L.J. 457 (1924), reprinted in SELECTED
READINGS, supra note 63, at 71, 77-78, 78 n.41, 81.
196. 294 U.S. at 549. Although "peculiar" may have been meant in the sense of dis-
tinct, particular, or exclusive, this view herein is that California's claimed concern for
Palma may more aptly be thought unusual, eccentric, or strange. If Alaska had provided
the defendant a clear, articulated defense, California's "peculiar concern" would have been
inadequate.
197. Id. at 550.
198. Id. By asking whether a "persuasive reason is shown for denying to California the
right to enforce its own laws in its own courts," id., Justice Stone established the presump-
tion that California law applied. Justice Stone seemed to suggest that Alaska's law would
displace California's law only if the "interest of Alaska is... shown to be superior to that
of California." Id. Although a weighing of interests might show one state's interest to be
greater according to some external standard provided by a super law, Stone's requirement
also would be met by a false conffict in which Alaska had an interest and California had
none. See, e.g., Home Ins. Co. v. Dick, 281 U.S. 397 (1930).
Strict interest analysis is qualitative, not quantitative. Interests are either present or
nonexistent; they cannot be weighed without resort to the discredited notion of an external
super law standard. What is not clear in Stone's language is whether the presumption in
favor of applying California law is based on California, the forum, or California, the place
of the contract.
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There may be a temptation to read Justice Stone's perception
of California's "peculiar concern" for Palma as recognition of a
California interest in Palma. This temptation should be resisted.
Although California's expanded policy protected nonresident
aliens such as Palma under workers' compensation, 199 the holding
of the Court did not necessitate finding a California interest since
this case presented only an apparent conflict in which the defend-
ant failed to show how the result would differ under Alaska law.
Thus, any suggestion in the case of a California interest must be
regarded as dictum.
b. Pacfc Employers Insurance Co. v. Industrial Accident
Commission." Dewey & Almy Chemical Company, headquar-
tered in Massachusetts, employed Kenneth Tator as a chemical
engineer and research chemist.201 The Massachusetts Workmen's
Compensation Act applied to both Tator and his employer, with
the Hartford Accident and Indemnity Company providing the in-
surance, but only for Massachusetts. °2
In 1935, Tator was assigned temporarily to the company's
Oakland, California plant. The California Workmen's Compen-
sation Act applied to the company and its California employees,
with Pacific Employers Insurance Company providing the re-
quired insurance.20 3
After his injury in California, Tator claimed compensation
under the California Act. Pacific raised no substantive defense,
but instead urged that California both lacked jurisdiction to hear
the claim of an employee hired in Massachusetts and was obliged
199. The California Workmen's Compensation Act expressly protected workers, who
were hired within the state, and California residents at the time of injury, who were injured
outside of California. Pacific Employers Ins. Co. v. Indus. Accident Comm'n, 10 Cal. 2d
567, 75 P.2d 1058, 1062 (1938). Palma was a nonresident and, therefore, outside the ex-
press protections of the Act. Although the California court of appeals based its decision on
Quong Ham Wah Co. v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 184 Cal. 26, 192 P. 1021 (1920),
dismissing writ of error, 255 U.S. 445 (1921), for the extension of the Act's protections to
nonresident aliens, Currie has argued that the extension of the statute's benefit in Quong
was dubious and properly limited under the privileges and immunities clause, U.S. CONST.
art. IV, § 2, only to citizens of some state. B. CURRIE, supra note 3, at 202 n.47. In an ironic
coincidence, Quong Ham Wah was also the labor broker that hired Palma on behalf of
Alaska Packers.
200. 306 U.S. 493 (1939).
201. Pacific Employers Ins. Co. v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 10 Cal. 2d 567, 569, 75
P.2d 1058, 1059 (1938).
202. Id.
203. Although Tator reported to both the manager of the Oakland plant and the of-
ficers of the company in Massachusetts, he was primarily under the control of the Massa-
chusetts office. Id.
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to defer to the state of employment.2 °4 Also present in the case
were health care providers in California who had treated Tator
and who allegedly were apprehensive that they might need to seek
their fees in Massachusetts.
One plausible reading of Justice Stone's framing of the issue is
that the Court impliedly assumed that forum law applied unless
and until precluded by the Constitution. The Court stated the
issue:
[W]hether the full faith and credit which the Constitution re-
quires to be given to a Massachusetts workmen's compensation
statute precludes California from applying its own workmen's
compensation act in the case of an injury suffered by a Massa-
chusetts employee of a Massachusetts employer while in Cali-
fornia in the course of his employment. °20
In Justice Stone's words, the defense urged by Pacific Employers
was
[T]hat the employee, because he was regularly employed at the
head office of the corporation in Massachusetts and was tempo-
rarily in California on the business of the employer when in-
jured there, was subject to the workmen's compensation law of
Massachusetts, and that the California Commission, in apply-
ing the California Act and in refusing to recognize the Massa-
chusetts statute as a defense, had denied to the latter the full
faith and credit to which it was entitled under Article IV, § 1 of
the Constitution.20 6
Justice Stone held that the exclusive remedy provided by Mas-
sachusetts and the full faith and credit clause did not require Cali-
fornia to "withhold the remedy given by its own statute to its
residents [Tator's medical creditors], by way of compensation for
medical, hospital and nursing services rendered to the injured em-
ployee .. "207
According to Justice Stone, the purpose of the full faith and
credit clause was "to preserve rights acquired or confirmed under
the public acts and judicial proceedings of one state,. . . [but that
it did not compel a state] to substitute the statutes of other states
for its own statutes dealing with a subject matter concerning
which it is competent to legislate. '20 8 Hence, the full faith and
credit clause protects rights in judgments but does not necessarily
compel application of another state's law before judgment. If the
204. Id. at 571, 75 P.2d at 1060.
205. 306 U.S. at 497.
206. Id.
207. Id. at 501.
208. Id.
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meaning and effect of the clause were otherwise, then Massachu-
setts would be obliged to defer to California, and California, in
turn, would be obliged to defer to Massachusetts. Thus, neither
state would be able to hear the case because neither California nor
Massachusetts could apply its own law and neither state could ap-
ply the other's law in its own administrative system. Conse-
quently, the victim would go remediless. Alternatively, the reach
of the full faith and credit clause would be expanded to compel
the California Industrial Accident Commission to become famil-
iar with every state's workers' compensation law-a responsibility
only reluctantly shouldered by state courts, much less administra-
tive agencies. Justice Stone decided the alleged conflict between
Massachusetts and California by concluding that either state
could apply its own law.
Although Massachusetts has an interest in safeguarding the
compensation of Massachusetts employees while temporarily
abroad in the course of their employment, and may adopt that
policy for itself, that could hardly be thought to support an ap-
plication of the full faith and credit clause which would over-
ride the constitutional authority of another state to legislate for
the bodily safety and economic protection of employees injured
within it .... [T]he full faith and credit exacted for the statute
of one state does not necessarily preclude another state from
enforcing in its own courts its own conflicting statute having no
extra-territorial operation forbidden by the Fourteenth Amend-
ment .... 209
Thus, the full faith and credit clause would not require California
to defer to Massachusetts. Application of California's statute,
therefore, would be constitutional if California did not deny due
process by using forum law without an interest in the face of a
conflicting Massachusetts interest.
The single most striking fact about Pacfc Employers is that
the Court treated the case as a true conflict in which Massachu-
setts and California had interests, even though no conflicting in-
terest in Massachusetts was articulated. All that Pacific
Employers urged was that Massachusetts law required the pay-
ment of creditors. California law did not differ on that point.
Neither state, consequently, had articulated any interest in its
workers' compensation carriers escaping liability. As in Alaska
Packers, the defendant insurance company raised the possible ap-
plication of the other state's compensation act solely as a techni-
cal, jurisdictional defense. If the other state's act controlled, then
209. Id. at 503.
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the California Industrial Accident Commission would not be able
to hear the case, and the worker, or in Pacfc, Tator's creditors,
would be obliged to travel to the other state, either Alaska or Mas-
sachusetts, respectively, to prosecute the claim. In neither in-
stance did the defendant insurance company advance any
substantive defense to the claim. Like Alaska Packers, therefore,
Pacfc Employers presented only an apparent conflict between
the laws of two states. The laws of both states, in fact, called for
full recovery. In neither case was the presumptive applicability of
the forum law overcome.
c. Cardillo v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Company.u" ° E.C.
Ernst, Inc., a contractor incorporated and headquartered in the
District of Columbia, employed Ticer,ul I a resident of the District,
on a job in Virginia. Returning home from work, Ticer was killed
in Virginia when struck by a stone hurled through the windshield
of his car.212 One of the working conditions negotiated by Ticer's
collective bargaining agent required Ernst to provide transporta-
tion to any job site outside the District." 3 Workers for Ernst on
the Virginia job had agreed orally to accept two dollars cash each
day in lieu of transportation in kind.214 At the time of his injury,
Ticer was transporting two members of a regular car pool and two
other co-workers who had paid him a dollar each for that day's
transportation.l 5
Ticer's widow brought a claim for death benefits under the
District of Columbia Workmen's Compensation Act. Liberty Mu-
tual defended Ernst on two grounds: First, that the injury had not
arisen out of and in the course of employment; and second, that
the deputy commissioner lacked jurisdiction to award compensa-
tion under the District's Act for a death which had occurred in
Virginia.216
The deputy commissioner, sitting as the initial determiner,
found that the provision of payment for transportation sufficed to
210. 330 U.S. 469 (1947).
211. The reports are not clear as to Ticer's full name. The Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit reported his name as Walter H. Ticer. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co.
v. Cardillo, 154 F.2d 529, 530 (D.C. Cir. 1946). Justice Murphy, however, reported his
name as Clarence H. Ticer. 330 U.S. at 472. Otherwise the accounts agree.
212. 154 F.2d at 530.
213. Id. at 530-31.
214. Id. at 531.
215. Id. at 530.
216. Id.
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bring Ticer's death into the course of his employment and thus,
that Ticer's widow was entitled to compensation." 7 The United
States District Court for the District of Columbia sustained that
finding. z18 The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit reversed in a split decision. 19 Having found that the in-
jury had not arisen out of and in the course of employment under
the District of Columbia Act, the court of appeals did not deter-
mine whether the District of Columbia compensation board had
jurisdiction over the injury."2 ' The Supreme Court, in an opinion
by Justice Murphy, reversed the Court of Appeals over the dis-
sents, without opinion, of Justices Jackson and Burton.
Although defendant argued that the District of Columbia Act
applied "only where the employee, during the whole of his em-
ployment, spent more time working within the District than he
spent outside the District," Justice Murphy construed the plain
meaning of the Act's jurisdictional provision:
Nothing in the history, the purpose or the language of the Act
warrants any limitation which would preclude its application to
this case .... [The words] "irrespective of the place where the
injury, or death occurs". . . leave no possible room for reading
in an implied exception excluding those employees like Ticer
who have substantial business and personal connections in the
District and who are injured outside the District.221
Buttressing reliance on the plain meaning of the language, the
opinion continued:
[T]he District's legitimate interest in providing adequate work-
men's compensation measures for its residents does not turn on
the fortuitous circumstance of the place of their work or in-
jury .... Rather it depends upon some substantial connection
between the District and the particular employee-employer re-
lationship, a connection which is present in this case. 2 22
Thus, the Court found a statutory policy to compensate resi-
dents of the District of Columbia for occupational injuries. By
statutory construction, the Court determined the compensatory
purpose of the statute and found that purpose would be advanced
by application of the statute to the case at hand. This concurrence
of policy and presence of a person of the protected class "fully
satisfie[d] any constitutional questions of due process or full faith
217. 330 U.S. at 472-73.
218. Id. at 473.
219. 154 F.2d 529 (D.C. Cir. 1946).
220. 330 U.S. at 473.
221. Id. at 475.
222. Id. at 476.
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and credit. '223 Thus, the statute expressed a clear policy that was
generally constitutional and reached the facts of the case. Nothing
more was required to support the constitutionality of the District's
jurisdiction.
Once again the court ignored an insurance company's argu-
ment of no legislative jurisdiction. The case, though presenting a
forum interest, is nonetheless similar to 4laska Packers and Pacfic
Employers. In each instance, the defendant's failure to allege any
difference between the laws that could be articulated presented the
courts with mere apparent conflicts and, therefore, with no reason
to displace the presumptively applicable forum law. Thus, a
choice of law decision was unnecessary.
4. Unprovided-for-Cases
Unprovided-for-cases, in which neither state has an interest
but the laws urged by the parties nonetheless differ, provide the
greatest confusion for courts and analysts.2 The consensus ac-
cepting false conflicts is broad and deep. 225 Recognition of true
conflicts is also widespread, even if agreement on their treatment
is not.2 2 6 The unprovided-for-case, however, with its lack of inter-
ests, is both unfamiliar and disquieting to many.2 7
223. Id.
224. See, e.g., Hurtado v. Superior Court, 11 Cal. 3d 574, 522 P.2d 666, 114 Cal. Rptr.
106 (1974), in which a Mexican passenger in an automobile driven by a resident of Califor-
nia was killed in California. Mexico's ceiling of $2,000 for wrongful death recovery fa-
vored defendants; California law which placed no ceiling on recovery favored plaintiffs.
The defendant was from California and the plaintiffs were from Mexico. Thus, neither
California nor Mexico had an interest in the application of its law.
The first part of the opinion is a model of clear interest analysis. Finding that no Mexi-
can interest required the displacement of the California forum's law, the court called for
the application of California's rule of unlimited recovery. Id. at 582, 522 P.2d at 671, 114
Cal. Rptr. at I 11. Unfortunately, the court then stated that wrongful death acts not only
favor plaintiffs, but also target defendants. Id. at 584, 522 P.2d at 672, 114 Cal. Rptr. at
112. Finding deterrence of wrongful conduct in an alternative policy within the California
wrongful death act, the court concluded that California had an interest. Id.
Deterrence, however, is a flimsy basis for an interest. See infra notes 332-33 and ac-
companying text. Furthermore, the conversion of an unprovided-for-case into an alleged
false conflict distorts precedent, creates a plethora of spurious true conflicts, and precludes
rigorous interest analysis. See infra notes 300-47 and accompanying text.
In partial defense of the court in Hurlado, however, it might be that the court under-
stood Traynor to have established a rule in favor of the foreign law in an unprovided-for-
case. See supra note 108.
225. See supra note 90.
226. See supra note 91.
227. See, e.g., Twerski, Neumeler v. Kuehner. Where Are The Emperor's Clothes?, 1
HOFSTRA L. REV. 104 (1973).
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Nonetheless, the unprovided-for-case is straightforward be-
cause it is strictly parallel to a purely domestic case in which the
court must apply forum law. Similarly, in an unprovided-for-
case, no reason exists for displacing forum law because no other
state has any interest.228
Unprovided-for-cases, however, may go unrecognized if courts
discern interests where none exists.229 Such unrecognized unpro-
vided-for-cases are doubly unfortunate. First, such cases delay
understanding and recognition of the utility and merit of interest
analysis. Second, such cases support a mistaken view of what suf-
fices to create a state interest. It is urged herein that there can be
no meaningful and successful interest analysis without acceptance
of the unprovided-for-case. Furthermore, interest analysis which
does not strictly discern interests will avoid unprovided-for-cases
only at the cost of generating excessive numbers of spurious true
conflicts.23°
Allstate Insurance Co. v. Hague 23 is not the first unprovided-
for-case to have been decided by the Supreme Court, as the fol-
lowing development of precedent will show. As with true con-
flicts, the precedent before Erie is mixed, 232 but since Erie, the
Supreme Court consistently has sustained and even required ap-
plication of forum law when no other state has presented an inter-
est, whether a forum interest was or could have been shown.
a. Carroll v. Lanza.23 3 Carroll, a Missouri resident, was in-
jured in Arkansas in the course of his employment with Hogan,
also a Missouri resident, who was a subcontractor to Lanza, a resi-
dent of Louisiana. The negligence of Lanza's employees, acting
within the scope of their employment, caused Carrolls injury.131
228. Cf. Home Ins. Co. v. Dick, 281 U.S. 397 (1930) (where the "other jurisdiction" did
have an interest in the application of its law, and the forum's interest was irrelevant, the
forum rule could not be invoked without denying due process). See supra text accompany-
ing notes 118-30.
229. See supra note 224.
230. See supra note 95.
231. 449 U.S. 302 (1981).
232. Compare Northwestern Life Ins. Co. v. McCue, 223 U.S. 234 (1912) (Virginia, the
forum and domicile of the decedent, regarded death by capital punishment a valid defense
to a life insurance police; Wisconsin, the home of the insurer, did not. Locating the con-
tract in Virginia, the Supreme Court denied recovery.) with Ormsby v. Chase, 290 U.S. 387
(1933) (place of wrong determines whether claim for damages survives death of wrong-
doer). See also supra note 100.
233. 349 U.S. 408 (1955).
234. 116 F. Supp. 491, 505 (W.D. Ark. 1953).
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Under Missouri law, the general contractor, Lanza, was immune
from tort actions brought by an employee of the subcontractor
when that employee had received workers' compensation for his
injuries.23 5 In contrast, the law of Arkansas permitted employees
of subcontractors to recover against negligent general contrac-
tors.236 The subcontractor's workers' compensation insurance car-
rier in both Missouri and Arkansas voluntarily paid compensation
to Carroll initially according to the law of Missouri, the state of
employment. Carroll, however, also obtained judgment against
the general contractor in federal district court in Arkansas.237
The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reversed 238 on
two grounds. First, according to his deposition, Carroll knew he
was being compensated under Missouri law six weeks before he
requested compensation under Arkansas law, but he continued to
accept the Missouri benefits for those six weeks. The court
deemed such acceptance of Missouri benefits to entail acceptance
of the exclusive remedy in Missouri law. Second, Magnolia Petro-
leum Co. v. Hunt,239 which has since been overruled, was deemed
to govern. Having received workers' compensation from his em-
ployer's insurer, which was all that he could obtain under Mis-
souri law, Carroll was barred from seeking a further tort recovery
under Arkansas law from Lanza, the general contractor.240
In an opinion by Justice Douglas, the Supreme Court reversed
the decision of the court of appeals and held that Arkansas, the
forum, need not defer to the law of Missouri.24 ' Although the
Court reached the correct result, its analysis omitted any express
distinction between the true conflict and the unprovided-for-case.
235. Id. at 501.
236. Id.
237. 116 F. Supp. at 509.
238. 216 F.2d 808 (8th Cir. 1954).
239. 320 U.S. 430 (1943). Magnolia was overruled by Thomas v. Washington Gas
Light Co., 448 U.S. 261 (1980), but Magnolia had never been a popular decision. Id. at 269
n.13.
240. In the Magnolia case, Hunt, a resident of Louisiana, was employed in that
state by Magnolia as a laborer in connection with the drilling of oil wells. In the
course of his employment he went to Texas where, while working on an oil well,
he was injured. He procured workmen's compensation for his injuries under the
Texas Workmen's Compensation Law. Under the Texas law the award of com-
pensation was final and exclusive, resembling the Missouri law in that respect.
Afterward Hunt instituted a proceeding in Louisiana to recover compensation
under the laws of that state. He was awarded the relief demanded by the state
court of Louisiana, and the Supreme Court reversed. It is difficult to distinguish
that case from the present one.
Lanza v. Carroll, 216 F.2d 808, 816 (8th Cir. 1954).
241. 349 U.S. 408 (1955).
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First, the Court distinguished Magnolia, in which final adjudica-
tion had been obtained in the state awarding compensation, from
Carroll, in which "no adjudication was sought or obtained."242
Justice Douglas also emphasized that Carroll was not a case in
which an employee "knowing of two remedies which purport to
be mutually exclusive, chooses one as against the other and there-
fore is precluded a second choice by the law of the forum."'243 In-
stead, Justice Douglas framed the issue as "whether the full faith
and credit clause makes Missouri's statute a bar to Arkansas' com-
mon-law remedy." 2"
In the remainder of the opinion, the Court departed from the
traditional Bealean concepts of the first Restatement by discarding
the notion that one law must apply exclusively to any one event.
Although a statute is a "public act" within the full faith and credit
clause,245 a forum need not yield to another state's statute if ob-
noxious 246 to the forum.247 Such rejection of exclusivity reflects
the modem view of basing choice of law on the competing policies
of the states' allegedly conflicting laws.2 48
Nonetheless, even though the Court was sensitive to the im-
portance of state policies, it overlooked the concurrent require-
ment that the policies also be relevant in the case at bar. Although
Carroll is actually an unprovided-for-case, the Court's language,
taken almost verbatim from Pacfc Employers,24 9 describes the
strict interest analysis of a true conflict:
The [Supreme] Court [has] proceeded on the premise, repeated
over and again in the cases, that the Full Faith and Credit
Clause does not require a State to substitute for its own statute,
242. Id. at411.
243. Id.
244. Id.
245. Id.
246. The exact meaning of "obnoxious" in the choice of law context has never been
clear, but it does seem to have had a lower threshhold than the public policy doctrine
described in Loucks v. Standard Oil, 224 N.Y. 99, 120 N.E. 198 (1918). See supra note
127.
247. 349 U.S. at 412.
248. If obnoxious behavior were contrary to local public policy, see supra note 127,
then nothing new would have been added by Pacfc Employers, upon which the Court in
Carroll relied. If obnoxious behavior meant merely being different, then there would be no
choice of law. If, however, a law without an interest is urged in the face of a forum interest,
then it may be obnoxious in an ordinary sense.
249. Cf. "Mhe full faith and credit clause does not require one state to substitute for
its own statute, applicable to persons and events within it, the conflicting statute of another
state, even though that statute is of controlling force in the courts of the state of its enact-
ment with respect to the same persons and events." Paeq#c Employers, 306 U.S. at 502.
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applicable to persons and events within it, the statute of an-
other State reflecting conflicting and opposed policy.250
Where both states are seen to have conflicting interests, which
the Court calls "policies," the Court finds a true conflict. If Ar-
kansas law is applicable to Carroll's injury, for example, then Ar-
kansas need not yield to the conflicting policy of the Missouri law.
The difficulty is that neither Pac~ic Employers nor Carroll
presents a true conflict. Pacft Employers is only an apparent
conflict,25" ' and Carroll is an unprovided-for-case.
The key issue in Carroll was whether Lanza, the general con-
tractor, could avail himself of the defense provided by the exclu-
sive remedy in the Missouri workers' compensation law. Lanza,
however, was completely unconnected to Missouri. It is unlikely
that the Missouri legislature worried about Louisiana general con-
tractors working in Arkansas even if such general contractors
hired Missouri subcontractors. 52 Lanza simply did not have
standing in an Arkansas court to seek a defense provided in Mis-
souri law,253 because Missouri had no interest in applying its law
protecting Missouri contractors in favor of a Louisiana
contractor.2 54
It is, of course, equally true that Arkansas had no interest in
providing a common law remedy to a Missouri worker who had
incurred no debts in Arkansas.255 Strict interest analysis, how-
ever, does not require a forum interest as a precondition to the
application of forum law. Forum law is applicable unless the fo-
rum lacks an interest in an issue in which another jurisdiction has
an actual interest.2 56 Application of Arkansas forum law to this
unprovided-for-case was correct and appropriate. Thus, the ma-
jority reached a result in full accord with strict interest analysis of
the unprovided-for-case.
Although Justice Frankfurter's dissent manifested a desire to
construe state interests broadly so that weighing would be used, at
250. 349 U.S. at 412.
251. See supra note 93.
252. "Thus there is no warrant for believing that the Missouri courts would refuse to
allow suit against [Lanza] as an ordinary third party." 349 U.S. at 425 (Frankfurter, J.,
dissenting).
253. See CRAMTON & CURRIE, supra note 71, at 307.
254. See, e.g., Home Ins. Co. v. Dick, 281 U.S. 397 (1930), discussed at supra note 228.
255. Currie has articulated a lower order of interests in unprovided-for-cases which'he
called "altruistic interests," B. CURRIE, supra note 3, at 489, but the primary purpose of
altruistic interests in his thinking was to allow unprovided-for-cases to meet his inaccurate
due process test.
256. See, e.g., Home Ins. Co. v. Dick, 281 U.S. 397 (1930), discussed atsupra note 228.
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least in the workers' compensation cases, to decide the conflicts, 25 7
even his discussion of Lanza's alleged defense under Missouri law
is consistent with strict interest analysis.25 According to Frank-
furter, Lanza's rights and duties were governed by Arkansas or
Louisiana law, 259 but not by Missouri law, because Lanza was not
a Missouri employer. With "no warrant for believing that the
Missouri courts would [allow an affirmative defense of exclusiv-
ity], [p]resumably, then, Carroll could sue Lanza under either
Missouri or Arkansas law for his negligence."2 0 Justice Frank-
furter then concluded that the question of whether Arkansas owed
full faith and credit to the Missouri defense need not have been
reached. Justice Frankfurter urged remand to determine whether
his reading of Missouri law was correct. If that reading were cor-
rect, then Arkansas had no duty to defer to the application of Mis-
souri law in a case in which careful consideration of Missouri
precedents showed that Missouri policy did not embrace out-of-
state contractors like Lanza. Thus, even the dissent's basic analyt-
ical framework is largely consistent with strict interest analysis.
Interest analysis enables the reconciliation of apparently con-
flicting cases. Although the consensus in the literature is that Car-
roll overruled Clapper sub silentio,261 the two cases are consistent
under strict interest analysis. Carroll is viewed as an unprovided-
for-case in which the presumption in favor of the Arkansas forum
257. 349 U.S. at 419.
258. See id. at 422-25.
259. Although Louisiana law provided immunity from tort liability to general contrac-
tors, the immunity was in exchange for the general contractor's liability for workers' com-
pensation benefits. Malone, Workmen'r Compensation, 12 LA. L. REv. 150, 150 n.3 (1952).
Because Carroll could not have obtained workers' compensation from Lanza under Louisi-
ana law, Cobb v. International Paper Co., 76 So. 2d 460 (La. App. 1954), Lanza could not
raise the Louisiana immunity as a defense to liability under Arkansas law. See supra text
accompanying note 148 (Brandeis, J. limiting the benefit of New Hampshire's employee
favoring law to New Hampshire employees in Clapper).
260. 349 U.S. at 425.
261. See, ag., R. CRAMTON & R. SEDLER, CONFLICT OF LAWS 159-60 (1977); A.
EHRENZWEIG, supra note 63, § 40, at 145; H. GOODRICH & E. SCOLES, HANDBOOK OF THE
CONFLICT OF LAWS § 100, at 190-91 (4th ed. 1964); R. LEFLAR, supra note 63, § 57; R.
WEINTRAUB, supra note 63, at 399-404. The Supreme Court's recent pronouncements,
however, have been inconsistent. Compare Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S. 410, 421 (1979)
(favorable to a modified application of Clapper) with Thomas v. Washington Gas Light,
448 U.S. 261 (1980), which stated: "Carroll, which for all intents and purposes buried
whatever was left of Clapper after Pacific Employers ... . cast no doubt on Clapper's
reliance on the Full Faith and Credit Clause itself." Id. at 273 n.18. Although Thomas is a
year more recent, Hall is more relevant. Hall concerned choice of law; Thomas concerned
recognition of judgments. Thomas also contains three opinions which in the aggregate con-
clude that the rule to be followed is conceptually inferior to the rule to be ignored.
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was not rebutted, and Clapper is a false conflict in which the inter-
est of Vermont, the nonforum, in the Vermont employer required
the New Hampshire forum to yield.
b. Allstate Insurance Company v. Hague.262 Under strict in-
terest analysis, Hague is an unprovided-for-case with the pre-
sumption of forum law not rebutted. This conclusion is justified
because neither Minnesota nor Wisconsin had an interest com-
posed of a policy and a person within the protected class.
Minnesota's stacking rule benefits the victims of accidents in
which the party legally responsible is uninsured. Under strict in-
terest analysis, the class for which this law was made is narrowly
defined. In Hague, that class consists of Minnesota residents, or
the heirs of decedents from Minnesota, or both. Regardless of her
motivation, Mrs. Hague's postaccident move to Minnesota did not
give her membership in the protected class. 263 With no one within
the protected class present in the case, Minnesota lacked an
interest.
Determining Wisconsin's interest is more complicated because
of the difficulty in identifying both the policy behind Wisconsin's
disallowance of stacking and the protected class.2 ' In a case like
Hague, Allstate would have collected three separate premiums,
each purporting to provide $15,000 of coverage against injury by
uninsured motorists. Upon the insured's injury by an uninsured
motorist, Allstate would tender $15,000 and, so far as any opinion
discloses, keep both the other $30,000 and the extra two premi-
ums. The Minnesota Supreme Court's majority in Hague sug-
gested that Wisconsin's purpose may have been "to keep
insurance premiums low while providing some protections against
uninsured motorists. 2 65 The rule against stacking could keep in-
surance rates down if the actuaries planned subsidizing purchasers
of single policies through the sale of nonexistent coverage, but it is
difficult to see how the class of compelled purchasers of multiple
uninsured coverages would be aided by denial of that for which
they had already paid. In short, if Wisconsin did not join the ma-
262. 449 U.S. 302 (1981).
263. See John Hancock Mut. Ins. Co. v. Yates, 299 U.S. 178 (1936).
264. There is substantial reason to believe that the case was actually only an appaient
conflict, notwithstanding Allstate's position. The Wisconsin statute in question had not
been interpreted since its amendment in 1973. It may be that the amended statute applica-
ble to Hague required stacking. See supra note 16.
265. 289 N.W.2d at 47.
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jority upholding stacking with its 1973 amendment, 266 the purpose
and policy of its minority rule resists identification.267 Wisconsin
certainly can enact laws without obvious purpose. Some such
laws might even survive scrutiny under due process and other con-
stitutional protections. Wisconsin, however, cannot expect other
states to defer to such laws.
With neither state having an identifiable interest in the litiga-
tion, Hague is an unprovided-for-case, and the presumption in
favor of applying Minnesota law in a Minnesota court stands un-
rebutted. Hague, therefore, illustrates the difference between
presuming forum law to apply and requiring an affirmative reason
for applying a law. Mrs. Hague's claim for the application of
Minnesota law may lack the affirmative support it would have
gained if she or Mr. Hague were within the set of beneficiaries for
whom the Minnesota rule had been enacted, but her lawsuit nev-
ertheless requires resolution. With the forum law as the residual
law, a predictable decision follows.
B. The Presumption of Forum Law in the Hague Opinions
Both the plurality and dissent concurred that a state's law may
not properly be applied in the absence of an affirmative state in-
terest. Only Justice Stevens recognized the rebuttable presump-
tion in favor of applying forum law.
The plurality's test for the constitutionality of applying a
state's law, however, sets too high a threshold. "[F]or a State's
substantive law to be selected in a constitutionally permissible
manner, that State must have a significant contact or significant
aggregation of contacts, creating state interests, such that choice of
its law is neither arbitrary nor fundamentally unfair. 268
The shortcoming of the plurality's test is that it does not allow
for the possibility of a lawsuit, like Hague, which does not reflect
any state interests. The plurality's implicit assumption that every
266. See supra note 16.
267. No serious consideration is given to Allstate as the party for whom the rule against
stacking was maintained. First, strict interest analysis regards casualty insurance compa-
nies as only proxies for their risk pools. See infra note 326 and accompanying text. Sec-
ond, Allstate stands to lose only the windfall associated with selling the same coverage
three times. Third, whatever Wisconsin's policy, Wisconsin is nonetheless entitled to a
presumption against having legitimized the intentional sale of phantom coverage. If this
type of review sounds too much like substantive due process, the defense offered is that the
subtantive standard which always has governed is that no law can take from A and give to
B. See, e.g., Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386 (1798).
268. 449 U.S. at 312-13.
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case presents at least one state interest ignores both the unpro-
vided-for-case in general and the facts of Hague in particular.
Moreover, the affirmative requirement is not necessary to explain
the precedents, for which the rebuttable presumption in favor of
applying forum law adequately accounts. The cost of this incor-
rect test is the plurality's need to exaggerate Minnesota's relation-
ship with Hague to justify the application of Minnesota law.
The plurality attempted to derive its test from leading, familiar
cases. Watson v. Employers Liability Assurance Corp.269 and Clay
v. Sun Insurance Office, Ltd ' 0 were correctly cited for the propo-
sition that more than one state's law may properly govern a law-
suit.27' Both cases meet the plurality's requirement of an
affirmative basis for the application of forum law. Yet, both cases
are true conflicts, not unprovided-for-cases like Hague. Further-
more, Watson and Clay 1I only show that a forum interest is a
sufficient basis for applying forum law, not a necessary basis.
Only a case barring use of forum law can demonstrate what is
necessary.
The next two cases relied on by the plurality, Home Insurance
Co. v. Dick27 2 and Yates v. John Hancock Mutual Life Insurance
Co. ,273 are described as cases in which "the selection of forum law
rested exclusively on the presence of one nonsignificant forum
contact."2 74 These two cases, however, are false conflicts in which
the application of forum law was barred not only because the fo-
rum had no interest, but also because the other jurisdictions did
have interests. Both Mexico, in Home, and New York, in Yates,
had clear interests contrary to the policies of the forums.
Watson and Clay II demonstrate that a forum interest is suffi-
cient. Home and Yates demonstrate that in the face of a contrary
nonforum interest, a forum interest is necessary. Neither pair of
cases establishes a requirement for a forum interest in the absence
of another jurisdiction's conflicting nonforum interest.
The Hague plurality then erroneously likened Hague to Alaska
Packers,275 Cardillo,276 and Clay 1,277 as "cases where this Court
269. 348 U.S. 66 (1954).
270. 377 U.S. 179 (1964).
271. 449 U.S. at 307.
272. 281 U.S. 397 (1930).
273. 299 U.S. 178 (1936).
274. 449 U.S. at 309.
275. 294 U.S. 532 (1935).
276. 330 U.S. 469 (1947).
277. 377 U.S. 179 (1964).
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sustained choice-of-law decisions based on the contacts of the
State, whose law was applied, with the parties and occurrence. 278
These three cases are, in fact, different. While Alaska Packers and
Cardillo resemble Hague in presenting no nonforum interest,27 9
Cardillo differs from Hague in that it presents a clear forum inter-
est. California's interest in Palma, the employee in Alaska Pack-
ers, was less clear. As a true conflict, Clay 1I differs completely
from Hague, the unprovided-for-case. In Clay II and Cardillo,
the forum interests sufficed to support the forums' laws. InAlaska
Packers and Cardillo, the absence of any nonforum interests
made a showing of a forum interest unnecessary. Thus, these
cases relied on by the Hague plurality do not provide strong sup-
port for its thesis.
Dropping a footnote, the plurality sought further to buttress its
argument.280 The cases on which the plurality relied, however,
are distinguishable when viewed under interest analysis. Nevada
v. Hall"1 and Watson applied forum law on the basis of the plain-
tifis residence and place of the injury. As true conflicts, forum
law was the correct choice in both instances. The footnote then
endorsed Pacftc Employers282 and CarrolP83 for relying on the fo-
rum as "the place of the injury arising from the respective em-
ployee's temporary presence in the forum State in connection with
his employment. '2 4 With neither case showing a nonforum inter-
est, there was no necessity to demonstrate a forum interest. In
Pacqc Employers, California did have an interest in its medical
creditors being paid, but in Carroll, Arkansas had no interest in
Carroll, whose injury "cast no burden on [Arkansas] or her insti-
tutions."28 5 As with Watson and Clay, because a forum interest
suffices to support forum law does not mean that a forum interest
is necessary for the forum to apply its law. Thus, while reaching
the correct result that forum law applied, the plurality's reasoning
is vulnerable to serious criticism.
Even more than the plurality, the dissent demonstrates the
conceptual difficulties of a failure to recognize the unprovided-
278. 449 U.S. at 311.
279. While Alaska Packers and Cardillo might well have presented nonforum interests
on their facts, no nonforum interest was articulated.
280. 449 U.S. at 312-13 n.17.
281. 440 U.S. 410 (1978).
282. 306 U.S. 493 (1939).
283. 349 U.S. 408 (1955).
284. 449 U.S. at 313.
285. 349 U.S. at 413.
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for-case. By requiring an affirmative showing of an interest in the
forum, the dissent only could reject application of forum law
when no Minnesota interest could be found. The dissent's state-
ment that "both the Due Process and the Full Faith and Credit
Clauses are satisfied if the forum has such significant contacts with
the litigation that it has a legitimate state interest in applying its
own law" 286 suggests that a forum interest is sufficient but might
not be necessary. The remainder of the opinion, however, urges
that an affirmative case must be made to sustain application of
forum law. The dissent may have gone beyond requiring a state
interest as a necessary condition precedent to application of forum
law by stating, "the forum State must have a legitimate interest in
the outcome of the litigation before it."'287 By restricting the
states' powers to hear cases and provide the rules of decision for
cases, the plain meaning of these words would bar Texas and
Georgia from even deferring to the interests of Mexico and New
York in Home and Yates, respectively. Yet the dissent may not
have intended the plain meaning to be interpreted to the fullest
extent because it expressed an awareness of the distinction be-
tween judicial jurisdiction and choice of law (i.e., legislative juris-
diction) in the next paragraph.288 More likely, the dissent simply
was joining the plurality in insisting on an actual state interest to
support any application of state law. Otherwise, further complexi-
ties would have been added to the question ofjudicial jurisdiction.
Nevertheless, even this limited reading of the dissent's seemingly
plain words is inconsistent with the second Restatement's para-
digm of the neutral forum.289 Moreover, the apparent conflict, Pa-
c/fc Employers, is thin authority for an affirmative condition
precedent to the application of state law. Dictum in Hall similarly
was relied on to restrict the full faith and credit clause from re-
quiring the application of nonforum law in the face of a contrary
legitimate public policy.
The dissent assumed that every application of a state's law re-
286. 449 U.S. at 333 (Powell, J., dissenting).
287. Id. at 334.
288. Id. But cf. supra notes 26 & 27 (Justices Black and Brennan and Justice Otis
linking judicial and legislative jurisdiction).
289. Compare Reese, supra note 75, at 692: "[T]he Restatement is written from the
viewpoint of a neutral forum which has no interest of its own to protect and is seeking only
to apply the most appropriate law," with Currie, The Disinterested Third State, 28 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBs. 754, 766 (1963): "[Reese] wants to devise rules for Almost-Never Land
with the expressed hope that they will encroach on real life and be applied to the [cases
neglected by the Restatement] that make up our normal experience."
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flects an attempt to advance its policy: "Nonetheless, for a forum
State to further its legitimate public policy by applying its own
law to a controversy, there must be some connection between the
facts giving rise to the litigation and the scope of the State's law-
making jurisdiction."2z 0
The existence of the unprovided-for-case, however, refutes the
dissent's assumption. Mere application of a state's law does not
imply an attempt to further its policy. A state cannot further its
policy without some party who stands to benefit from application
of that policy. Congruence of party and policy is required where
at least one of the litigants is within the legitimate concern of the
state-that is, when the state has an interest. Yet, the unprovided-
for-case is the precise instance where no such party is present. Not
every case presents a state interest.
In an unprovided-for-case, the forum does not attempt to fur-
ther its interest because it has none. All that the forum can do in
an unprovided-for-case is apply forum law to decide the parties'
real dispute. There is no reason to do otherwise. Certainly the
application of the equally uninterested law of another state cannot
be thought preferable.
It is especially unfortunate that the dissent quoted Currie out
of context. The dissent stated, "In short, examination of contacts
addresses whether 'the state has an interest in the application of its
policy in this instance.' "291 Currie, of course, did not speak of
contacts, but rather of interests which were not generated simply
by the geographical location of a transaction. 92 Moreover, the
quotation is the last line of the second of five suggestions. The
first suggestion is that, "normally, even in cases involving foreign
factors, a court should as a matter of course look to the law of the
forum as the source of the rule of decision. '2 93 Thus, quite to the
contrary of the dissent's suggestion, Currie presumed the applica-
bility of forum law unless "the forum state has no interest in the
application of its law and policy, but . . . the foreign state has
such an interest. 294 Currie, of course, would have applied forum
law to cases where neither state has an interest.295 Reliance on
290. 449 U.S. at 334.
291. Id. at 334-35.
292. See B. CuPuin, supra note 3, at 192-93.
293. Id. at 188.
294. Id. at 189.
295. "In comparatively rare cases, it may be found that neither state has an interest in
the application of its policy, although no other state is concerned. In such [unprovided-for-
cases], also, it seems the law of the forum should ordinarily be applied. Id.
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Currie notwithstanding, the dissent's requirement of an interest to
sustain the forum's law and determination that there was none in
Minnesota necessitated the conclusion that Minnesota erred in ap-
plying its own law.
In his concurring opinion, however, Justice Stevens recognized
an express presumption in favor of applying forum law, applica-
ble even in a case such as Hague, where neither state seemed to
have an interest: "[T]he [Full Faith and Credit] Clause should not
invalidate a state court's choice of forum law unless that choice
threatens the federal interest in national unity by unjustifiably in-
fringing on the legitimate interests of another State." '296 With All-
state having "failed to establish that Minnesota's refusal to apply
Wisconsin law poses any direct or indirect threat to Wisconsin's
sovereignty," '297 Stevens found no denial of full faith and credit.
Similarly, Stevens found the presumption in favor of applying
forum law to be consistent with the requirements of due process.
I question whether a judge's decision to apply the law of his
own State could ever be described as wholly irrational. For
judges are presumably familiar with their own state law and
may find it difficult and time consuming to discover and apply
correctly the law of another State. The forum State's interest in
the fair and efficient administration of justice is therefore suffi-
cient, in my judgment, to attach a presumption of validity to a
forum State's decision to apply its own law to a dispute over
which it has jurisdiction.
With the application of Minnesota law presenting no funda-
mental unfairness to Allstate, Justice Stevens concluded, "Al-
though I regard the Minnesota court's decision to apply forum law
as unsound as a matter of conflicts law, and there is little in this
record other than the presumption in favor of the forum's own law
to support that decision, I concur in the plurality's judgment. 299
Whereas his Brother Justices' insistence on an affirmative case
for applying any state's law left them with the choice between the
plurality's invention of a Minnesota interest or the dissent's insis-
tence on the wrong result, Justice Stevens was able to affirm the
application of Minnesota law simply because there was no good
reason to apply any other. Having examined the Hague opinions
in detail, this Article next will advocate the use of strict interest
analysis for deciding future cases and reconciling past decisions.
296. 449 U.S. at 323 (Stevens, J., concurring).
297. Id. at 325.
298. Id. at 326.
299. Id. at 331-32.
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III. IDENTIFYING STATE INTERESTS
Currie defined an interest as "the product of (a) a governmen-
tal policy and (b) the concurrent existence of an appropriate rela-
tionship between the state having the policy and the transaction,
the parties, or the litigation. ' 300 Extension of Currie's insights has
become necessary because courts have found state interests where
none exists and commentators have combined appropriate criti-
cisms of arguments and decisions with inappropriate attribution
of flaws in those decisions and arguments to interest analysis. 301 In
300. B. CuRuE, supra note 3, at 621.
As a pioneer interest analyst whose work was tragically shortened by an early death,
Currie did not live to see what courts and commentators have done with his essentially
sound insight. Moreover, because Currie viewed his essays as only a series of working
papers with which to enhance his understanding of the cases in his conflicts course, id. at
585, and, perhaps more importantly, because he disliked systems, id. at 121, Currie never
wrung every inconsistency from his work nor used his insights to the fullest extent as ana-
lytical tools.
301. See, e.g., Briimayer, Interest 4naysis and the Myth of Legislative Intent, 78 MICH.
L. REv. 392 (1980), stating in part: "Interest analysis is simply too unpredictable and paro-
chial to be a plausible theory of constructive intent." Id. at 393. Professor Brilmayer holds
Currie's interrupted, interim efforts, which posed important questions more than they pro-
vided definitive answers, to a high standard of rigor and consistency. Professor Brilmayer
is, of course, correct that Currie's work is not entirely satisfactory, but this author prefers to
attempt to understand what was intended and to further interest analysis' evolutionary
progress, rather than to resolve Currie's ambiguities and tentative conclusions against him.
Additionally, it appears that Professor Brilmayer's perception of the structure and content
of interest analysis differs so signficantly from the views expressed herein that neither our
respective descriptions of several cases nor the conclusions drawn therefrom can be recon-
ciled. This divergence of viewpoints reinforces the need for this exposition of the structure
and content of strict interest analysis.
In charging Currie with parochialism, Professor Brilmayer states: "'Interest' under the
Currie approach amounts to an 'interest' in getting the best deal possible for the resident
party by choosing the most favorable law." Id. at 409. Professor Brilmayer further states:
"Currie assumed that the legislature would want a guest statute to benefit resident drivers
only, if the driver was from a state without a guest statute, Currie would allow a resident
plaintiff to recover." Id. at 409 n.66. But see B. CURRIE, supra note 3, at 489.
If Professor Brilmayer is assuming the forum to be a guest act state, Brilmayer, supra at
408, she poses an unprovided-for-case, which additionally could raise jurisdictional
problems if the accident happened outside the state. See, e.g., Frummer v. Hilton Hotels,
Int'l, Inc., 19 N.Y.2d 533, 227 N.E.2d 851, 281 N.Y.S.2d 41, cert. denied, 389 U.S. 923
(1967). Professor Brilmayer's citation, however, is to Curries discussion of an Ontario
driver being sued by a New York resident in New York, a state without a guest act. Cf. B.
CURRIE, supra note 3, at 725 (Ontario driver sued by New York guest in New York court).
Currie's hypothethical case is a true conflict. In interest analyses, whether strict, Sedler's,
or Currie's, these cases are absolutely different: in the former case, neither state has an
interest; in the latter, both present interests. Professor Brilmayer's analysis does not reflect
a full appreciation of this distinction and its consequences. It is inferred that Professor
Brilmayer equates the cases because she perceives them to result in the local party always
winning. In strict interest analysis, the forum law is presumed applicable and is displaced
only when another jurisdiction has the only interest. Thus, viewed in terms of strict interest
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strict interest analysis, a state will be recognized to have an inter-
est only if it has a clear302 policy which is otherwise constitu-
tional3°3 and which reaches the facts of the case at hand by
analysis, the cases are similar because the forum law will be applied to both, but in the
former, that application will occur to the detriment of the local plaintiff, in the latter to his
benefit.
In short, the presumption of forum law in the unprovided-for-case is not narrowly self-
ish and parochial. Currie did not necessarily discuss these considerations fully. It is only
the gap between Professor Brilmayer's perception of Currie's interim thought and the cur-
rent status of the evolutionary extensions of his insights that leads to the appearance of
unpredictability. Cf. Twerski, supra note 227, at 121 (conceding the predictability of inter-
est analysis).
Just as this Article was going to press, the Columbia Law Review published a well-
deserved tribute to Professor Reese upon his retirement July 1, 1981 as Charles Evans
Hughes Professor of Law at Columbia University Law School. This issue contained arti-
cles by Professors Rosenberg, Hill, Cavers, von Mehren, Juengar, and Leflar. A recurring
theme was the superiority of insightful rules over interest analyses. 81 COLUM. L. REv.
933-1149 (1981).
In particular, however, Professor Rosenberg seems to have joined Professor Brilmayer
in ascribing the flaws they find in others' work to Currie. It may be, for example, that the
method of the California Supreme Court in Vesely v. Sager, 5 Cal. 3d 135, 486 P.2d 151, 95
Cal. Rptr. 623 (1971), in which an action for dram shop damages was created, differed from
that of Bernhard v. Harrah's Club, 16 Cal. 3d 313, 546 P.2d 719, 128 Cal. Rptr. 215 (1976).
If Currie failed to predict the language of the courts, so be it. What Currie did urge, and
what the court did do, however involuted and confused its method, see Kay, supra note
187, was for the forum court to apply its compensatory law in favor of its injured plaintiff,
regardless of the fact that the defendant's law would not have sustained compensation.
The case was a true conflict and a contrary result would be expected and appropriate in
Nevada where the defendant did business. The choice of law should be the same even if
the bar were at Metropolitan Airport outside Detroit and the customer stayed drunk for the
five hours it would take to get from Michigan to his car in the parking lot at Los Angeles
International Airport. This hypothetical ease, of course, makes clear that the real problem
in Bernhard might well be judicial jurisdiction and not choice of law.
Similarly, the failure of the court in Bernkrant v. Fowler, 55 Cal. 2d 588, 360 P.2d 906,
12 Cal. Rptr. 266 (1961), to track a domestic case perfectly does not show the impossibility
of determining the appropriate reach of a state's policy. In fact, there is no reason to expect
Currie and Traynor to approach cases identically. Compare supra note 107 with note 108.
302. The requirement of a clear interest serves only to emphasize that a judge deciding
an issue of choice of law should not first discover a policy in either domestic or foreign law
unintended by its makers and then use that revelation to justify choosing the reinterpreted
law. Cf. Leflar, The Nature of Conflicts Law, 81 COLUM. L. REv. 1080 (1981). "Inventive
minds can discover local interests and ascribe major weight to them even when factual
contacts are small and the interest itself is making its first appearance in court." Id. at
1087. Furthermore, a state should not adopt a covert discriminatory policy under an ap-
parently acceptable disguise. See B. CURRIE, supra note 3, at 347.
A separate, although easily commingled, question is what the court should do when it
prefers the other jurisdiction's substantive law to its own. See, e g., Emery v. Emery, 45
Cal. 2d 421, 289 P.2d 218 (1955), discussed in Traynor, supra note 73, at 132 (domestic rule
was changed before the court reached the choice of law issue). Leflar has recognized this
preference as a potentially valid basis for choice of law. See supra note 17.
303. The requirement that the law to be applied be otherwise constitutional simply
recognizes that the choice of law process cannot be a tool to sidestep other valid con-
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affecting a member of the class to be protected by the law under
consideration.
Strict interest analysis considers the actual rather than the pre-
sumed relevance of a state's law. The premise is that in the ab-
sence of guidance from the legislature, courts shall determine the
proper reach of each policy. In making these ordinary common
law determinations, however, the courts should be careful to con-
strue their interests narrowly. Such strict construction harmonizes
state choice of law decisions with the Supreme Court's constraints
on the choice of law process.
Currie did not discuss whether interests should be broadly or
narrowly construed. It is evident, however, that Currie recognized
in himself a tendency toward the overinclusive identification of
state interests. When confronted by a seemingly true conflict, for
example, Currie was willing to reconsider his initial characteriza-
tion of both laws so as to avoid the true conflict. 3" This overin-
clusion followed by reconsideration is harmless when a seemingly
true conflict is recognized, on closer examination, as a false con-
flict. The harm occurs when what is merely an unprovided-for-
case is perceived spuriously and treated as a false conflict without
reexamination.
If the forum is found erroneously to have an interest, the ap-
propriate law is nonetheless applied, but misleading precedent
will have been made.305 Thereafter, insightful counsel may be
able to separate the dictum purporting to find an interest from the
narrower holding, but the task will be difficult where stare dic-
tum 30 6 and headnote jurisprudence30 7 are the professional norms.
Later, when false conflicts are erroneously apprehended to be true
conflicts, actual foreign interests may be frustrated by the errone-
ous precedents of spurious forum interests. 30 ' Likewise, if the for-
eign state instead is found erroneously to have an interest,
straints. But see Day & Zimmermann, Inc. v. Challoner, 423 U.S. 3 (1975), discussed at
infra note 349.
304. See B. CURRIE, supra note 3, at 83-84; supra note 107. Moreover, sometimes when
Currie used "interest," he meant "altruistic interest." E.g. B. CuRRIE, supra note 3, at 489.
Currie created this construct to reconcile the unprovided-for-case with his due process test,
id. at 271, which is modified herein. See infra notes 348-433 and accompanying text.
305. See, eg., Hurtado v. Superior Court, I 1 Cal. 3d 574, 522 P.2d 666, 114 Cal. Rptr.
106 (1974), discussed at supra note 95.
306. See F. COOPER, WRITING IN LAW PRAcTIc iii (rev. ed. 1963).
307. Cf. K. LLEWELLYN, THE BRAMBLE BUSH 67-68 (1960) (attack on wooden adher-
ence to misperceived precedent).
308. See, eg., Milkovich v. Saari, 295 Minn. 155, 203 N.E.2d 408 (1973). Cf. Her-
nandez v. Burger, 102 Cal. App. 3d 795, 162 Cal. Rptr. 564 (1980) (an unprovided-for-case
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misleading precedent results and the wrong party prevails as the
normally applicable forum law is displaced without reason.30 9
This Article will not offer detailed guidelines to draw the lines
between actual and speculative interests. Reconsideration of ac-
tual cases will be employed instead. While these past courts prob-
ably did not consciously use strict interest analysis, the large
number of Supreme Court decisions conforming to such analysis
is striking-a coincidence of outcome reflecting the sound in-
stincts of the Justices. Furthermore, such coincidence satisfies the
requirements for acceptance of any theory: that it account for past
converted to a spurious true conflict by the California courts' aggressive overinclusive iden-
tification of state interests).
309. Brilmayer, supra note 301, implies that interest analysts advocate the parochial
ploy of denying nonresidents the benefits of local policies, whether protective or compensa-
tory. Id. at 408. In unprovided-for-cases, e.g., Carroll v. Lanza, 349 U.S. 408 (1955);
Northwestern Life Ins. Co. v. McCue, 234 U.S. 234 (1912); Hurtado v. Superior Court, 11
Cal. 3d 574, 522 P.2d 666, 114 Cal. Rptr. 106 (1974); Neumeier v. Kuehner, 31 N.Y.2d 121,
286 N.E.2d 454, 335 N.Y.S.2d 64 (1972), the nonresident will obtain the forum law if suit
can be brought there. For nonresident plaintiffs, it should be simple to sue the defendant at
its home.
Strangely, however, Professor Brilmayer offers Frummer v. Hilton Hotels, Int'l, Inc., 19
N.Y.2d 533, 227 N.E.2d 851, 281 N.Y.S.2d 41, cert. denied, 389 U.S. 923 (1967), as an
example of a court eschewing what she calls parochialism. In Frummer, a New York court
gave a New York plaintiff the benefit of England's rule of comparative negligence when
interest analysis would have applied forum law to what the court acknowledged as an
unprovided-for-case. The decision is clearly wrong under interest analysis, but does illus-
trate a forum "getting the best deal possible for the resident party." Brilmayer, supra note
301, at 409.
With Frummer having been injured, in a London bathtub, only an interest analysis
would deny him English law in a New York court. Fuld's third rule, supra note 35, both
Conflict of Laws Restatements, and according to the court in Frummer, Leflar, supra note
17, would call for English law to be applied to the benefit of the New York plaintiff. The
court said that it was applying interest analysis, but actually did not.
Perhaps some of the confusion occurred during the printing of Professor Brilmayer's
article. The language quoted in Brilmayer, supra note 301, at 410 n.67, appears without a
direct citation. The full citation to the case, 19 N.Y.2d 533, 227 N.E.2d 851, 281 N.Y.S.2d
41, cert. denied, 389 U.S. 923 (1967), which immediately precedes the quotation, is to the
earlier phase of the litigation in which the London hotel and its parent resisted New York's
long-arm statute. Inste2 d, the quoted language appears at 60 Misc. 2d 840, 848, 304
N.Y.S.2d 335, 343 (Sup. Ct. 1969). The decision rests as much on Leflar, supra note 17, as
on any other basis. 60 Misc. 2d at 849, 304 N.Y.S.2d at 344. In this unprovided-for-case
which plaintiffs counsel attempted to litigate at home, only an interest analysis would deny
recovery. The presumption in favor of applying forum law is neither parochial nor selfish.
The results of the other cases Professor Brilmayer cites, Hurtado v. Superior Court, 11
Cal. 3d 574, 522 P.2d 666, 114 Cal. Rptr. 106 (1974); McCrossin v. Hicks Chevrolet, Inc.,
248 A.2d 917 (D.C. Ct. App. 1969); Labree v. Major, 111 R.I. 657, 306 A.2d 808 (1973), do
not support the argument that the presumption favoring the application of forum law is
parochial or selfish, even though the courts in McCrossin and Hurtado reached for phan-
tom interests when recognition of the unprovided-for-case would have amply sustained the
application of forum law in favor of the nonresident.
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events and accurately predict future ones. If the outcomes of past
cases were not largely consistent with the analysis, that analysis
would be fatally flawed.31
Yet, strict interest analysis does provide a useful tool to recon-
cile past precedent, provided the interests are construed strictly. A
state interest is discerned most clearly when the state has a policy
which benefits some class within its reasonable concern and the
litigation presents a member of the class who would be benefitted
by application of that state's law. In New York Insurance Co. v.
Head,31 l for example, the Court considered the question of apply-
ing a Missouri statute to a non-Missouri decedent. The Missouri
statute provided that if a life insurance policy in force for at least
three years were allowed to lapse for nonpayment of premiums,
three-quarters of the net value of that policy would be used to
provide paid-up term insurance in the face amount of the policy
for as long as that fraction of the net value would provide.3 12 A
unanimous Court barred application of Missouri's nonforfeiture
statute.31 3 In the factually parallel case of Mutual Life Insurance
Co. v. Liebing,3 14 however, the Court considered a Missouri dece-
dent, and an equally unanimous Court sustained application of
Missouri law. The only distinction between the cases is that in
Head the decedent was not from Missouri. Missouri's nonforfeit-
ure act was enacted to protect the beneficiaries of Missouri in-
sureds from the consequences of nonpayment of premiums. Thus,
the beneficiary in Liebing was within the protected class, thereby
supporting the forum's interest.3 I5
Strict interest analysis next focuses on the defendant insurers,
both New York companies. With New York law protecting the
security interests of the insurers, which in both cases had ad-
310. The distinction between this symbiotic and synergistic method and the scientific
method is that when Mendel spoke to his plants, there was no expectation that doing so
would affect their genetics. In this case, there is no desire to change the way the Court has
been deciding choice of law issues, but only a desire to affect the way the Court and com-
mentators explain the Court's actions so that other courts will be as sure-handed as the
Supreme Court has been.
A fortiori, any analysis which is more successful at accounting for and predicting actual
decisions is more worthy of respect than its less successful counterparts. See supra text
accompanying notes 7-8.
311. 234 U.S. 149 (1914).
312. Mo. REv. STAT. §§ 5856-5859 (1889); Id. §§ 7897-7900 (1899), citedin New York
Life Ins. Co. v. Head, 234 U.S. 149, 157 (1914).
313. 234 U.S. at 157.
314. 259 U.S. 209 (1922).
315. 259 U.S. at 212; 234 U.S. at 160.
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vanced cash on the security of a lien on the entire cash value later
in dispute, New York had an interest in each of its insurers. Thus,
New York's interest made Liebing a true conflict, but Head only a
false conflict. By applying the forum law in Liebing and the
nonforum law in Head, the Court demonstrates the consistent ap-
plication of strict interest analysis and the ability to reconcile the
cases. The Court in Head also explicitly recognized the impropri-
ety of applying Missouri law in favor of residents of other states
even when their contracts technically had been made in Mis-
souri.31 6 Similarly, in Yates,3 17 the decedent could not have been
within the class for whom the favorable Georgia law had been
enacted and Mrs. Yates' post mortem move to Georgia was un-
availing. Thus, Yates was a false conflict to which Georgia forum
law did not apply.
If strict interest analysis is to be a fully meaningful tool, how-
ever, the analysis of state interests must indeed be strict and nar-
row. An example underscoring the need for strictness in interest
identification is Home Insurance Co. v. Dick,3 18 which shows that
a state does not have an interest merely because a casualty insur-
ance problem concerns one of its domiciliaries. Whereas domicile
sufficed for membership in the protected class so as to generate an
interest in Liebing, and would have sufficed if present in Head and
Yates, "The fact that Dick's permanent residence was in Texas
[was] without significance," due to Dick's extended absence from
his Texas domicile.3 19 Thus, while life insurance is a concern of
the insured's domicile, it is less clear that a state has an interest in
every casualty insurance problem of its citizens.
To illustrate, assume the forum has the common rule that the
insured will have at least two years in which to bring suit on a
claim, notwithstanding any contract to the contrary, and the con-
tract provides only one year. Further assume that after a resident
of the forum has purchased insurance from a forum insurer, an
316. In other words,. . .we must consider ... how far it was within the power of
the State of Missouri to extend its authority into the State of New York and there
forbid... a citizen of New Mexico and.., a citizen of New York from making
such a loan agreement in New York simply because it modified a contract origi-
nally made in Missouri .... [That Missouri could not do so was] so obviously
the necessary result of the Constitution that it has rarely been called in question.
234 U.S. at 161.
317. 299 U.S. 178 (1936). For a discussion of Yates, see supra notes 152-56 and accom-
panying text.
318. 281 U.S. 397 (1930). For a discussion of Home, see supra notes 118-30 and accom-
panying text.
319. 281 U.S. at 408.
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arguably insured loss occurs for which the insured waits eighteen
months to make a claim. If the loss occurs within the forum, there
will be no reason not to apply the domestic rule. The facts will be
within the lawmakers' anticipations. If, instead, the loss occurs
outside the forum, the court must determine whether the policy of
the rule includes losses without and within the forum. The forum
might properly find the insured within the class intended to be
protected by its policy, and thereby find an interest, if the policy
provided such coverage, if the loss was in the course of a tempo-
rary absence from the forum, or especially if the insurance pre-
mium had been determined wholly or in part by the insured's
residence.32 o
In Home, however, Dick's absence from the forum was pro-
tracted and the risk against which Dick was insured had no con-
nection with the forum. Thus, a real issue arose whether a long-
absent resident remained, for all purposes, within the ambit of the
policies of his technical place of residence. While the decedent in
Gri.Xn v. McCoach32' seems to have remained a basis for one
Texas interest while doing extensive business in New York, Dick's
stay in Mexico vitiated the Texas policy under the facts of that
case.
The distinction between these two cases lies in the difference
between casualty insurance and life insurance. With life insur-
ance so closely related to estate planning and intestacy, it is not an
extravagant reach for the domicile to retain an interest in the
question of who may have an insurable interest in a person's life.
The reach on casualty insurance, however, is shorter and usually
dependent upon the risk pool against which loss will be charged.
When strictly construing statutory policies to determine the exist-
ence or absence of interests in cases involving casualty insurance,
courts must consider carefully the dimensions of the actuarial risk
pool bearing the loss to distinguish statutory policies protecting all
domiciliaries from policies having a narrower focus. Consider, for
example, Tooker v. Lopez.322 Catherina Tooker and Marcia Lo-
pez, both residents of New York, were killed in Michigan when
Lopez lost control of her sports car. Suit for wrongful death was
320. See B. CURRIE, supra note 3, at 724-25 and the authority discussed therein. More-
over, a state does not abandon its resident while the resident is merely temporarily absent
from the state.
321. 313 U.S. 498 (1941). For a discussion of Grffin, see supra notes 170-75 and ac-
companying text.
322. 24 N.Y.2d 569, 249 N.E.2d 394, 301 N.Y.S.2d 519 (1969).
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brought in New York state court, alleging negligence by Lopez.
Recognizing the case as a false conffict in which only the forum
had an interest, the New York Court of Appeals correctly applied
New York law. Michigan did not have an interest because there
was no reason to believe that New York drivers were within the
policy of the Michigan Guest Act to protect negligent, gratuitous
Michigan hosts.
Consider two hypothetical variants of Lopez to distinguish lia-
ble New York host-drivers from immune Michigan host-drivers.
Assume, in addition to the facts already mentioned, that Lopez
had been engaged to marry a student from Michigan, with their
intent having been to live in Michigan. Lopez then would have
acquired a Michigan domicile.323 The distribution of Lopez' es-
tate, as a domiciliary of Michigan, would no longer be controlled
by the law of her previous domicile, New York.32 4
Next, assume that Lopez' father agreed to continue providing
and insuring the car from his Brooklyn, New York home until
after the wedding. Notwithstanding Michigan's new found control
of Lopez' estate, neither her estate nor her father's insurer would
be entitled to raise the guest act defense because Michigan had no
interest composed of a policy and a member of the protected class.
The policy of Michigan's guest act was to protect Michigan driv-
ers-the aggregate pool of drivers sharing in and contributing to
Michigan's loss experience-from liability to gratuitous guests.325
323. Her Michigan domicile would have been a consequence of her previous arrival in
Michigan, together with her newly formulated intent to remain indefinitely. RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 15, 18 (1971). No reliance is placed on RE-
STATEMENT OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 27 (1934) (married woman has domicile of husband).
324. In the actual case, New York law controlled distribution of Lopez' estate, as she
was a New York domiciliary. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 260
(1971); In re Barrie's Estate, 240 Iowa 431, 35 N.W.2d 658 (1949).
325. See supra note 320. This analysis rejects "plaintiff-targeting" as unlikely, unrealis-
tic, and a misconstruction of arguably rational defendant-protecting policies.
A common example of supposed plaintiff-targeting is the bar on suits by hitchhikers as
a buttress to the existing ban on hitchhiking. If Michigan enacted such a disability, it
presumably would apply to Michigan hitchhikers. A determination would then have to be
made as to who would properly be included within that set. If the motive were to protect
hitchhikers from attacks and abuse by drivers and highwaypersons, then all Michigan
domiciliaries, wherever hitchhiking, would be targeted. If the motive were to protect Mich-
igan drivers by targeting plaintiffs, then the class would be hitchhikers riding in Michigan,
irrespective of home address. If the motive were to encourage the sale of automobiles by
discouraging ad hoc carpooling, the class would be more difficult to discern. The first view
is essentially perverse. To discourage hitchhiking, which is usually a last resort mode of
transportation, by leaving the cost of an accident on one who likely has limited resources,
would be little more effective than imposing capital punishment for stealing food. Deter-
rence affects choices made by people who have a choice. See infra notes 332-33. Impover-
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Tooker's claim against Lopez could not affect Michigan insurance
rates because Lopez was not in the pool of drivers contributing to
Michigan's loss experience since she was insured according to the
loss experience of New York drivers. While Lopez' car was in-
sured and registered in New York, she remained a New York
driver.326 The extra facts do not change the case's characteriza-
tion as a false conflict.
If, however, Lopez retained an intent to return indefinitely to
New York upon the completion of her studies so that her domicile
remained in New York, but she chose to register and insure her
car in Michigan (perhaps to enjoy the difference between insur-
ance rates in East Lansing and Brooklyn), she then would have
been a Michigan driver because she would have been a member of
the pool of drivers sharing in Michigan's loss experience which
determined Michigan's insurance rates. Lopez' estate would have
been entitled, consequently, to the Michigan defense in what
would have become a true conflict. Although, as false conflicts,
the results of both the actual case and the former hypothetical case
should be forum invariant, the latter hypothetical case would
present a true conflict and would be governed by the law of the
forum in which it was brought. By giving close attention to the
particular risk pool involved, the courts would have firm factual
basis for use of strict interest analysis.
Furthermore, strict interest analysis would permit courts and
commentators to eschew the two frequently articulated policies of
"cleanup" and deterrence which only serve to hinder correct anal-
ished hitchhikers have no choice. The second view is merely another way of actually
protecting Michigan drivers. The third view so obscures the real purpose as to excuse a
court from any obligation to effectuate its goals. See B. CuRUE, .Supra note 3, at 283, 347.
Plaintiff-targeting generally does not make sense; defendant-protection does.
One plausible, although perhaps pernicious example of plaintiff-targeting is Wood
Bros. Homes, Inc. v. Walker Adjustment Bureau, 198 Colo. 444, 601 P.2d 1369 (1979), in
which the Colorado Supreme Court denied a California contractor compensation for serv-
ices rendered in New Mexico because of his failure to obtain a New Mexico license.
326. Limiting Michigan's policy to Michigan insureds protects the correct risk pool,
avoids both overinclusion and underinclusion, and tracks the method insurance companies
use to monitor experience and to build premiums. See B. CURRIE, supra note 3, at 724-25
and authority discussed there. The reasonableness of geographic differentials in casualty
insurance rates survives the hazards of population mobility (and thus the risks) in inverse
proportion to the length of the policy. In Michigan, auto insurance is written for only six-
month periods. Even if the problems with small geographical units are potentially serious
since "redlining" is facilitated, rates generally have not been challenged for using too small
a unit. Life insurance, however, is written for much longer time spans, and the risks
against which the insurance is bought do not involve the same legal and geographical
variations.
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ysis. The cleanup policy rests on the erroneous assumption that if
a state policy seeks to compensate its citizens for physical injuries,
that state has a policy to compensate anyone injured within its
territory. 327 The policies in favor of recovery should not, and
need not, be construed so broadly. Although California had an
interest in the payment of its health care creditors in Pacfc Em-
327. See, e.g., Traynor, supra note 73, at 136. In Carroll v. Lanza, 349 U.S. 408 (1955),
Justice Douglas seemed to have suggested such: "Arkansas therefore has a legitimate inter-
est in opening her courts to suits of this nature, even though in this case Carroll's injury
may have cast no burden on her institutions." Id. at 413. See supra notes 233-61 and
accompanying text.
Justice Douglas' statement, however, is ambiguous. That statement could mean that a
state has a legitimate interest in compensating anyone injured within its borders, whether
other states have conflicting provisions and whether the injury has actually burdened the
situs state's institutions. If this view is adopted, interest analysis would not differ signifi-
cantly from territorialism when the state in which the injury occurred provided compensa-
tion, even if the state of common residence had alternative arrangements. This overly
broad view of the class protected by a state's policy of compensation would generate spuri-
ous interests casting unprovided-for-cases as false conflicts and false conflicts as true con-
flicts. While the former might provide short term comfort for those reluctant to
acknowledge the unprovided-for-case, the latter would unnecessarily tempt the courts to
solve the resulting spurious true conflicts, see, e.g., Hernandez v. Burger, 102 Cal. App. 3d
795, 162 Cal. Rptr. 564 (1980).
Since state courts have no legitimate means to resolve true conflicts, strict interest anal-
ysis construes state policies narrowly so as to insulate state courts from confronting any
conflicts but actual true conflicts. Moreover, expansive construction of state interests also
would substantiate otherwise unfounded criticisms of interest analysis for being parochial.
See supra note 301. If Justice Douglas' words are read as legitimizing an irrebuttably
presumptive cleanup interest, whether any debris remained to be swept up, then the overly
broad construction of state policies also may be legitimized. Justice Douglas' words, how-
ever, support another interpretation.
To have barred Carroll's action would have suggested, as Justice Douglas did not, that
the state of employment had the exclusive power to provide compensation for workers
injured during employment. Clapper, discussed at supra notes 131-51 and accompanying
text, need not be read so expansively and Justice Douglas showed no desire to return to any
particular territorial connection as a basis for choice of law. Writing "not only for this case
and this day alone, but for this type of case," 349 U.S. at 413, Justice Douglas may be
understood to have been preserving the possibility of applying Arkansas law if there were
an Arkansas interest because of actual local expenses or if, as in Carroll, there were no
conflicting nonforum interests. The Arkansas courts were not to be foreclosed merely be-
cause of Carroll's Missouri employment or his receipt of Missouri workers' compensation.
See CRAMTON & CURRIE, supra note 71, at 452-75.
Cramton, D. Currie, and Kay suggest that Currie would find an interest in a recovery
state for any plaintiff injured therein, id. at 338, but the text they cite, B. CURRIE, supra
note 3, at 128, 144-45, and Bradford Elec. Light Co. v. Clapper, 286 U.S. 145 (1932), im-
plies a qualification that some expense be owed to local creditors as a result of the injury.
Strict interest analysis requires a showing of consequential local debts and limits the
cleanup doctrine exactly to its basis: cleaning up the actual mess after an accident. Hypo-
thetical messes are left to others. The state in which the injury occurs may claim an interest
only on this basis, unless, of course, a secondary right of recovery vested in the plaintiff at
the time of injury. See B. CURRIE, supra note 3, at 487-89; supra notes 63-71 and accompa-
nying text.
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ployers, no such interest was present in Carroll since no expenses
were incurred in Arkansas. Similarly, although California had an
interest in Hall, New Hampshire had no such interest in Clapper.
Perhaps the most bothersome recent case is Milkovich v.
Saari328 in which an Ontario guest-passenger was injured in Min-
nesota through the negligence of his Ontario host-driver. The
Minnesota Supreme Court assumed without inquiry that Minne-
sota had an interest in providing a recovery for the Ontario pas-
senger to ensure that Minnesota health care providers would be
guaranteed payment. In fact, no medical debts were incurred in
Minnesota.329 Moreover, because the Province of Ontario had
provided a different allocation of the losses, 330 the Minnesota
judgment for the plaintiff needlessly meddled in the affairs of an-
other sovereign. Milkovich was a false conflict in which Minne-
sota had no interest, but Ontario had a clear policy and parties for
whom that policy had been created. The Court should have relied
on Ontario law instead of an implicit cleanup policy in Minnesota.
The cleanup policy, when used, should be limited to those
cases, such as Hall and Pac#7c Employers, in which the existence
of an actual unpaid loss within the forum brings the injured party
within the ambit of the policy, either because the injury is to a
domiciliary or because actual debts to forum creditors have been
incurred. No policy should automatically be "manna for the
whole world. 331
328. 295 Minn. 155, 203 N.W.2d 408 (1973).
329. 58 MINN. L. REv. 199, 204 (1973) (citing 142 N.W.2d 66 (1966).
330. ONT. REV. STAT. ch. 200, §§ 6, 9, 19(2), 25 (1970), essentially amount to an all-
inclusive, compulsory health insurance scheme providing an alternative allocation and dis-
tribution of some of the risks recognized by Minnesota's negligence law. The Ontario
scheme does not, of course, include all of a passenger's potential losses, but it does include
all of the losses in which Minnesota can properly have an interest. Debts to Minnesota
medical creditors are within Minnesota concerns. The debts, however, were both insured
and paid.
331. Reese, Chief Judge Fuld and Choice of Law, 71 COLUM. L. REv. 548, 563 (1971).
Professor Reese used the term in praising the lower court's denial of recovery in Neumeier
v. Kuehner, 31 N.Y.2d 121, 286 N.E.2d 454, 335 N.Y.S.2d 64 (1972), the well-known un-
provided-for-case decided under Judge Fuld's third rule. See infra note 506 for a statement
of Judge Fuld's rules. Reese's next paragraph contains similar praise for the entirely differ-
ent but equally wrong true conflict of Weinstein v. Abraham, 64 Misc. 2d 76, 314 N.Y.S.2d
270 (Sup. Ct. 1970) (reliance on Judge Fuld's third rule to grant Illinois defendant use of
California guest act defense against claim by New York plaintiff). It should be noted that
Weinstein is a true conflict not because California, the place of injury, and Iowa, the origin
of the journey, are guest act states but because Illinois, where the car and the driver were
based, was also a guest act state, Rosenbaum v. Raskin, 45 Ill. 2d 25, 257 N.E.2d 100 (1970)
(finding Illinois guest act, ILL. REV. STAT. 1967, ch. 95 1/2, § 9-201 not applicable to chil-
dren 7 years of age or younger)-afact not even mentioned in Weinstein. Strict interest
19821
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Just as inferring a cleanup policy in every state compensation
rule makes too low a threshold for finding state interests, inferring
a deterrence policy leads to an overly broad construction of state
interests. Deterrence seeks to prevent acts by affecting the deci-
sionmaker's calculations of benefit.332 An individual who is deaf
to threats or heedless of consequences cannot be deterred.333 To
deter, first the decisionmaker's attention must be gained, then sig-
nificant loss must be threatened, and finally, credibility of the
threat must be established. An insured defendant, however, sim-
ply does not perceive the likelihood of a personal loss in immedi-
ate terms. Thus, strict interest analysis ignores deterrence as a
policy unless the attempt to deter is unmistakable. Clear, uninsur-
able, punitive damages, together with a well-publicized campaign
of enforcement, would establish an actual policy of deterrence.
All other damages, however, are compensatory and therefore di-
rected to the benefit of plaintiffs.334
analysis agrees with Professor Reese in denying the benefit of New York's recovery law to
an Ontario plaintiff injured by his Ontario host, even if the injury occurred in New York.
See Reese, supra, at 564 (praising Arbuthnot v. Allbright, 35 A.D.2d 315, 316 N.Y.S.2d 391
(1970)). With the application of strict interest analysis, however, there is no reason to dis-
place the normally applicable forum law in an unprovided-for-case like Neumeier. Because
Professor Reese does not seem to have been as specific as strict interest analysis would
warrant in attempting to determine the relevance of state interests, he does not seem to
have recognized the absence of state interests in some cases. Professor Reese, therefore, has
not considered unprovided-for-cases as such.
It required the acumen of Judge Weinfeld to use a loophole in Fuld's third rule to
provide recovery to a New Jersey guest for injuries inflicted by the New York host in Ohio,
the only guest act state of the three. Chila v. Owens, 348 F. Supp. 1207 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
How could there be doubt that Ohio's guest act was irrelevant to the apparent conflict
between New York and New Jersey? See supra text accompanying notes 189-223.
332. H. KAHN, ON ESCALATION-METAPHORS AND SCENARIOS 281 (1965).
333. "[11f our interest is confined to how [threats] affect human behavior, membership
in the threatened audience should be restricted to those individuals who are aware of a
threat's existence." F. ZIMRING & G. HAWKINS, DETERRENCE 71 (1973). See also H.
KAHN, ON THERMONUCLEAR WAR 291-95 (1961). Indeed, the ineffectiveness of even capi-
tal punishment to deter murder has been shown repeatedly. See, e.g., Bailey, Deterrence
and the Death Penalty for Murder in Utah: A Time Series Analysis, 5 J. CONTEMP. L. I
(1978).
334. Contra Brilmayer, supra note 301, at 404. Brilmayer offers the hypothetical case of
a state which requires a safety guard on power lawnmowers and provides that noncompli-
ance shall be negligence per se. Because the guard is expensive, the manufacturer calcu-
lates that it need not install the guard on machines to be sold out-of-state. Brilmayer
concludes that it would be unlikely that an interest analyst would apply the negligence per
se rule in favor of a resident injured out-of-state by a machine manufactured and sold
without the guard. Id.
Professor Brilmayer misconstrues interest analysis. The case she poses is a false con-
flict, the place of injury is fortuitous, and Babcock v. Jackson, 12 N.Y.2d 473, 191 N.E.2d
279, 240 N.Y.S.2d 743 (1963), is exactly on point. Moreover, while she will have been led
astray by her expectations of what Currie and his disciples actually think, and the manu-
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If either cleanup or deterrence is uncritically accepted as an
interest, then whenever the situs has plaintiff-favoring law, loose
interest analysis will assume a situs interest.335 Even if the core-
sidence of the parties has provided an alternative, adequate allo-
cation of the loss in question, the result will be no more sensitive
to actual sovereign interests than was the first Restatement. This
uncritical assumption of situs interests, without regard to the ac-
tual relevance of situs policies, easily can lead to the further, re-
flexive assumption that the situs always has an interest, even if its
law disfavors recovery.336 Hague presents these risks of interpreta-
tion to subsequent courts and commentators.
In Hague, for Minnesota to have had an actual interest in ap-
plying its plaintiff-favoring law, Hague would have had to have
been within the class for whom Minnesota maintained its policy in
favor of stacking. The plurality opinion offers three factors which
are said to suffice in the aggregate, though not individually, to give
Minnesota an interest: Hague's Minnesota employment, his travel
to and from work in Minnesota, and Mrs. Hague's later move to
Minnesota.337 The second factor is an almost inevitable conse-
quence of the first and the first is irrelevant to the issue of stack-
ing. Employment in a state usually connotes presence for at least
part of the time. Mention of Hague's commuting into Minnesota
facturer will have been led astray by its expectations of the consequences of being sued,
neither set of expectations will have been reasonable in retrospect.
Some plaintiffs who also are required to comply with registration laws may be deterred.
But see Wood Bros. Homes, Inc. v. Walker Adjustment Bureau, 198 Colo. 444, 601 P.2d
1369 (1979) (plaintiff undeterred from enforcing contract despite noncompliance with re-
gistration laws). Cf. Intercontinental Planning, Ltd. v. Daystrom, Inc., 24 N.Y.2d 372, 248
N.E.2d 576, 300 N.Y.S.2d 817 (1969) (New York statute of frauds applied against a New
York broker in favor of a New Jersey defendant to bar recovery on a promise made in New
Jersey).
335. If cleanup is the articulation, it will encompass every plaintiff within the situs, and
if deterrence is the articulation, it will include every defendant within the situs. With plain-
tiff and defendant usually in close proximity at the time of the injury, few injuries will
avoid situs law, even if the co-residence of the parties has made adequate alternative
arrangements.
336. See, eg., Ryan v. Clark Equip. Co., 268 Cal. App. 2d 679,74 Cal. Rptr. 329 (1969)
(Oregon limit on recovery applied against an Oregon worker and in favor of a Michigan
manufacturer). This aspect of Ryan was disapproved in Hurtado v. Superior Court, 11 Cal.
3d 574, 522 P.2d 666, 114 Cal. Rptr. 106 (1974). For a discussion of Hurtado, see supra
note 224. Ryan was actually an unprovided-for-case in a disinterested forum. It is sug-
gested below that Clark Equipment should not have to answer in a disinterested foreign
forum. See infra notes 434-94 and accompanying text. Until those jurisdictional limita-
tions are recognized, there is no reason to displace the California forum's law in the ab-
sence of any actual contrary interest in any other state.
337. 449 U.S. at 313-16.
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is an attempt to put a "positive spin" on the fact that he neither
lived nor died in Minnesota. If the issue involved employment
law, such as workers' compensation or provisions against discrimi-
nation, then Hague's employment, and consequent commuting, in
Minnesota would have been relevant. The stacking issue in
Hague, however, has nothing to do with employment.
The third factor, Mrs. Hague's move after death, is equally ir-
relevant to a Minnesota interest, regardless of her motivation.
John Hancock Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Yates338 is authority
for this conclusion. If post-event moves could supply relevance to
state policies where none had previously existed, then interest
analysis would deserve some of its criticisms.3 39 If a party could
affect the choice of law process with post-event changes of resi-
dence, then mobile persons would be unjustly advantaged and vir-
tually retroactive legislation 340 would be permitted.
Thus, since neither Hague's employment nor Mrs. Hague's
subsequent residence has any relevance to stacking, no forum in-
terest existed in Minnesota. There is no precedent for combining
two or three irrelevant factors to make one relevant factor. Strict
interest analysis rejects aggregation of contacts. One actual, rele-
vant policy is all that is required. In Hague, however, the plural-
ity offered only an aggregation of irrelevant factors in lieu of a
sufficient basis for finding an affirmative reason to apply Minne-
sota law. Having overstated the minimum requirements, the plu-
rality could not avoid an equal overstatement of its argument.
Wisconsin's interest in denying recovery is equally nonexis-
tent. Being the situs of an event provides no automatic relevance
to a state's law sufficient to sustain an interest. If Wisconsin's
stacking law did differ from Minnesota's, 341 the Wisconsin policy
against stacking must be determined. With the policy identified, it
should not be difficult to determine whether any person in the
lawsuit is a member of the class to be protected by that policy who
can, therefore, support a Wisconsin interest. To be recognized in
strict interest analysis, a policy must be clear, not obscure. Even
before 1973, Wisconsin did not actually bar stacking but rather
permitted insurers to limit uninsured motorist coverage through
narrow contractual language. Wisconsin's one-time policy against
338. 299 U.S. 178 (1936).
339. For criticism of interest analysis, see, e.g., Brilmayer, supra note 301.
340. See CRAMPTON & CURpRE, supra note 71, at 432-33.
341. See supra note 16.
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stacking, therefore, was at most the commonplace policy of en-
forcing contracts which were entered into freely.
The policies behind enforcing promises need not be reviewed.
One consequence of this policy is that a party who has paid in
advance is usually entitled to receive performance. The policy in
favor of enforcing a bargain is not, of course, unlim-
ited-fraudulent bargains do not support enforcement. The in-
surer's interpretation of the contract allowed it to collect three
premiums for a single coverage. At a minimum, that collection is
not generous. Moreover, even before 1973, it was not Wisconsin's
policy. The Minnesota court in Hague relied on Nelson v. Employ-
ers Mutual Casualty Co.342 which in turn relied on Leatherman v.
American Family Mutual Insurance Co. "I and Scherr v.
Drobac.34 None of these cases concerned an insured like Hague
paying three times for one performance.345 While the Minnesota
court's interpretation of Wisconsin law before 1973 is not incon-
sistent with these cases, it was neither compelled by them nor con-
sistent with the general policies behind the enforcement of
contracts.
Even if the Wisconsin policy were to allow narrow uninsured
coverages to reduce costs and increase attractiveness, letting an
insurer retain two extra premiums without performing would not
reduce the cost of uninsured coverage across Wisconsin. Since the
alleged Wisconsin policy provided no advantage to Wisconsin in-
sureds, Hague could not have been the party to support the exist-
ence of a Wisconsin interest by making the rule against stacking
relevant. Allstate, however, is no more attractive as the benefici-
ary of Wisconsin's concern.
Strict interest analysis requires a more explicit statement of
342. 63 Wis. 2d 558, 217 N.W.2d 670 (1974).
343. 52 Wis. 2d 644, 190 N.W.2d 904 (1971).
344. 53 Wis. 2d 308, 193 N.W.2d 14 (1972).
345. Leatherman and Scherr involved this question:
[W]hether the uninsured motorist provision guaranteed payment to the plaintiff
only to the extent that all other sources had not yielded the recovery to which the
plaintiff would otherwise be entitled under the uninsured motorist coverage or
whether it guaranteed recovery equivalent to that which would have been had if
the uninsured motorist had been minimally insured.
Nelson, 63 Wis. 2d at 567, 217 N.W. at 674. Nelson involved a completely uninsured de-
fendant. The plaintiff was attempting to stack her father's coverage of members of the
insured's household on top of her employer's coverage for an accident in her employer's
automobile. In Hague, however, the decedent himself had paid for three separate
coverages.
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Wisconsin's alleged policy to provide a triple dip 34 6 to Hague's
insurer. 347 A casualty insurer is no more than a proxy for and
conduit to the underlying risk pool of insureds for whose benefit
these coverages are required. The insurer should break even on
the pooled risk. Under strict interest analysis, the mere existence
of a particular party in the case will not suffice to support an inter-
est based only on a supposed state policy or presumed relevance
of a policy to those parties. With no articulated policy benefitting
either Hague or Allstate, Wisconsin had no interest in denying
Mrs. Hague the benefit for which Mr. Hague had paid. Thus,
under strict interest analysis, as extended in this Article to casualty
insurance cases, Hague is an unprovided-for-case in which forum
law is applied. While the Supreme Court reached the correct re-
sult, the Court's contact analysis is debatable, and strict interest
analysis provides a superior analytical framework for the
problem.
IV. FALSE CONFLICTS AND THE CONSTITUTION
There is no doubt that the Constitution, and therefore the
Supreme Court, controls at least the outer limits of the choice of
law process in state courts.34 Traditionally, however, constitu-
tional constraints have been considered only after completion of
the state law analysis. Thus, the issues of which law should be
chosen and which law can be chosen have been differentiated.349
Consequently, state choices of law are made initially without re-
gard to the Constitution and are then subject to the condition sub-
sequent that the choice not violate the Constitution.350 This
346. Cf. W. SAFIRE, SAFIRE'S POLITICAL DICTIONARY 185 (3d ed. 1978) ("double dip"
defined as income, in the form of salary or pensions from two governmental sources).
347. Hague did not benefit, but if Wisconsin had an articulated policy explicitly pro-
viding for a compulsory windfall-to-the-insurer triple dip, the choice of law requirements
would have been met. The analysis then would have shifted to whether the explicit statu-
tory triple dip would deny due process.
348. For a comparison of the efficacy of the due process clause and the full faith and
credit clause as constraints, see Martin, Constitutional Limitations on Choice of Law, 61
CORNELL L. REv. 185 (1976).
349. Indeed, the choice of law is made often without any consideration of constitu-
tional constraint. Consider, for example, Day & Zimmermann, Inc. v. Challoner, 423 U.S.
3 (1975), in which the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit was instructed to apply the law
of Cambodia, which could not possibly meet the requirements of Home, to an apparent
conflict in which the law of every relevant state provided recovery. See Allo, Book Review,
30 J. LEGAL EDUC. 612, 619 (1980).
350. A comparable analogy would be if police manuals could provide for assorted in-
terrogational techniques including barring counsel and using rubber hoses (1) so long as
the manuals also contained an epilogue stating that if any of the enumerated and therefore
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Article proposes integration of the constitutional constraints and
the basic rules.
Since, as is correctly acknowledged by the Court, the Constitu-
tion exerts at least a minimal constraint on choices of law,351 in
addition to its undoubted exertion of constraints on the contents
of the laws chosen,352 the Court must provide clear guidance to
the states on these issues. Such guidance probably will not be
forthcoming while the issues of state choice of law and the consti-
tutional constraint on choice of law are separated, as evidenced by
the decisions of the Minnesota Supreme Court and United States
Supreme Court in Hague. Such separation is unnecessary and
counter-productive. Strict interest analysis provides the needed
integration. If state interests are construed narrowly, the require-
ments for choice of law and the constraints of the Constitution
will be seen to have converged. Moreover, once the existing con-
stitutional controls are better understood, the states will find
neither need nor room for two-step analyses.
Many commentators and the current Court's majority assert
that precedent requires an affirmative basis for applying a state's
law to meet the requirements of the Constitution.353 Precedent,
however, does not require an affirmative basis for constitutional
application of a state's law. If interests are construed strictly, a
forum interest, though sufficient, is not necessary to support con-
stitutional applications of forum law. Thus, the Constitution per-
mits strict interest analysis' presumption in favor of forum law in
unprovided-for-cases where neither state has an interest. The re-
buttable presumption provides a better analytical tool to explain
precedent and unifies state choice of law doctrine with constitu-
tional constraints. Hague is a prime example of the integrative
role of strict interest analysis.
A. The Hague Analses-Plurality and Dissent
The plurality correctly asserted that some issues in some cases
may be decided properly by applying the law of more than one
apparently authorized techniques violated the Bill of Rights, those violations would be
ignored, and (2) so long as no actual violations occurred.
351. See, eg., Hague, 449 U.S. at 307.
352. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10.
353. See, eg., Hague, 449 U.S. at 308; B. CURRIE, supra note 3, at 271; R. WEINTRAUB,
supra note 63, at 505; Kirgis, The Roles of Due Process and Full Faih and Credit in Choice
of Law, 62 CORNELL L. REv. 94 (1976); Martin, supra note 348.
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state.354 The cases cited, Watson v. Employers Liability Assurance
Corp. ," and Clay v. Sun Insurance Office, Ltd ,356 are true con-
flicts, however, and they provide support for the point under
either theory. Additionally, while the cases directly support the
principle of strict interest analysis that a forum interest is suffi-
cient, but not necessary, for forum law to apply, they are at best
only consistent with the plurality's view that an interest is neces-
sary. The cases do not provide direct support for a necessity
requirement.
In equating the requirements of full faith and credit35 7 and due
process, 358 the plurality based its conclusion on evidence which
was irrelevant. Although Watson and Clay were argued under
both clauses, the cases cited, Nevada v. Hall,3 59 Alaska Packers
Association v. Industrial Accident Commission ,36' and Carroll v.
Lanza,36t were argued only under the full faith and credit clause.
Notwithstanding citation of Clay and Alaska Packers, the plu-
rality's assertion that an affirmative state interest is necessary to
sustain the application of a state's law is without support in case
law. 362 Only a reversal of forum law in an unprovided-for-case
for lack of a forum interest would demonstrate the necessity of a
forum interest.363 Clay, however, a true conflict, presented forum
interests in both Florida and Illinois. Without doubt, Florida's
354. 449 U.S. at 307. See supra note 39 and accompanying text. Beale, however, as-
serted that only one clearly determined law controlled the consequences of any event or
transaction. See supra note 64 and accompanying text.
355. 348 U.S. 66 (1954).
356. 377 U.S. 179 (1964).
357. See U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1.
358. See id. amend. XIV, § 1.
359. 440 U.S. 410 (1979).
360. 294 U.S. 532 (1935).
361. 349 U.S. 408 (1955).
362. 449 U.S. at 308. Clay and 41aska Packers are joined by Cardillo v. Liberty Mut.
Ins. Co., 330 U.S. 469 (1947). The plurality correctly discerned Cardillo to have presented
an actual forum interest in the District of Columbia, but again the plurality overlooked the
defendant's failure even to plead or prove a contrary interest or policy in Virginia. Cardillo
presented an interest but does not begin to show that an interest is necessary.
363. The only reversal of the application of forum law to an unprovided-for-case dis-
covered to date is Ormsby v. Chase, 290 U.S. 387 (1933), in which a New York tenant
waited until after the death of her landlord, who was domiciled in Pennsylvania, to bring
suit in the decedent's domicile for her personal injuries incurred on the landlord's New
York property. Id. at 338. Under New York law, the action abated at the defendant's
death; in Pennsylvania such actions survived. Id. at 389. The Third Circuit's application
of Pennsylvania's rule was reversed quickly under territorial principles without discussion
of any forum interests. Id. The court did not inquire into the purpose of New York's
adherrence at the time to the nonsurvivability of tort actions. If, however, analysis clearly
showed that the New York law which did not allow such actions to survive was designed in
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interest in Clay was necessary constitutionally for the application
of Florida law, but its necessity was a consequence of the contrary
interest in Illinois. Alaska Packers, an apparent conflict, can stand
only for the proposition that in the absence of a clear, contrary
policy in another state, full faith and credit does not require a
party to show an interest in the forum." 4 Alaska Packers, there-
fore, supports the existence of the presumption in favor of apply-
ing forum law but provides minimal support for a forum interest
as a necessary condition precedent to the application of forum
law. The defendant in Alaska Packers, of course, made no at-
tempt to rebut the presumption. In Carroll, however, an attempt
was made to displace forum law by arguing a contrary policy, but
in the absence of an actual interest in another state, full faith and
credit did not require the displacement of forum law.365 Carroll
shows that a contrary interest is needed to displace the presump-
tively applicable law of the forum; a contrary policy alone will not
suffice. Although Clay, Watson, and Hall contained clear forum
interests, Alaska Packers and Carroll presented only the absence
of nonforum interests. Since Alaska Packers presents only an ap-
parent conflict and Carroll is an unprovided-for-case, each is con-
sistent with true conflicts analysis only in that each bases the
permissible application of forum law on something other than the
plurality's proffered requirement of an affirmative forum interest.
All six cases, of course, are consistent with the rebuttable pre-
sumption of strict interest analysis. Thus, the plurality went be-
yond its proofs when it asserted the necessity, instead of the
sufficiency, of a forum interest.
The plurality's detailed treatment of Home Insurance Co. v.
Dick"' and John Hancock Mutual Lfe Insurance Co. v. Yates3 67
was similarly imprecise. In both cases, the forum lacked an inter-
est, and in neither case was the forum allowed to apply its own
law. Hence, both cases show the presumption in favor of applying
forum law overcome. The plurality, however, ignored the essen-
tial fact that in both Home and Yates, clear, contrary, and rele-
vant nonforum policies created nonforum interests. That was true
of neither Alaska Packers, in which no policy contrary to forum
part to induce investment in New York, the case would have been a false conflict and
decided correctly.
364. See supra notes 192-99 and accompanying text.
365. See supra notes 233-61 and accompanying text.
366. 281 U.S. 397 (1930).
367. 299 U.S. 178 (1936).
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law was articulated, nor Carroll, in which the contrary policy
could not be shown to have been relevant. In Home, Mexico had
a clear interest in protecting its defendant through limiting the
time in which to bring suit. In Yates, New York had a clear inter-
est in protecting its insurance company by denying payment on an
insurance policy procured through material misstatements. These
contrary nonforum interests made Home and Yates false conflicts
in which the forum lacked an interest. Due process and full faith
and credit, respectively, would not, therefore, allow the forum
lacking an interest to apply its law in the face of a contrary
nonforum interest.
When the plurality returned to a more detailed consideration
of Alaska Packers, its argument supported strict interest analysis
more than the plurality's own thesis that an affirmative showing of
forum interest was necessary, not simply sufficient, for applying
forum law. "[T]he Court upheld California's application of its
Workmen's Compensation Act, where the most significant contact
of the worker with California was his execution of an employment
contract in California." '368 California's choice of law was not "'so
arbitrary or unreasonable as to amount to a denial of due process,'
• . . because '[w]ithout a remedy in California,. . . [he] would be
remediless,' . . . and because of California's interest that the
worker not become a public charge." '3 6 9 No reason was ever given
why Palma, the worker in Alaska Packers, could not have sought
compensation under the law of Alaska. While less convenient,
seeking compensation under Alaska law was not shown to be im-
possible. If the minimal contact of a migrant worker contracting
to work in another state is sufficient to provide a state interest,
then the plurality's test is hollow, for no requirement could be
lower. It is evident that Dick's affiliation with Texas exceeded
Palma's connection with California. Both cases were correctly de-
cided, but a correct reading requires recognition of the contrary
Mexican interest and the absence of any contrary interest in
Alaska. Strict interest analysis allows for this needed recognition.
Thus, the plurality's purported requirement that the applica-
tion of a state's law must be supported by the affirmative presence
of a state interest is superficially attractive, but fails to account for
precedent. Moreover, by not allowing for an unprovided-for-case,
the plurality's test invites the discernment of spurious interests
368. 449 U.S. at 311. "Most significant contact" also can mean the best contact Califor-
nia could muster.
369. Id. (quoting Alaska Packers, 294 U.S. at 542).
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with the consequent expense of erroneous decisions and misstated
precedents.370 The plurality correctly sustained the application of
Minnesota law to the unprovided-for-case of Hague, but to do so
under its misreading of the constitutional requirements, it was
obliged to invent interests for Minnesota.
The dissenters accepted the plurality's erroneous premises, but
not its conclusions. 37' The dissent correctly noted that Minnesota
had no interest in the application of its law to the facts of Hague,
but drew an incorrect conclusion from that correct observation.
B. Justice Stevens' Concurrence and the Constitution
Justice Stevens took a significantly different view of the consti-
tutional principles and their application. Full faith and credit and
due process, having different purposes, required separate, though
perhaps parallel, analyses.3 72 By observing that another state's in-
terest does not immediately prevent the application of the forum's
law,373 Justice Stevens adopted an approach to full faith and
credit similar to that of strict interest analysis. According to Jus-
tice Stevens, if the forum has a legitimate interest, it may apply its
own law. The forum's interest, therefore, is sufficient, a position
consistent with strict interest analysis.374 Full faith and credit will
restrict the application of forum law only if the forum has no in-
terest and another state has an interest.375 Only if Wisconsin had
an interest would a finding of Minnesota's interest be necessary
for application of Minnesota law, again a view consistent with in-
terest analysis. With Wisconsin lacking an interest, there was no
impediment to applying Minnesota law in Hague.376
Even Justice Stevens, however, misread precedent. Justice
Stevens categorized Hall, Alaska Packers, and Pac'c Employers
together implicitly as true conflicts when only Hall included a
nonforum interest 377 and Alaska Packers may not have included
any interest in either California or Alaska.378 Justice Stevens
nonetheless correctly placed on the party seeking to displace fo-
rum law the burden to show that not only did the forum lack an
370. See supra notes 303-09 and accompanying text.
371. See supra notes 52-54 and accompanying text.
372. 449 U.S. at 320 (Stevens, J., concurring).
373. Id. at 323.
374. Id.
375. Id.
376. Id. at 325-26.
377. See supra note 185 and accompanying text.
378. See supra notes 192-99 and accompanying text.
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interest in the litigation, but also that another state possessed an
actual interest in its outcome.379 Only if both conditions were met
would full faith and credit prevent the application of forum
law.38° Such a requirement is consistent with strict interest analy-
sis of a false conflict.
Justice Stevens also found due process to support a presump-
tion in favor of applying forum law which would be overcome
only if the application of forum law were fundamentally unfair to
one of the parties.3 8 ' Although there were a number of ways in
which choice of law could be fundamentally unfair, the focus of
Justice Stevens' concern was the prevention of unfair surprise.3
82
Justice Stevens' review of precedents under due process empha-
sized the parties' expectations 38 3 and ignored the issue of whether
state interests existed. The difficulty with his concentration on un-
fair surprise as an essential test is that this benchmark is both cir-
cular in its logic and largely irrelevant in precedent.384 While
there is always some concern for avoiding unfair surprise in any
judicial action, surprise is often inevitable among laypersons, and
the unfairness of the surprise is more often a matter of subjective
evaluation.
Justice Stevens' other due process tests do not add to his analy-
sis. His concern for protecting nonresidents from discrimination
is legitimate, but safeguarded by both equal protection and privi-
leges and immunities.3 5 Due process generally provides protec-
tion against rules which are intrinsically unfair, either as applied
or on their faces. Such protection is not part of a choice of law
analysis, however, because it applies equally well to purely do-
mestic cases. Justice Stevens' final concern that forum law not
"represent a dramatic departure from the rule that obtains in most
379. 449 U.S. at 325-26.
380. Id.
381. Id. at 326.
382. Id. at 327.
383. See supra notes 75-84 and accompanying text.
384. The clearest illustration of the minimal utility of unfair surprise as an analytical
tool may be the Missouri Life Insurance cases. Currie has shown that the Missouri nonfor-
feiture rule itself was an unfair surprise to all insurers. Indeed, Currie uses that conclusion
as an explanation for the Supreme Court's action in New York Life Ins. Co. v. Dodge, 246
U.S. 357 (1918). Although the Court succumbed to the temptation to protect an out-of-
state party from unfair surprise in Dodge, a more principled decision on insignificantly
different facts followed almost immediately afterward in Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Liebing,
259 U.S. 209 (1922). See B. CURRIE, supra note 3, at 214-22.
385. See infra notes 495-530 and accompanying text.
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American jurisdictions" 386 is both an affront to federalism and an
unnecessary throwback to substantive due process.
Having found none of his constitutional tests violated, Justice
Stevens approved the use of Minnesota law in Hague even though
he regarded the choice of Minnesota law as erroneous.38 7 Stevens
could find no reason to displace the presumptively applicable fo-
rum law because he conceived the Court's role not to include pro-
viding a federal choice of law scheme38 and neither full faith and
credit nor due process had been violated.
C. Strict Interest Analysis and the Constitution
Justice Stevens correctly stated that the full faith and credit
and due process clauses provide separate constraints on state
choice of law decisions.389 The full faith and credit clause ensures
that states do not improperly ignore an impingement on the inter-
ests of other states.390 The due process clause assures persons that
courts will neither act unfairly nor exceed their powers.39' Under
strict interest analysis and the most recent decisions on judicial
jurisdiction, the clauses usually are interpreted to provide
equivalent protections. Construing, equally narrowly, both state
interests for choice of law and state interests for constitutional
constraints on choice of law achieves a synthesis of state choice of
law and the Constitution. Neither due process nor full faith and
credit is violated unless a state lacking an interest in the applica-
tion of its law attempts to apply that law in the face of another
state's actual interest. Thus, the result of constitutional analysis is
consistent with the result of strict interest analysis.
Full faith and credit's command with respect to judgments has
a single condition-the judgment must have been grounded in
386. 449 U.S. at 327.
387. Id. at 331.
388. Id. The task, however, is unavoidable. Once some boundaries for state choice of
law are provided, all choice of law systems necessarily are constrained. Although many
commentators assert the existence of sufficient room within the acknowledged constraints
for varying choice of law methodologies, see supra note 356, it is argued herein that a
clearer understanding of the cases provides a complete and unique system.
389. Id. at 320-22.
390. Cf. "But the full faith and credit clause is the foundation of any hope we may
have for a truly national system ofjustice, based on the preservation but better integration
of the local jurisdictions we have." Jackson, Full Faith and Credit, The Lawyer's Clause of
the Constitution, in SELECTED READINGS, supra note 63, at 229, 254.
391. "These procedural safeguards have their historical origins in the notion that con-
ditions of personal freedom can be preserved only when there is some institutional check
on arbitrary government action." L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 501 (1978).
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proper jurisdiction.392 Even if the first court made an egregious
choice of law3 93 or refused to give full faith and credit to a valid
prior judgment,394 a second court cannot look behind the judg-
ment if the first court had valid power over the issues and parties.
Full faith and credit's command before judgment is only
slightly more complicated. If no other state has an interest in an
issue, then the use of forum law cannot threaten interstate har-
mony by impinging on the sovereignty of other states. The forum
is forbidden only from applying its law when it lacks an interest
and another state has an actual interest. If a nonforum state does
have an interest, then the potential for conflict does exist, but the
forum's interests are not foreclosed before judgment.395 The es-
sential requirement for this rule, which avoids weighing respective
states' interests, is for all of the states' interests to be construed
strictly. This strict construction reduces the frequency of true con-
flicts in which forum law is applied, notwithstanding the contrary
interests of other jurisdictions. More importantly, one state will
be required to defer to another only because of an actual, con-
trary, nonforum interest. There will be no need for the forum to
defer to another state's potential interest at the expense of its own
actual interest. In an unprovided-for-case like Hague, Wisconsin
had no interest. The Minnesota forum is allowed to apply its own
law even without a Minnesota interest. With Wisconsin equally
without an interest, the deference required by the full faith and
credit clause is not activated.
The analysis under due process is parallel. Due process is gen-
erally recognized to have two components. The sovereign's ac-
tions must be within its power396 and fair.397 Fairness is measured
by the procedures used 398 and the actual content of the law ap-
392. Thompson v. Whitman, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 457, 469 (1873).
393. See, e.g., Fauntleroy v. Lum, 210 U.S. 230 (1908).
394. See, e.g., Treinies v. Sunshine Mining Co., 308 U.S. 66 (1939).
395. See, e.g., Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S. 410 (1979).
396. "The article is a restraint on the legislature as well as on the executive and judicial
powers of the government, and cannot be so construed as to leave Congress free to make
any process 'due process of law,' by its mere will." Murray's Lessee v. Hoboken Land &
Improvement Co., 59 U.S. (18 How.) 272, 276 (1855).
397. Due process is to be determined by "those canons of decency and fairness which
express the notions ofjustice of English-speaking peoples .... " Rochin v. California, 342
U.S. 165, 169 (1952) (quoting Malinski v. New York, 324 U.S. 401, 417 (1945)). No prdtec-
tion is given, however, unless life, liberty, or property is threatened. Board of Regents of
State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 569-72 (1972).
398. See The Constitution of the United States of America, Analysis and Interpretation
(Senate Document 92-82) 1145-62 (1973).
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plied,3 99 although the scope of the last restriction has been nar-
rowed substantially."° Some events are wholly outside a
particular sovereign's reach. It is not for South Dakota to deter-
mine the usury rate for redit transactions between a Michigan
merchant and a Michigan consumer.4°1 Other transactions, how-
ever, which are arguably within the reach of a state, may raise
questions of fairness if the state attempts to control their conse-
quences. When Ontario, for example, has provided a comprehen-
sive scheme for allocating the losses following automobile
accidents and providing for any of its citizens' health care
needs,40 2 it simply is not fair for Minnesota to interject its own
ideas on these issues.403 Even though the Minnesota law is gener-
ally fair on its face, it is not fair when applied to a particular oc-
currence for which other provisions have been made.
It is unimportant to determine whether the lack of fairness is
simply a procedural defect or whether the application of a law
alien to a transaction compares in gravity with the few remaining,
recognized violations of substantive due process.' 4 If application
of forum law actually will advance forum policy, thus giving the
forum an interest, due process will not be denied by use of forum
law. If, as in Hague, neither state has an interest, due process ex-
erts no control; either law may be applied. If, however, the
nonforum state has an interest and the forum does not, then due
process requires the application of the only relevant law.405
The Hague plurality and dissent asserted the requirement
under due process and full faith and credit that a forum interest
exist prior to application of forum law, but differed on what suf-
ficed to present such an interest.4" 6 Neither opinion satisfactorily
accounted for the precedents. If, however, as in strict interest
anaysis, interests are construed narrowly, then neither full faith
and credit nor due process forbid a forum from applying its own
399. See Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578 (1897).
400. Compare United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144 (1938) with Roe v.
Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
401. Cf. supra note 316.
402. See supra note 330.
403. Contra Milkovich v. Saari, 295 Minn. 155, 203 N.W.2d 408 (1973).
404. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), is an example of a recognition of a substantive
due process violation.
405. See Home Ins. Co. v. Dick, 281 U.S. 397, 407 (1930).
406. Compare supra notes 49-51 and accompanying text with supra note 54 and accom-
panying text.
1982]
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 32:1
law unless it both lacks an interest and another sovereign has an
interest, as shown in the following table.
Case Forum Nonforum Type of The Law Consistent With
Interest Interest Case Chosen Hague Plurality
GROUP I: Forum Interest Sufficient, Although Not Necessary, and Choice of Law Consistent With Strict
Interest Analysis
Heaa
" 07  no yes fc nonforum yes
Brown40 no yes fc nonforum yes
Liebing4M9  yes yes tc forum yes
Home4 10  no yes fc nonforum yes
Clapper 4 t  no yes fc nonforum yes
Yates
4 12  
no yes fc nonforum yes
Grif,,413  yes yes tc forum yes
Hoopvesron 4 14  yes yes tc forum yes
Cardillo4t 5  yes no fc forum yes
Wason41 6  yes yes tc forum yes
Carroll
4 17  
no no un forum no
Clay4 18  yes yes tc forum yes
Hague
4 19  
no no un forum no
GROUP II: Apparent Conflicts Requiring No Actual Choice of Law
Kryger 42°  yes yes app both yes
Alaska 4 2 1  no .422 app forum no
PaefC4 23  yes yes app both yes
GROUP III: Constitutional Under Strict Interest Analysis View of Full Faith and Credit and Due Process, but
Inconsistent With the Presumption in Favor of Applying Forum Law
Dodge 4 24  yes yes tc nonforum yes
Young
4 25  yes yes tc nonforum yes
Delia l Pine 42 6  yes yes tc nonforum yes
Key: tc=true conflict, fe-false conflict, un-unprovided-for-case, and app=apparent conflict.
Strict interest analysis' articulation of the constitutional con-
straints on choice of law accounts for all of these cases, reconciles
407. New York Life Ins. Co. v. Head, 234 U.S. 149 (1914).
408. Western Union Tel. Co. v. Brown, 234 U.S. 542 (1914).
409. Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Liebing, 259 U.S. 209 (1922).
410. Home Ins. Co. v. Dick, 281 U.S. 397 (1930).
411. Bradford Elec. Light Co. v. Clapper, 286 U.S. 145 (1932).
412. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Yates, 299 U.S. 178 (1936).
413. Griffin v. McCoach, 313 U.S. 498 (1941).
414. Hoopeston Canning Co. v. Cullen, 318 U.S. 313 (1943).
415. Cardillo v. Liberty Mut. Co., 330 U.S. 469 (1947).
416. Watson v. Employers Liab. Assurance Corp., 348 U.S. 66 (1954).
417. Carroll v. Lanza, 349 U.S. 408 (1955).
418. Clay v. Sun Ins. Office, Ltd., 377 U.S. 179 (1964).
419. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302 (1981).
420. Kryger v. Wilson, 242 U.S. 171 (1916).
421. Alaska Packers Ass'n v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 294 U.S. 532 (1935).
422. The presence or absence of an Alaska interest was not raised by the defendant.
See supra note 195.
423. Pacific Employers Ins. Co. v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 306 U.S. 493 (1939).
424. New York Life Ins. Co. v. Dodge, 246 U.S. 357 (1918).
425. Young v. Masci, 289 U.S. 253 (1933).
426. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v. Delta & Pine Land Co., 292 U.S. 143 (1934).
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Clapper and Carroll,427 and explains Hague. The Hague plural-
ity's formulation cannot account for all of these cases, is ambiva-
lent with respect to Clapper and Carroll, and does not explain
Hague satisfactorily. Strict interest analysis' ability to account for
all of the data with only a slightly more complicated formulation
makes it a superior theory of the constitutional constraints on
choice of law.42
Strict interest analysis parallels full faith and credit by com-
manding deference when the forum lacks an interest and another
forum possesses an interest and by not requiring deference when
the forum has its own interest. The rationales supporting strict
interest analysis and full faith and credit are identical. A forum
without an interest should not meddle in another sovereign's af-
fairs, but a forum with an interest should not be a slave to another
sovereign. When, as in the unprovided-for-case, neither sovereign
has an interest, there should be no full faith and credit objection
to the forum's application of its own law.
There is a consensus that due process presents no difficulty
when a forum with an interest applies its own law.429 Acknowl-
edging the forum's interest in an issue recognizes that its law per-
tains to the immediate facts and that control of the outcome is
properly within the sovereignty of the forum. When disputes arise
over the existence of an actual forum interest, strict interest analy-
sis' narrow construction of state interests generally resolves doubts
against the existence of interests.
The fundamental dispute arises when neither state is perceived
to have an interest: Strict interest analysis finds no problem with
the unprovided-for-case, and the Hague plurality finds no unpro-
vided-for-cases. It is difficult, however, to conceive what interest a
majority of the Court would discern, for example, if a Minnesota
driver negligently injured an Ontario passenger in Ontario. Per-
haps the Court would find an interest in Minnesota desiring its
drivers to be careful wherever they travel.430 Not even a cleanup
interest could exist for an accident outside Minnesota's borders.
Perhaps the Court would find an interest in Ontario denying its
passengers recovery, regardless of the identity, insurance, and
427. Seesupra note 261 and accompanying text for a discussion of the reconciliation of
Clapper and Carroll.
428. See supra note 310.
429. See supra note 352 and accompanying text.
430. See Kell v. Henderson, 47 Misc. 2d 992, 263 N.Y.S.2d 647 (Special Term 1965).
Contra Arbuthnot v. Allbright, 35 App. Div. 2d 315, 316 N.Y.S.2d 391 (1970).
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ordinary duties of their drivers. Yet, the plurality's view of due
process requires an interest to be attributed to at least one of the
jurisdictions. Once it is acknowledged that some cases simply do
not present interests, but nonetheless require resolution, strict in-
terest analysis and full acceptance of the unprovided-for-case fol-
low easily.
Further benefits to be derived from strict interest analysis are
that false conflicts will not be misconstrued and possibly wrongly
decided as true conflicts and unprovided-for-cases will not be mis-
construed and possibly wrongly decided as false conflicts. 43'
In sum, because there is no super law which provides for the
perfectly fair allocation of legislative jurisdiction among the sev-
eral states, 432 the best available standard of fairness is that which
actually has been applied by the Court throughout this century:
Due process is denied if, but only if, the law of a sovereign with-
out an interest is applied in the face of another sovereign's actual
interest. There is, of course, no collateral attack for improper
choice of law.433 If the choice of law is thought to be improper, as
with other instances of unfairness, the remedy can be sought only
through vertical attack. Only if the defect is of the power of the
rendering court, can attack be made collaterally. Because the
power component of due process is better addressed under the
topic of judicial jurisdiction, it suffices to note that once a court
has properly obtained judicial jurisdiction over the parties to an
action, it has the power to affect them and their property. Hence,
a wrong choice of law does not defeat a court's power, but only,
perhaps, impugns the court's fairness.
V. STRICT INTEREST ANALYSIS AND JUDICIAL JURISDICTION
The explicit bias of strict interest analysis in favor of forum
law may provoke concern that it will induce undue forum shop-
ping, defeat uniformity, and otherwise prejudice litigants, espe-
cially defendants. If choice of law were all there were to the
subject of conflict of laws, the charge would be most serious.
It is always an error, however, to ignore the interaction of leg-
islative jurisdiction (choice of law) and judicial jurisdiction.
While strict interest analysis is a forum-favoring choice of law sys-
tem, the presumption in favor of applying forum law will not un-
431. See supra notes 94-95.
432. See supra note 73.
433. Fauntleroy v. Lum, 210 U.S. 230 (1908).
[Vol. 32:1
9LLSTATE INSURA4NCE CO. v. H4GUE
fairly affect defendants, unless it is used under an unduly
expansive system of personal judicial jurisdiction.
When personal judicial jurisdiction, however, is viewed in an
unduly expansive way, both modem forum-favoring and tradi-
tional choice of law approaches produce unsatisfactory results. 434
In the Mississippi statute of limitations cases,435 for example, Kan-
sas plaintiffs barred by the statutes of limitations in every other
state brought suit in Mississippi against defendants whose prop-
erty436 or presence 437 there would support personal judicial juris-
diction. Plaintiffs sought to use the "procedural" law of
Mississippi to subvert the protections of the other states' laws, es-
pecially those of Kansas.
Such cases raise three issues: First, whether the requirements
of due process in judicial jurisdiction and legislative jurisdiction
disclose consistent, logical relationships; second, if not, whether
recent decisions on judicial jurisdiction have any important prac-
tical effect on choice of law decisions; and finally, whether the cur-
rent understandings are sufficient to promote the reasonable goals
of a conflict of laws system.
A. Logical Connection
Chief Justice Stone distinguished judicial jurisdiction from
choice of law (legislative jurisdiction) in International Shoe v.
Washington.438 Justice Stone's distinction was not novel then and
434. See, eg., Rosenthal v. Warren, 475 F.2d 438 (1st Cir. 1973) (in an action for mal-
practice in which jurisdiction in New York over a Massachusetts surgeon was obtained via
Seider v. Roth, 17 N.Y.2d 111,216 N.E.2d 312, 269 N.Y.S.2d 99 (1966), overruled, Rush v.
Sauchuk, 444 U.S. 320 (1980), the interest in New York of full compensation outweighed
interest of Massachusetts which was situs of tort and residence of defendant).
Professor Hill also has addressed this problem recently, but his basic premises are sig-
nificantly different. See Hill Choice of Law and Jurisdiction in the Supreme Court, 81
COLUM. L. Raov. 960 (1981).
435. See, eg., Schreiber v. Allis-Chalmers Corp., 611 F.2d 790 (10th Cir. 1979);
Steel v. G.D. Searle & Co., 483 F.2d 339 (5th Cir. 1973). For comment, see Martin, Statutes
of Limitations and .Rationaity in the Conflict ofLaws, 19 WASHBURN L.J. 405 (1980).
436. Steele v. G.D. Searle & Co., 483 F.2d 339 (5th Cir. 1973).
437. Schreiber v. Allis-Chalmers Corp., 611 F.2d 790 (10th Cir. 1979).
438. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
The questions for decision are (I) whether, within the limitations of the due
process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, appellant, a Delaware corporation,
has by its activities in the State of Washington rendered itself amenable to pro-
ceedings in the courts of that state to recover unpaid contributions to the state
unemployment compensation fund exacted by state statutes.... and (2) whether
the state can exact those contributions consistently with the due process clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment.
Id. at 311. Because the answer to the first question of jurisdiction sufficed to control the
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endures today, despite occasional wistful comments to the con-
trary.439 The separateness of the issues, however, does not necessi-
tate independence. Professor Martin, for example, has suggested
that the forum court should not have the power to apply forum
law unless the facts of the dispute standing alone would sustain
specific in personam jurisdiction under International Shoe."
Thus, specific personal jurisdiction 44 would be necessary for the
application of forum law." 2 Although Professor Martin's sugges-
tion would eliminate an egregious abuse of the federal system," 3
his proposed cure is slightly off the mark.
Judicial jurisdiction depends on the conjunction of forum,
facts, and defendant."' In determining the correct choice of law,
however, strict interest analysis (and, it is argued herein, the Con-
stitution) looks to the conjunction of forum, facts, policy, and
party." 5 Thus, either the plaintiff," 6 the defendant," 7 or even oc-
casionally the court448 can support an interest in applying forum
second question of application of law, it might appear that less is required to support a
choice of law than to support the application of specific long-arm jurisdiction over a corpo-
ration. The inference, however, does not stand. See infra notes 444-50 and accompanying
text.
439. See supra notes 24-27 and accompanying text.
440. Martin, Personal Jurisdiction and Choice of Law, 78 MIcH. L. REV. 872 (1980).
441. "Specific personal jurisdiction" arises out of the transaction in dispute rather than
out of more generally affiliating circumstances. See A. VoN MEHREN & D. TRAUTMAN,
supra note 63, at 654.
442. Chief Justice Stone's analysis in International Shoe shows only that specific juris-
diction can be sufficient for application of law. Professor Martin sets a higher standard
than is necessary. See Martin, supra note 440, at 873.
443. The abuse is the use of 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1976) (diversity jurisdiction) and id.
§ 1404(a) (transfer between federal district courts) to achieve a result in a federal district
court in Kansas which was unattainable in the Kansas state courts. See Erie R.R. v.
Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). The cure, which Professor Martin did not suggest, would be
to bar the use of the Mississippi long-arm and the Mississippi statute of limitations in a case
in which specific personal jurisdiction was unavailable in Mississippi. Perhaps Professor
Martin was thinking only of traditionally substantive laws. Compare Martin supra note
440 with Martin supra note 435.
444. Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 204 (1977).
Neither substantial concern for the plaintiff nor status as situs of injury suffices to sup-
port judicial jurisdiction over an absent corporate defendant. World-Wide Volkswagen
Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980).
445. See supra notes 300-47 and accompanying text.
446. See, e.g., Cardillo v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 330 U.S. 469 (1947).
447. See, e.g., Bradford Elec. Light Co. v. Clapper, 286 U.S. 145 (1932).
448. See, e.g., Wells v. Simonds Abrasive Co., 345 U.S. 514 (1953). If the forum has a
shorter statute of limitations than other jurisdictions to protect its courts, it should be able
to reject a suit even when the defendant has no particular claim for solicitude. Cf. Loucks
v. Standard Oil, 224 N.Y. 99, 120 N.E. 198 (1918) (forum court would open its doors to
domestic plaintiff suing domestic defendant on foreign cause of action where granting re-
lief did not offend basic forum public policy). A fortiori, if the proffered law would violate
[Vol. 32:1
ALLSTATE INSURANCE CO. v. HAGUE
law if the particular facts of the case make the policy of forum law
relevant (usually beneficially)4 9 to one of the parties.45 Since the
inputs for the two analyses are different, there is no simple, logical
relationship between them. Thus, Professor Martin's suggestion
that personal judicial jurisdiction be a condition precedent to ap-
plication of forum law does not work under the existing decisions.
Moreover, the practical consequences of such a requirement
also might be unsatisfactory. The Michigan legislature, for exam-
ple, has adopted comparative negligence as the state's rule for
products claims.4 ' With Michigan as the home of the auto indus-
try, the policy of the statute does not seem to be to target manu-
facturers nor to benefit all consumers,452 but rather to assist
injured plaintiffs who might have contributed slightly to their own
injuries.453 Thus, if a plaintiff from a contributory negligence
state were to sue a manufacturer at its Michigan headquarters for
an injury suffered at home, traditionalists would apply the law of
the place of injury.4 54 Professor Martin would bar the use of
Michigan law455 and probably reach the same outcome,456 while
strict interest analysts would apply forum law to what would be an
unprovided-for-case.
It is submitted that there is nothing wrong with using forum
law, even if by default, when the defendant is centered in the fo-
rum. The evil occurs when a nonresident defendant is sufficiently
local public policy, a court has the power to protect itself from taint. Id. at 111, 120 N.E. at
202.
449. Under strict interest analysis, inferring targeting policies should be avoided when
compensatory policies explain a law. See supra notes 332-34 and accompanying text.
450. At least one problem, unsurprisingly, is the unprovided-for-case. It hardly can be
a denial of due process to the defendant to use the defendant's law in the defendant's
forum, yet it is unlikely that the defendant's home will have specific jurisdiction in every
suit against its defendants. Another problem arises in a case like Tooker v. Lopez, 24 N.Y.
2d 569, 249 N.E.2d 394, 301 N.Y.S.2d 519 (1969), discussed at notes supra 322-27 and
accompanying text, in which Michigan surely had specificjurisdiction but could not consti-
tutionally apply its law.
451. MICH. CoMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.2949 (1978).
452. Indeed, in comparison with a jurisdiction following strict liability, this compara-
tive negligence statute could be defendant-protecting in a case involving a nonnegligent
defendant.
453. The policy also did not defeat the interests of foreign plaintiffs. It is believed that
the Michigan legislature, was at least unmindful, if not consciously indifferent to the fate of
foreign consumers.
454. See supra notes 62-84 and accompanying text.
455. With jurisdiction based on domicile rather than specific contacts, Professor Mar-
tin's test would be unmet.
456. If Michigan law could not be applied, then the law of the place of injury might be
all that would be left without reaching for a third law or inventing a law.
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active in the forum so as to be amenable under today's notions of
jurisdiction to suit in the forum on any cause, but the cause in
particular has nothing to do with the forum.457 This situation is
presented by the Mississippi statute of limitations cases.458 The
flaw, however, is not in any general preference for forum law, but
rather in the rules of jurisdiction. Thus, the remedy lies not in
choice of law, but rather in judicial jurisdiction.
B. Current Constraints
Only two types of defendants need fear an adverse choice of
law under strict interest analysis: nonlocal defendants who have
purposely availed themselves of the benefits and protections of a
forum through the conduct of activities related to the litigation,
and nonlocal defendants who have done generally the same
through activities unrelated to the litigation. All other defendants
will have been protected either through judicial jurisdiction or the
presumption in favor of applying forum law. Shaffer v. Heitner459
and Rush v. Savchuk46 ° have eliminated the abuse of quasi-in-rem
jurisdiction. Kulko v. Superior Court46 1 and World- Wide Volk-
swagen v. Woodson462 have refuted any claim of state court juris-
diction based on the forum's concern for the plaintiff. Under strict
interest analysis, local defendants in true conflicts may expect to
enjoy the application of forum law. Abuse would be prevented
further if general activities which did not constitute residence were
457. There is little likelihood of serious abuse when the defendant corporation is ame-
nable only to specific jurisdiction, for the contacts with the forum that support the jurisdic-
tion also are likely to make the local law relevant. This likelihood was the basis for Chief
Justice Stone's conclusion in International Shoe. So too, even Professor Martin's standard
would be satisfied. The case in which the specific facts do not support specific jurisdiction,
but in which the corporate defendant is present, should be distinguished from that case
where the plaintiff is a resident injured out-of-state. Assume, for example, that a Michigan
native purchased a defective tire from Sears while vacationing in California and was in-
jured in Iowa on the way home. After World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444
U.S. 286 (1980), specific jurisdiction would exist only in California. Sears nonetheless
would be amenable to suit in Michigan for its general activities. Assuming that Michigan
law favored the plaintiff, there would be no objection under strict interest analysis to the
application of Michigan law, but the result under Professor Martin's suggested standard
probably would be different. See supra note 442.
458. Moreover, under the Hague plurality's view, the use of the local long-arm statute
for the benefit of a nonresident plaintiff is improper for failing to meet the plurality's re-
quirement of an affirmative forum interest.
459. 433 U.S. 186 (1977).
460. 444 U.S. 320 (1980).
461. 436 U.S. 84 (1978).
462. 444 U.S. 286 (1980).
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no longer a basis for judicial jurisdiction.463 All that remains is
the completion of the consolidation of the theory of judicial juris-
diction. Even so, the Mississippi long-arm cases464 have been re-
solved improperly under current doctrines.
First, consider the issue of timeliness. The use of a statute of
limitations either to bar or to allow suit is an application of forum
law. Although these statutes usually are enacted to protect local
defendants, an unusually long statute of limitations protects plain-
tiffs, presumably local plaintiffs. A nonresident plaintiff, there-
fore, would not support a forum interest in the application of its
longer statute of limitations period. If the typical case, for exam-
ple, is that of a Kansas woman suing a national drug company in
Mississippi after the statute of limitations in every other state in
the union has run,465 then Mississippi has no interest in opening
its courts merely to allow the litigant the benefits of its longer limi-
tations period.466
Moreover, if the purpose of the statute of limitations in the
defendant's home state includes a policy of repose for defendants,
the home state will have an interest. Additionally, if the purpose
of the plaintiffs statute of limitations also were stated clearly to be
to deny the slothful, the plaintiff might even be under a direct,
legal disability. Notwithstanding the smokescreen of the procedu-
ral characterization,467 Mississippi can show no legitimate policy
relevant to a Kansas plaintiff, no matter how unfortunate her loss.
Each of these cases has been a false conflict in which Mississippi
has applied its law which was unsupported by an interest in the
face of another state's relevant policies. Thus, Mississippi was
constitutionally barred from applying its longer limitations period
in favor of a nonlocal plaintiff and at the expense of a nonlocal
defendant. It is only the traditional, procedural characterization
of both the Kansas and Mississippi statutes of limitations which
463. There is a difference between a company doing significant business in a state and a
company being located physically in the state. The former must respond to claims arising
out of specific jurisdiction; the latter also must accept the full impact of the forum's laws.
See National Bellas Hess, Inc. v. Department of Revenue, 386 U.S. 753 (1967) (mail order
company not subject to the impact of forum tax statute).
464. See supra notes 435-37 and accompanying text.
465. See, ag., Steele v. G. D. Searle & Co., 483 F.2d 339 (5th Cir. 1973).
466. Moreover, it is hard to see how Mississippi could have sufficient interest in the
Kansas plaintiff to meet even the Hague plurality's test.
467. But see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 142(2) (1971); RE-
STATEMENT OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 604 (1934).
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has obscured the repeated violations of Home Ins. Co. v. Dick468
by the Mississippi courts.
Similarly, on the issue of whether to grant jurisdiction, Kansas
initially had an interest in hearing suits between its parties, but
because long-arm statutes are enacted to assist local plaintiffs in
bringing suit against nonlocal defendants, Mississippi never had
an interest in appying its long-arm statute for the benefit of a Kan-
sas plaintiff. Until the Kansas statute of limitations ran, however,
there was no conflict; both states would hear the case. The analy-
sis is different after the Kansas statute has run. Kansas has re-
solved any conflict between its domestic policies in favor of the
defendant and therefore has an interest in providing a defense, but
Mississippi still has no interest in either party. The issue of juris-
diction is therefore also a false conffict and under strict interest
analysis, Mississippi again should yield to Kansas. Because the
obligation to provide a forum does not arise unless a state has
jurisdiction over a cause469 and is subject to an impartial statute of
limitations,47 ° Hughes v. Fetter47 does not affect the analysis.
C. Potential Solutions
Because not every case of egregious forum shopping will pres-
ent a false conflict and thereby be constrained by Home Insurance
Co. V. Dick,4 7 2 general jurisdiction must be restricted to the de-
fendant's home base, or following the analogy to diversity juris-
diction,473  to the defendant's home bases.474  Without this
468. 281 U.S. 397 (1930). See supra notes 118-30 and accompanying text for a discus-
sion of Home.
469. Jurisdictional restrictions, however, cannot be used to defeat a class of claims or
claimants. Hughes v. Fetter, 341 U.S. 609, 611 (1951).
470. See Wells v. Simonds Abrasive Co., 345 U.S. 514, 517 (1953).
471. 341 U.S. 609 (1951).
472. 281 U.S. 397 (1930).
473. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c) (1976) provides that for purposes of subject matter jurisdic-
tion, a corporation shall be construed to be a citizen of both its state of incorporation and
its principal place of business. The suggestion here is that a corporation should be re-
garded as a resident of every state'in which it has substantial physical presence.
474. Von Mehren & Trautman, Jurisdiction to Adjudicate: .4 Suggested Analysis, 79
HARV. L. REV. 1121, 1178-79 (1966).
Professor Martin suggests restricting the application of forum law to only those defend-
ants within its specific jurisdiction. See Martin, supra note 440, at 872. This suggestion is
underinclusive. The Hague plurality standard, in contrast, is overinclusive because under
that standard, any defendant within the general jurisdiction of a state is vulnerable. It is
urged instead that only those defendants that are either within the specific jurisdiction of a
forum or quasi-residents should be subject to the appliction of forum law. Professor Mar-
tin and the Hague plurality and dissent use choice of law to constrain overly broad jurisdic-
tional principles. This Article suggests using narrower jurisdictional principles to prevent
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constraint on judicial jurisdiction, the potential for confusion as
desperate plaintiffs seek to bring unprovided-for-cases in forums
lacking interests could discredit strict interest analysis.
Judicial jurisdiction has two necessary elements: power and
fairness. 475 Power can be shown either through domicile, personal
service, or attachment. Fairness can be shown either through
domicile or specific contracts among the forum, the facts, and the
defendant. Fairness also requires a comparison of hardship be-
tween requiring the defendant to defend in the plaintiff's choice of
forum and requiring the plaintiff to travel to the defendant's
home. Since suing the defendant in a third forum minimizes
neither parties' inconvenience, the defendant's inconvenience can-
not be justified by the plaintiffs convenience. Thus, even though
the third forum may have adequate power over the defendant,
perhaps because of property 76 or general activities477 within the
forum, the separate and independently necessary requirement of
fairness is not satisfied. If the choice of the third forum is further
motivated solely for choice of law reasons, the unfairness usually
will be greater.478 In short, it is suggested that jurisdiction based
merely on general contacts is likely to yield unfairness, is unneces-
sary,479 and should be abolished.
In the Mississippi long-arm cases,480 the Kansas defendants
being sued in Mississippi were corporations, but the same problem
can arise for individuals. Individuals perhaps may be amenable
to suit via long-arm statutes because of their general activities
within a forum.48' If so, then individuals need the same protec-
the abuse of a broad preference for forum law. For example, a retailer such as Sears would
be subject to Michigan law not so much because so many of its products are sold in Michi-
gan, but instead because Sears stores anchor so many Michigan shopping malls.
475. Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977), represents power without fairness; World-
Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980), represents fairness without
power. Neither combination is sufficient; both are necessary.
476. See, e.g., Steele v. G. D. Searle & Co., 483 F.2d 339 (5th Cir. 1973).
477. See, e.g., Schreiber v. Allis-Chalmers Corp., 611 F.2d 790 (10th Cir. 1979).
478. The choice of a Minnesota forum in Hague, for example, could not have been
without regard to the content of Minnesota law.
479. The defendant's home is always available as is any other place of significant pres-
ence and often, through specific jurisdiction, the situs of an alleged wrong.
480. See supra notes 435-37 and accompanying text.
481. The Supreme Court has not given a general answer to the question of whether
long-arm statutes which do not rest on consent apply to individuals. The nonresident mo-
torist acts can rest on the state's power to condition driving in the state on consent to suit
arising out of the same activity. In contrast, Kulko v. Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84 (1978),
was decided in favor of the defendant individual on the basis of his not having purposely
availed himself of the benefits and protections of the California forum. Given the recent
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tion described above. Moreover, whether individuals are subject
to long-arm jurisdiction for "doing business" '482 or for "the com-
mission of any tortious act"483 in a state, it is accepted today that
an individual can be sued wherever found by a plaintiff. The clas-
sic, hypothetical case is that of the passenger who is merely chang-
ing planes at Chicago's O'Hare airport when presented with a
summons from an equally out-of-state plaintiff seeking, for
whatever reason, to litigate in a hub city. As with corporations,
jurisdiction based merely on an individual's presence is unfair.4 84
A forum should be required to show both power and fairness. A
purposeful, specific availment of the benefits and protections of a
forum's laws can provide both power and fairness.485  Not only
does the continued existence of jurisdiction over transients
threaten rational treatment of choice of law problems, it poses a
direct threat to the right to travel.486 With domiciliary service al-
ways available and with the potential for local personal service
wherever the cause of action would support a long-arm action
over a similarly situated corporate defendant,487 plaintiffs suing
contractions of state courts' powers to reach out-of-state defendants, see, e.g., World-Wide
Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980); Kulko v. Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84
(1978); Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977), it may not be too much to suggest that
individuals will be amenable to suit only on the bases of domicile and consent.
482. See, e.g., N.Y. Civ. PRAc. LAW § 302(a)(1) (McKinney 1972).
483. See, e.g., id. § 302(a)(2).
484. It has been suggested by students that changing planes at O'Hare is a purposeful
availment of the benefits and protections of Illinois law. The availment of United Airlines
may be purposeful or without alternative, but the choice of Chicago as a hub, however well
judged, is United's. Moreover, transient jurisdiction may be independently unconstitu-
tional as an infringement on the fundamental right of travel. Cf. Crandall v. Nevada, 73
U.S. (6 Wall.) 35 (1868) (striking down for abridgement of right to travel a state tax im-
posed on every person leaving state).
485. Before International Shoe, the two metaphors of consent and presence explained
jurisdiction over foreign corporations. International Shoe can be understood as having
consolidated the metaphors, making it unnecessary to decide which applied. Hanson v.
Denckla, 357 U.S. 235 (1957), can be read as providing the test for the consolidated meta-
phor. If a defendant purposefully has availed itself of the benefits and protections of a
forum's law, then it has consented implicitly to jurisdiction for suits arising out of the
purposeful availment. Id. at 253 (essentiality of purposeful availment by defendant).
486. See Crandall v. Nevada, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 35 (1868).
487. Although long-arm statutes provide no conceptual difficulties when applied to cor-
porations which are legal fictions, the application of a long-arm statute to an individual is
disquieting. See, e.g., Great W. United Corp. v. Kidwell, 577 F.2d 1256 (5th Cir. 1978)
(Texas long-arm statute conferred personal jurisdiction over Idaho state official, who never
left Idaho because offcial enforcement of Idaho statute foreseeably caused compliance ef-
forts in Texas). Thus, it is suggested that personal service on an individual meets the power
requirement and that specific minimum contacts meet the fairness requirement, and that
both are necessary.
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individuals should not be at a loss for a forum due to abolition of
jurisdiction over transients.
Thus, in conclusion, so long as a forum-favoring choice of law
system like strict interest analysis does not operate under an un-
duly expansive system of personal jurisdiction, 88 the presumption
in favor of applying forum law will not unfairly affect defendants.
False conflicts will be decided uniformly. True conflicts will be
decided under forum law. If the defendant has specifically, pur-
posely availed itself of the benefits and protections of the plain-
tiff's forum, that defendant will be subject to forum law. If the
defendant has not sufficiently affiliated itself with the plaintiffs
forum to satisfy traditional notions of fair play and substantial
justice, the plaintiff will have to sue the defendant at home and
likely lose. Unprovided-for-cases usually will be tried in the de-
fendant's forum, resulting in the application of forum law.4 89
Under strict interest analysis, the frequency of true conflicts will
be reduced to the lowest possible rate.490 Thus, although there is
no necessary correlation between judicial jurisdiction and choice
of law, if both are construed narrowly, certainty and uniformity
can be achievable.
If, as suggested in this Article, judicial jurisdiction had been
construed narrowly in Hague, Minnesota might have declined to
hear the case for lack of specific jurisdiction, notwithstanding All-
state's general presence in Minnesota.491 Mrs. Hague would have
been left with a Wisconsin forum4 9z which would have applied
Wisconsin law as written by the Wisconsin legislature, rather than
as the Minnesota Supreme Court misread it.493 Mrs. Hague then
would have received that for which Mr. Hague" had paid, and
much discomfiture could have been avoided.494
488. See, e.g., Rosenthal v. Warren, 475 F.2d 438 (1st Cir. 1973).
489. But see Frummer v. Hilton Hotels, Int'l, Inc., 19 N.Y.2d 533, 227 N.E.2d 851,.281
N.Y.S.2d 41, cert. denied, 389 U.S. 923 (1967), discussed at supra note 309.
490. See supra note 95.
491. If Allstate has so many agents and such a volume ofinsurance in Minnesota that it
is unrealistic to regard it as a mere transient, then it should have to answer any cause,
including ague, in Minnesota. This kind of substantial presence surely would be shown if
Allstate were one of the five largest insurers in Minnesota. See Hill, supra note 434, at 984-
85.
492. There would be no problem with specific jurisdiction in Wisconsin over a casualty
insurance policy sold there to cover a risk principally located there.
493. See supra note 16.
494. Alternatively, Allstate always can be sued in Illinois at its headquarters. The use
of Illinois law would be correct because Minnesota's lack of an interest in the Hagues
presents no reason to displace Illinois law. The Illinois rule was described as the same in
effect as the Wisconsin rule of 1967 applied in Nelson v. Employers Mut. Casualty Co., 63
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CASE WESTERV RESERVE LAW REVIEW
VI. STRICT INTEREST ANALYSIS AND INTERSTATE
DISCRIMINATION
Professors Currie and Kay have suggested that many choice of
law decisions contain the potential for improper discrimination.495
The traditional territorial jurisdiction selecting rules can result in
irrational distinctions among domestic parties, 496 and the modern
policy-based analyses may, if not properly constrained, result in
explicit bias against out-of-state parties.497
The following analysis explores the utilities of and potentials
in the interstate privileges and immunities49 8 and equal protection
clauses 499 for constitutional control of choices of law. As the ap-
plication of due process to choice of law problems may be unfa-
miliar to many students of constitutional law, so too the extension
of equal protection may be novel.
The assumption is that the control of the false conflict and the
apparent conflict by the due process and full faith and credit
clauses is both sound and established by the weight of author-
ity.500 Just as the due process and full faith and credit clauses
implicitly prevent improper discrimination in false conflicts, the
interstate privileges and immunities and equal protection clauses
may buttress the presumption in favor of applying forum law to
further prevent improper discrimination in unprovided-for-cases
and true conflicts.
A. False Conflicts
Strict interest analysis presents no problems of improper dis-
crimination in false conflicts. In the typical false conflict, two lo-
cal parties will be litigating in a local court. The only foreign
factors will be the locations of one or more of the allegedly signifi-
cant events. When the local court applies the local law to a dis-
Wis. 2d 558, 565 n.3, 217 N.W.2d 670, 674 n.3 (1974). Illinois, therefore, would be an
available, but unsatisfactory choice of forum for Mrs. Hague.
495. See generally B. CURRIE, supra note 3, at 445-583.
496. See, e.g., Alabama Great S. R.R. v. Carroll, 97 Ala. 126, 11 So. 803 (1892).
497. See, e.g., Rosenthal v. Warren, 475 F.2d 438 (2d Cir. 1973). The doctrine of
Seider v. Roth, 17 N.Y.2d 111, 216 N.E.2d 312, 269 N.Y.S.2d 99 (1967), was a noteworthy
source of these cases. That door to the forum has been closed. See Rush v. Savchuk, 444
U.S. 320 (1980).
498. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2 provides: "The Citizens of each State shall be entitled to
all Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in the several States."
499. U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV. provides in part, "No State shall... deny to any per-
son within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."
500. See supra notes 348-433.
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pute between two local parties, it will be treating them identically
with all other local parties.
The result could be different if a court continued to follow the
territorialist view. If, regardless of whether the differing laws had
relevant policies, the court distinguished among local parties on
the basis of where their injuries occurred, then completely arbi-
trary and capricious discrimination would occur.50 1 Because the
result under due process has been clear for at least a generation,
the equal protection issue implicit in such a situation has not re-
quired adjudication. Similarly, if in a misguided attempt to treat
foreign parties as natives, a court were to attempt to apply its own
law to a false conflict in which its law lacked any interest,502 due
process503 and full faith and credit5° would provide adequate ba-
ses for preventing it from improperly treating foreign litigants as if
they were natives.
B. Unprovided-for-Cases
Neumeler v. Kuehner505 is the paradigmatic unprovided-for-
case. An Ontario passenger was killed in Ontario through the al-
leged ordinary negligence of his New York host-driver. Under
the law of Ontario, recovery by the guest would require a showing
of at least gross negligence. Under New York law, ordinary negli-
gence would suffice to support recovery. Judge Fuld's rules5 0 6 re-
stricted the fruits of interest analysis to false conflicts and left both
501. See B. CURRIE, supra note 3, at 575-79.
502. See, eg., Milkovich v. Saari, 295 Minn. 155, 203 N.W.2d 408 (1973).
503. See, e.g., Home Ins. Co. v. Dick, 281 U.S. 397 (1936).
504. See, e.g., John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Yates, 299 U.S. 178 (1936).
505. 31 N.Y.2d 121, 286 N.E.2d 454, 335 N.Y.S.2d 64 (1972).
506. 1. When the guest-passenger and the host-driver are domiciled in the same
state, and the car is there registered, the law of that state should control and deter-
mine the standard of care which the host owes to his guest.
2. When the driver's conduct occurred in the state of his domicile and that state
does not cast him in liability for that conduct, he should not be held liable by
reason of the fact that liabilty would be imposed upon him under the tort law of
the state of the victim's domicile. Conversely, when the guest was injured in the
state of his own domicile and its law permits recovery, the driver who has come
into that state should not-in the absence of special circumstances-be permitted
to interpose the law of his state as a defense.
3. In other situations, when the passenger and the driver are domiciled in different
states, the rule is necessarily less categorical. Normally, the applicable rule of
decision will be that of the state where the accident occurred but not if it can be
shown that displacing that normally applicable rule will advance the relevant
substantive law purposes without impairing the smooth working of the multi-state
system or producing great uncertainty for litigants.
Id. at 128, 286 N.E.2d at 457-58, 335 N.Y.S.2d at 70 (quoting Tooker v. Lopez, 24 N.Y.2d
569, 585, 249 N.E.2d 394, 404, 301 N.Y.S.2d 519, 532 (1969) (concurring opinion)).
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true conflicts and unprovided-for-cases to territorial principles.10 7
With New York law favoring guest-plaintiffs (there being no sug-
gestion that it targeted driver-defendants), New York lacked an
interest. Similarly, with Ontario law protecting drivers and the
driver coming from New York, Ontario also lacked an interest in
the case. Whereas strict interest analysis would apply New York
forum law to this unprovided-for-case, the court of appeals ap-
plied the Ontario law of the place of injury to deny the plaintiff
recovery.
If the plaintiff had been from New York, all but the most tena-
cious territorialist would expect the law of New York to control
the dispute between coresidents, regardless of the situs of the in-
jury. Thus, the plaintiffs loss of recovery in the actual case is a
direct consequence of his residency or citizenship, 0 8 thereby rais-
ing concerns over denial of equal protection and interstate privi-
leges and immunities which may compel a result contrary to
Neumeier.
Because of Neumeier's international elements, it will be useful
to first consider the application of the privileges and immunities
clause to the case of a Delaware plaintiff against a New York de-
fendant. The earliest interpretation of the interstate privileges andimmunities clause injected natural rights into the clause and also
confined them to "those privileges and immunities which are, in
their nature, fundamental; which belong, of right, to the citizens of
all free governments; and which have at all times been enjoyed by
the citizens of the several states which compose this Union from
the time of their becoming free, independent, and sovereign."50 9
Thus, if the claim involved one of the few protected privileges,
immunities, or rights, the state surely would lose, but otherwise
the state surely would win.
The more recent interpretations, however, have both widened
the range of the foreign state party's protected interests and legiti-
mized an actual inquiry into the state's justifications for the ac-
507. Rule one allocates most false conflicts to the law of the coresidence. Rule two
allocates most true conflicts to the law of the situs. Rule three allocates most unprovided-
for-cases to the law of the situs. The rules are especially inappropriate when parties from
different states have an accident in a third state. See supra note 331.
508. When Ontario law is not read to target Ontario plaintiffs, the potential failure to
enjoy New York law is a consequence of not being from New York rather than of being
from Ontario. Cf. Wood Bros. Homes, Inc. v. Walker Adjustment Bureau, 198 Colo. 444,
601 P.2d 1369 (1979).
509. Corfield v. Coryell, 6 F. Cas. 546, 551-52 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823) (state law prohibit-
ing nonresidents from raking state oyster beds constitutional).
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tion.510 Consequently, the Supreme Court has held that article
IV, section two "bar[s] discrimination against citizens of other
States where there is no substantial reason for the discrimination
beyond the mere fact that they are citizens of the other States.-"'
To deny a Delaware plaintiff the benefit of New York law, which
a New York plaintiff would receive in a suit against a New York
defendant, merely because of the plaintiffs Delaware affiliation,
would therefore violate the interstate privileges and immunities
clause. Strict interest analysis' presumption of the applicability of
forum law in the unprovided-for-case, which treats out-of-state
plaintiffs and natives equally, is consistent, therefpre, with the in-
terstate privileges and immunities clause. If, however, both plain-'
tiff and defendant were from Delaware, but nonetheless litigating
in New York, then the due process and full faith and credit
clauses would command New York not to meddle in the domestic
affairs of Delaware and would provide a "substantial reason" for
denying a Delaware plaintiff the recovery he or she would enjoy if
a New York plaintiff.5"2
In Neumeier, Ontario plaintiff is not within the protections of
article IV, section two, but is within the equal protection clause
and therefore may enjoy even greater protection." 3 Nonetheless,
even if the corresponding Ontario false conflict somehow were
heard in New York,5" 4 due process should provide a sufficiently
compelling reason not to apply New York law.515
510. See L. TRIBE, supra note 391, § 6-33. Although Baldwin v. Fish & Game Comm'n,
436 U.S. 371 (1978), might appear to be a partial retreat toward Co ieid, the conservation
of ferae naturae has been a consistent theme in the privileges and immunities cases which
need not affect its application to choice of law decisions. See L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CON-
STITUTIONAL LAW 40 (1979 supplement).
511. Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385, 396 (1948).
512. Contra Milkovich v. Saari, 295 Minn. 155, 203 N.W.2d 408 (1973).
513. Compare In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717 (1973) (classification based on alienage in-
herently suspect and, therefore, subject to close judicial scrutiny) with Ambach v. Norwick,
441 U.S. 68 (1979) (special significance of citizenship to governmental entities permits a
school system to justify classification based on alienage by showing a rational basis for the
classification). That alienage is a classification requiring strict scrutiny is well accepted,
although not universally. Justice Rehnquist has suggested that the fourteenth amendments
protections were aimed only at racial minorities, W. LOCKHART, Y. KAMISAR & J.
CHOPER, CONsTrrurIoNAL LAW 1389 (5th ed. 1980). Even if alienage or citizenship in
another state provide no special protection from local discrimination per se, the view here
is that any difference in result which rests upon factors unrelated to actual relevant state
policies must fall as irrational under any form of actual review.
514. See, e.g., Arbuthnot v. Allbright, 35 App. Div. 2d 315, 316 N.Y.S.2d 391 (1970).
515. B. CuRuuE, supra note 3, at 539-40. Consider the scenario of a New York defend-
ant traveling to Delaware to seek a declaration of no liability under Delaware's less gener-
ous law. Although some might find the potential for races to the opposing parties'
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The soundest objection to the compulsory use of forum law in
the unprovided-for-case arises when the defendant's connection
with the forum is trivial, as when service of the defendant has
been achieved based only on either transient or, as in Hague, gen-
eral jurisdiction. To have denied Mrs. Hague the benefit of the
Minnesota stacking rule when Wisconsin had no concrete interest
in protecting Allstate would have discriminated against her for
"no substantial reason." But if Allstate were not essentially as ac-
tive in Minnesota as would be a "native" insurance company,1 6
the result in Hague still would not be altogether satisfactory.
If jurisdiction instead were based only on either the defend-
ant's basic, long-term affiliation with the forum51 or the defend-
ant's specific, litigation related activities within the forum, no
harm would follow from "saddling" the defendant with what then
would be its own law. Unprovided-for-cases would be heard al-
most exclusively in the defendant's home court,5 18 where the de-
fendant actually might have had some opportunity through the
representational political process to exert influence over the con-
tent of the law to be applied. With the evil a consequence of
overly expansive jurisdiction, the remedy should be a limitation of
judicial jurisdiction and not the application of arbitrary constitu-
tional constraints on choice of law.
C. True Conflicts
A New York plaintiff-passenger suing an Ontario defendant-
driver in a guest act case in New York can claim that any failure
of the New York courts to apply New York law would amount to
discrimination. Other New York plaintiffs suing New York de-
fendants surely would receive the benefits of the application of
New York law. Currie and Kay asked whether use of the law of
the Ontario place of injury in such a case would deny the plaintiff
equal protection of the law. 19 Even as a definitive answer was
courthouses disturbing, if not perverse, neither native can object properly to the application
of his or her own law when no other law has an interest.
516. But if Allstate were much a part of Minnesota, then there would be no hesitation
in treating it like any other native. Just as the national policy in favor of commerce re-
quires doors to be open to foreign entrepreneurs, it also requires them to compete fairly by
stepping in all the way. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945) (out-of-
state manufacturer must pay unemployment tax on local sales representatives).
517. This requirement may have been met by Allstate in Minnesota.
518. For Allstate, the home courts certainly would include Illinois and possibly, with
respect to the Hagues, Wisconsin as well.
519. B. CURRIE, supra note 3, at 454.
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unavailable in 1961 when Currie and Kay posed the question, it is
now beyond the scope of this Article. Nonetheless, these sugges-
tions should at least be considered.
Although discrimination on the basis of one's opponent or
place of injury does not rest on any invidious classification, 520 it
does potentially threaten a fundamental right.5 21 The voting
rights522 and apportionment 23 cases recognized the right to par-
ticipate in the political and legislative processes. 24 Thus, it would
seem that protection for the resident's enjoyment of the fruits of
the legislative process would be necessary to make the right to
participate fully meaningful. To deny a New York plaintiff the
benefit of New York law merely because an Ontario defendant
injured him or her in Ontario would deny the New York plaintiff
the benefit of the New York legislative process and make worth-
less prior opportunities to participate in the political life of the
state. Before denying the fruits of participation in the New York
political process, New York should be required to adduce a com-
pelling state interest-a difficult, if not impossible, burden on
these facts.525
The defendant, who is away from home in a true conflict, how-
ever, finds no protection in either the equal protection clause or
the interstate privileges and immunities clause. Both clauses re-
quire treating the non-native as a native. That treatment, how-
ever, is exactly the result the foreign defendant in a true conflict
seeks to avoid.
The foregoing analysis may have limited applicability, how-
ever, for under the most recent cases 526 and the jurisdictional prin-
520. Cf. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1966) (racial discrimination).
521. Cf. Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971) (access to courts).
522. E.g., Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89 (1965).
523. Eg., Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
524. The author is indebted to his colleague, Jim O'Fallon, for this notion. Professor
O'Fallon is, of course, free from any responsibility for its use.
525. Except for assuming that strict scrutiny still is triggered by invidious classifications
or abridgements of fundamental rights, neither assessments of nor assumptions about
mainstream equal protection analysis are offered herein. Even if the connection between
the making and the application of law is too tenuous to support strict scrutiny, it is not clear
that territorialism could withstand actual review today. This latter point, however, is far
less certain than the failure of territorialism to pass strict scrutiny. If the review is not via
strict scrutiny, the standards may range from very deferential to the state legislature, see,
ag., Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61 (1911), to an actual inquiry into
purpose or alternatives. See, eg., Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
526. E.g., World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980); Kulko v.
Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84 (1978); Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977).
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ciples urged above,5 27 it may be difficult for New York guests
injured in Ontario to sue their allegedly negligent Ontario hosts in
the courts of New York. If the defendant generally is amenable to
process in New York, he or she is probably not exclusively an
Ontario defendant. Thus, only Ontario defendants brought
before New York courts because of a purposeful availment of the
benefits and protections of New York laws which apply to the par-
ticular facts of the case at hand need fear New York law. Such
cases do not present the specter of "unfair surprise."
Another species of true conflicts may be less affected by the
proposed narrower jurisdictional standard. If a manufacturer or
insurer has distributed the identical product line in the forum
which provides the basis for the litigation, then the fact that the
particular item which elicited complaints was not distributed
within the forum should not impair jurisdiction.5 28 Thus, in
World- Wide Volkswagen ,529 because Volkswagen sold Audis in
Oklahoma, Volkswagen had to respond to suit in Oklahoma even
though the particular vehicle had been sold in New York.
Whether such jurisdiction represents a vestige of general corpo-
rate jurisdiction or a broad reading of specific contacts is beyond
this Article's scope; the result appears to be in accord with intui-
tive fairness and not foreclosed by precedent. Moreover, some
businesses may be so active within the forum that to regard them
as nonlocal would ignore reality. Instead of true conflicts, such
defendants would generate only false conflicts.
Most unprovided-for-cases and many true conflicts will be
brought in the home state of the defendant, where the presump-
tion of forum law will provide application of the law of the de-
fendant. This application will redound to the defendant's benefit
in a true conflict and to his or her detriment in the unprovided-
for-case. The latter result flows directly from both equal protec-
tion and interstate privileges and immunities. The former result is
a plausible consequence of an application of the equal protection
clause. If the defendant has been active sufficiently in the plain-
tiff's forum, then equal protection again supports the application
of forum law, but to the benefit of the plaintiff. False conflicts
should almost always be litigated at the parties' coresidence under
their mutually applicable law. Regardless of the forum, due pro-
527. See supra notes 434-94 and accompanying text.
528. See, e.g., Clay v. Sun Ins. Office, Ltd., 377 U.S. 179 (1964).
529. 444 U.S. 286 (1980).
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cess and full faith and credit will require the use of only the inter-
ested law in a false conflict.
VII. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
Although choice of law, constitutional constraints on choice of
law, and judicial jurisdiction have been considered to be separate
issues, their intersection in conflicts cases is unavoidable. The ap-
parent virtues and evils of the various explanations of each issue
can be affected greatly by an understanding of the other issues.
Consequently, doctrinal difficulties associated with one of these
issues have often indirectly affected the debates and understand-
ings of the others. This Article has argued that a synthesis of these
issues not only eliminates most of these difficulties, but also sim-
plifies the application of the doctrines to actual cases. The starting
point for analysis has been Currie's interest analysis. Two modifi-
cations of Currie's analysis have been offered. First, state interests
should be construed strictly for choice of law purposes. If these
interests are construed in this manner, then state interests for
choice of law and for the purpose of constitutional controls on
choice of law can be measured identically. Second, if the power of
state courts over both corporations which have only minimal con-
tacts unrelated to the litigation, and over transient individuals also
is construed strictly, many of the most difficult problems of choice
of law will be ameliorated. The following statements summarize
the method advocated:
1. The law of the forum is rebuttably presumed to apply;
2. A state has an interest in the resolution of an issue if and
only if it has both a relevant policy and a party toward whom that
policy is clearly directed; and
3. Due process is denied by a choice of law if and only if the
law of a state lacking an interest is applied to the exclusion of the
law of another state which has an interest.
These three statements are sufficient to provide a satisfactory
choice of law system. Additionally, however, this Article urges
that:
4. Interstate privileges and immunities and equal protection
require application of forum law in unprovided-for-cases.
5. Equal protection requires application of forum law in true
conflicts.
Finally, this Article urges that a forum favoring a choice of
law system will be more attractive if the fairness component of the
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requirements for judicial jurisdiction is recognized to limit juris-
diction not related to the forum so that:
6. Transient jurisdiction over individuals in litigation with no
relationship to the forum is forbidden; and
7. Jurisdiction over nonindividuals is not allowed in cases in
which the defendant neither has a strong primary affiliation with
the forum nor contacts relevant to the litigation sufficient to sup-
port specific personal jurisdiction.
Allstate Insurance Co. v. Hague53° provides an excellent vehi-
cle for analysis: Under current jurisdictional doctrines, the case
was properly decided, even though improperly described. As an
unprovided-for-case under strict interest analysis, there was no
reason not to apply the law of the Minnesota forum. By adding
the suggestions for narrowing jurisdiction, the dispositive issue in
Hague would have become whether Allstate was sufficiently affili-
ated with Minnesota for Minnesota to have been fairly considered
one of its homes. If so, then the result is correct; if not, then Mrs.
Hague's forums would have been limited to Wisconsin via specific
jurisdiction or Illinois via general jurisdiction. The choice of Wis-
consin might have yielded the same result after a more accurate
reading of the Wisconsin statute. The choice of an Illinois forum
would have led to the application of Illinois law which is allegedly
the same as Wisconsin's law.
For over a generation, the Supreme Court's choice of law deci-
sions have exhibited a basic consistency with these articulated
principles. When examined retrospectively, these decisions are
consistent with the proffered due process test and show only three
counter-examples to the rebuttable presumption in favor of apply-
ing forum law. 'Even the most recent of these counter-examples is
over forty years old. In contrast, the principle articulated by the
Hague plurality is contradicted by two of the Court's more recent
choice of law cases, including, according to an equal number of
Justices, Hague itself.
If state interests and state jurisdiction are both construed nar-
rowly, then simplicity, predictability, and basic fairness are
achievable. Moreover, these goals can be met without the invoca-
tion of an extra-constitutional super law. The time has come for
the strict analysis of interests.
530. 449 U.S. 309 (1981).
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